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 Abstract 
 
 
Water sector reform programmes in Ghana, including the National Com-
munity Water and Sanitation Programme (NCWSP), have sought to 
achieve accelerated and equitable delivery of improved water facilities to 
small towns and rural communities, while at the same time ensuring sus-
tainable facility management. This achievement was to be delivered within 
the framework of the Government of Ghana’s decentralisation agenda. 
However, implementation of these reforms has not led to the desired out-
comes and targets. Implementation has faltered in part because the re-
forms have conflicted with practices within the communities implement-
ing these programmes. Indeed, the policymakers designing the 
institutional arrangements under the NCWSP hardly took these local con-
texts into account.  
The literature identifies different sets of factors by which to understand 
the underlying mechanisms and processes that account for institutional 
change. Three of these are bricolage, translation and institutional entre-
preneurship. In short, to resolve conflicts that arise from the incompati-
bility of externally given water policies with local practices, institutional 
entrepreneurs use translation and bricolage to reconcile the given policies 
with existing practices. 
The current study adopts Mollinga and Gondhalekar’s (2014) stepwise 
small-N/medium-N qualitative comparative analysis approach to water 
research to specify the structures and mechanisms that explain institu-
tional change. Application of this methodology helps us to understand 
what factors account for differences between given policies and actual 
practices in implementation, both across and within a variety of study 
cases. Through an in-depth exploration of six case studies in three regions 
of Ghana, this research investigates processes of institutional change and 
local perceptions of the quality of water services and the sustainability of 
small town water supply systems. Both quantitative and qualitative 
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methods are used, including original survey research (n=673), focus group 
discussions, in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation and oral histories. 
Specifically, this study (i) examines contextual factors which constrain 
or enable institutional change; (ii) explains how institutional changes man-
ifest in actual practices and what resources actors employ to frustrate or 
promote institutional change; (iii) analyses the motivating factors and logic 
behind actors’ capacity to emerge as institutional entrepreneurs and 
change institutional arrangements; and (iv) explores ways in which the 
concepts of bricolage, translation and institutional entrepreneurship con-
tribute to our understanding of institutional change.  
Findings from the case studies demonstrate that institutional entrepre-
neurs, through processes of bricolage and translation, recombine and 
modify existing institutional principles and practices. With these recom-
bined institutions and practices, change agents are able to address some of 
the challenges that emerge in the process of transferring centrally designed 
water policies to participating communities.  
The research finds that the local social and institutional context con-
strains actors’ understanding, interpretation and implementation of insti-
tutional change in the water sector. Yet, the constraining factors also ena-
ble institutional entrepreneurs to find solutions to pressures exerted by 
exogenous factors such as technological developments, economic condi-
tions, shifts in state policies and power struggles. This has led to variation 
in how the NCWSP has been implemented across different communities 
in Ghana. 
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Processen van institutionele verandering:  
watervoorzieningssystemen in kleine steden in Ghana 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
Het doel van programma's voor de hervorming van de watersector in 
Ghana, met inbegrip van het National Community Water and Sanitation 
Programme (NCWSP; een nationaal programma voor water en sanitaire 
voorzieningen), is een versnelde en rechtvaardige levering van verbeterde 
watervoorzieningen aan kleine steden en plattelandsgemeenschappen, 
terwijl tegelijkertijd een duurzaam beheer van de voorzieningen wordt 
gewaarborgd. Dit resultaat moest worden bereikt binnen de decentrali-
satieagenda van de Ghanese regering. De uitvoering van deze hervormi-
ngen heeft echter niet tot de gewenste resultaten en streefdoelen geleid. 
De uitvoering is deels mislukt omdat de hervormingen in botsing kwamen 
met de gebruiken van de gemeenschappen die deze programma's 
uitvoeren. De beleidsmakers die de institutionele opzet van het NCWSP 
hebben uitgewerkt, hielden inderdaad nauwelijks rekening met de lokale 
context.  
In de literatuur worden verschillende groepen factoren aangewezen om 
de mechanismen en processen achter institutionele verandering te 
begrijpen. Drie daarvan zijn ‘in elkaar zetten', vertaling en institutioneel 
ondernemerschap. Om conflicten op te lossen die voortvloeien uit de 
onverenigbaarheid van een extern opgelegd waterbeleid met de lokale 
gebruiken, vertalen institutionele ondernemers dus diverse elementen en 
zetten ze die in elkaar. Zo brengen zij het gevoerde beleid in overeenstem-
ming met de bestaande praktijken. 
In dit onderzoek wordt gebruikgemaakt van de stapsgewijze kleine-
N/medium-N kwalitatieve vergelijkende analyse van wateronderzoek van 
Mollinga en Gondhalekar (2014) om de structuren en mechanismen bloot 
te leggen die institutionele verandering verklaren. Toepassing van deze 
methodologie biedt inzicht in de factoren die de verschillen verklaren 
tussen het gevoerde beleid en de daadwerkelijke uitvoering, zowel tussen 
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als binnen diverse onderzoekscasussen. Voor dit onderzoek zijn zes 
casestudies in drie regio's van Ghana uitgebreid bestudeerd. Op deze 
manier worden processen van institutionele verandering en lokale 
percepties van de kwaliteit van de watervoorziening en de duurzaamheid 
van de watervoorzieningssystemen in kleine steden onderzocht. Er zijn 
zowel kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve methoden gebruikt, waaronder survey 
onderzoek (n=673), focusgroepsdiscussies, diepte-interviews, semi-
gestructureerde interviews, participerende observatie en oral history. 
In het bijzonder is dit onderzoek gericht op: (i) de contextuele factoren 
die institutionele verandering beperken of mogelijk maken; (ii) het 
verklaren van hoe institutionele veranderingen in de praktijk tot uiting 
komen en welke middelen actoren inzetten om institutionele verandering 
te frustreren of te bevorderen; (iii) een analyse van de motiverende 
factoren en de logica achter het vermogen van actoren om zich te 
ontpoppen tot institutionele ondernemers en om institutionele regelingen 
te veranderen; en (iv) de manieren waarop de concepten ‘in elkaar zetten’, 
vertaling en institutioneel ondernemerschap bijdragen aan het inzicht in 
institutionele verandering.  
Uit de resultaten van de casestudy's blijkt dat institutionele onder-
nemers door middel van in elkaar zetten en vertalen bestaande institu-
tionele principes en praktijken opnieuw combineren en aanpassen. Met 
deze gerecombineerde instellingen en praktijken zijn actoren die verande-
ring brengen in staat om uitdagingen aan te pakken die zich voordoen bij 
het invoeren van centraal ontworpen waterbeleid bij de deelnemende 
gemeenschappen.  
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de lokale sociale en institutionele context 
het begrip, de interpretatie en de implementatie van institutionele 
verandering in de watersector beperkt. De beperkende factoren stellen 
institutionele ondernemers echter ook in staat om oplossingen te vinden 
voor de druk die ontstaat door exogene factoren zoals technologische ont-
wikkelingen, economische omstandigheden, verschuivingen in het 
overheidsbeleid en machtsstrijd. Hierdoor bestaan er verschillen tussen 
gemeenschappen in Ghana in de wijze waarop het NCWSP is geïmple-
menteerd. 
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1 
Social and Institutional Context: 
Drivers for Institutional Change  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Small town and rural communities1 are least likely to have a safe and reli-
able water supply. This has long been a major concern of the international 
development community. Thus, 1981-1990 was declared the International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD), aimed at has-
tening provision of safe drinking water facilities throughout the world. 
Continuing that effort, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in-
cluded a target related to water. This prioritised water sector development 
for the benefit of all developing country citizens. Currently, the Sustaina-
ble Development Goals (SDGs) uphold the importance of expanding uni-
versal access to water services, alongside quality improvement and sustain-
ing service levels.  
These international initiatives have been central in propelling institu-
tional reforms of small town and rural water sectors worldwide. As part 
of these institutional reforms, many countries have decentralised water 
provision to sub-national government levels (Herrera and Post 2014, Car-
litz 2017). These reforms have often adopted a community management 
or demand-responsive approach as their default means of ensuring ade-
quate rural water supplies (Moriarty et al. 2013: 331). These approaches 
hold that state intervention should be reduced, water should be perceived 
as a human right and an economic good, and that “people first” and em-
powerment goals should be pursued (Harvey and Reed 2006). Evidence 
suggests that these reforms did lead to an increase in new water infrastruc-
ture in rural areas and increased water supply coverage rates (Lockwood 
and Smits 2011: 11). 
Ghana is a case in point. Institutional reforms in small town and rural 
water sectors implemented by the Government of Ghana and interna-
tional organisations have sought to ameliorate years of low coverage and 
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unsustainability of existing water facilities (Karikari 1996, Fuest 2006). 
These efforts led to development of Ghana’s National Community Water 
and Sanitation Programme (NCWSP). The NCWSP was implemented as 
part of a government decentralisation agenda and promulgated principles 
of the community management and demand-responsive approaches. In-
stitutional arrangements under the NCWSP required communities (i) to 
contribute 5% of the investment cost of water supply infrastructure; (ii) to 
pay tariffs for water system operation and maintenance; and (iii) to form 
management groups – called water sanitation and management teams – to 
assume day-to-day responsibility for the water system (CWSA 2014b, 
2008). 
Decades into the implementation of these reforms, however, the re-
sults are disappointing. A report by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation 
(JMP) states that worldwide 83% of people living in rural areas remained 
without access to safe and reliable drinking water (WHO and UNICEF 
2013). Most of the water supply systems constructed over the past decades 
experience frequent breakdowns, forcing residents to revert to unwhole-
some sources. A large share of the world's population still draws water 
from precarious sources (Lockwood and Smits 2011). Moreover, increases 
in population, rapid urbanisation and migration have further raised de-
mand for water, widening the gap between those with access to water and 
those without (WHO and UNICEF 2013).  
The majority of the water systems provided over the past decades con-
tinue to underperform. Studies have attributed the abysmal performance 
of rural water sectors to the lack of technical skills and capacity, incon-
sistency of policy guidelines, lack of information and knowledge about the 
water reforms, and lack of commitment and support from state actors 
(Eguavoen and Youkhana 2008, Nyarko 2007, Pilgrim et al. 2004a, Fuest 
2006, Lockwood and Smits 2011). A number of studies conclude that the 
problems confronting the water sector are due to policymakers’ failure to 
take beneficiaries’ local social and institutional context into consideration 
(Cleaver et al. 2014, Andrews 2013). Indeed, often policymakers have fo-
cused on the regulative elements of institutions, ignoring or taking for 
granted the normative and cultural-cognitive elements embedded within 
social structures. However, these latter can constrain local actors’ 
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capacities to implement institutional reforms. This partly accounts for the 
slow progress of institutional change2 in small town and rural water sec-
tors.  
Structuralist explanations in general have ignored the role of actor 
agency in the slow progress of institutional changes in small town and rural 
water sectors. In Ghana, too, actor agency has been overlooked. Yet, ac-
counting for agency can enable us to better understand how local water 
actors define their problems and interests, and the practices they adopt to 
resist or embrace institutional change.  
In the policy implementation scholarship, different institutional set-
tings and structures are said to account for the variation between policies 
as centrally designed and those actually implemented (Matland 1995: 148). 
Actors’ lack of capacity to implement policies as designed has been at-
tributed to institutional factors and lack of enforcement mechanisms. Oth-
ers focus less on endogenous factors and actor agency, proposing a con-
straints-based explanation that emphasises exogenous factors. Some 
scholars have argued that the processes through which institutions enable 
and constrain are not specified in the analysis of institutions (Campbell 
2004, North 1990, Campbell and Lindberg 1990). This is considered a ma-
jor weakness in the work of the institutionalists (Campbell 1997, 2004: 62; 
Bendor et al. 2001: 188; DiMaggio 1988: 10; Skocpol 1984: 17).  
Factoring actor agency into the analysis of institutions is crucial to un-
derstand how institutions emerge, change and are sustained. Nonetheless, 
little attention has been given to the issue of actors and their agency, which 
has been a major gap in the study of institutional change (e.g., Hay 2002, 
McAnulla 2005, Giddens 1979). By factoring actor agency into analyses of 
institutions, we are able to understand how actors define their problems 
and interests, and how they develop the ideas that inform the choices they 
make among alternative institutional arrangements. This is important to 
understand the mechanisms or processes by which institutions change 
(e.g., North 1990, Campbell and Lindberg 1990).  
The current research contributes to the debate within institutionalist 
theory on how institutions change. Specifically, it seeks to understand the 
institutionalisation of small town and rural water reforms by investigating 
implementation of Ghana’s National Community Water and Sanitation 
Programme (NCWSP). A better understanding of this centrally designed 
reform will advance our knowledge of processes of institutional change.3 
In particular, I examine institutional factors that have driven actors to 
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resist and modify institutional arrangements in implementation of Ghana’s 
NCWSP.  
This study is not about policy success or failure; nor does it delve into 
issues of NCWSP sustainability and its impact on users. Furthermore, this 
research does not seek to provide an international or national perspective 
on how a Ghanaian small town water reform programme was generated, 
including interactions between the central government and international 
actors such as donors and NGOs. Although this study’s analysis occasion-
ally refers to the water literature, its focus is on how local water actors 
have implemented the NCWSP. Thus, I look at the reasons behind actors’ 
actions in resisting, embracing and possibly modifying new institutional 
arrangements in rural water supply. I employ three key concepts – trans-
lation, bricolage and institutional entrepreneurship – to explain how local 
actors interpreted the NCWSP and adapted local institutions and practices 
to implement the NCWSP and the role of institutional entrepreneurs 
herein. I then use the empirical findings to expand on theories of institu-
tional change.  
1.2 Objectives  
The objectives of this study are four: 
▪ to examine contextual factors that constrain or enable institu-
tional change 
▪ to explain how institutional changes occur in actual practice and 
what resources are employed to frustrate or promote institutional 
change  
▪ to analyse the motivating factors and logic behind actors’ capaci-
ties to emerge as institutional entrepreneurs and change institu-
tional arrangements 
▪ to explore ways in which the concepts of bricolage, translation 
and institutional entrepreneurship might contribute to under-
standing processes of institutional change 
1.3 Specific questions  
Four research questions were derived based on the research objectives 
mentioned above:  
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▪ What contextual differences explain variations in the implementa-
tion of the NCWSP? 
▪ What practices have implementing actors engaged in to find solu-
tions to pressure for institutional and technological change? 
▪ In what ways have institutional entrepreneurs engaged in institu-
tional change, and what were their motivations for changing institu-
tional arrangements under the NCWSP?  
▪ How can we account for the motivations and logic behind the prac-
tices and actions that institutional entrepreneurs ultimately em-
ployed?  
1.4 Significance of the study 
This study provides an exciting opportunity to advance understanding of 
processes of institutional change. Its main contribution is to empirically 
set in place a structured understanding of the institutionalisation of reform 
processes related to small town water supply in Ghana. The empirical find-
ings will contribute to the ongoing debate among policy implementation 
scholars on what factors drive local actors to resist policy changes and 
what circumstances stimulate actors to embrace changes. By focusing on 
actor agency, I investigate the role that institutional factors and actors’ ac-
cess to resources have played in shaping implementation of the NCWSP. 
Understanding actor agency is crucial to comprehend processes of insti-
tutional modification and change. Agency, as used in the current research, 
refers to the capacity of actors to shape their environment. 
Secondly, my focus on actor agency advances understanding of how 
actors define their interests and problems, and how existing institutions 
can enable actors to mobilise resources. The investigation of actor agency 
will allow us to better understand actors’ choices and the practices they 
adopt to modify central government policies.  
Ultimately, this research will contribute to scholarship on why policy 
or institutional change appears in a path-dependent and evolutionary man-
ner. The results of this study support the idea that differences in imple-
mentation of institutional reforms are often triggered by pressure for 
change and influenced by context-related factors such as physical charac-
teristics, the commitment and support of implementing actors, infor-
mation availability, knowledge of the institutional reforms, technical and 
capacity gaps between implementers, and the role of institutions (both 
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community-led and state-led). In addition, the ideological stance of actors 
and their interpretations and understandings of their problems, and the 
kinds of institutions available to them, provide a link to the kinds of solu-
tions or institutional arrangements that are locally crafted. The extent to 
which an institution will change also depends to a large extent on the avail-
ability of institutional entrepreneurs who take the initiative to make 
changes.  
1.5 Research approach  
This research adopts the stepwise small-N/medium-N qualitative com-
parative analysis approach to water research described by Mollinga and 
Gondhalekar (2014). This methodology was chosen, first, to bring out fac-
tors that can explain the diversity found in implementation of water re-
forms under the NCWSP in Ghana. Acknowledging and investigating this 
diversity can lead to a better understanding of why implementation of the 
programme differed across and within communities. Secondly, the meth-
odology enables us to understand the logic and motivation that informed 
implementing actors’ preferences, choices and actions. This advances 
knowledge and understanding of processes of institutional change. A third 
reason for choosing the stepwise small-N/medium-N qualitative compar-
ative analysis approach is to avoid overgeneralisation and over-contextu-
alisation of the study results. 
This research uses a case study approach. A case study, according to 
Yin (2009: 18), “is an empirical inquiry, which investigates the contempo-
rary phenomenon in-depth, and within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. 
This implies that case studies normally deal with phenomena that have 
multiple results. Moreover, case studies use different data collection tech-
niques, which rely on a predetermined theoretical proposition.  
The methodological paths of case selection for this study represent 
“most similar” and “most different” typologies (Gerring 2007). Use of 
these typologies provides insight into structured combinational factors 
likely to yield particular outcomes, providing avenues towards understand-
ing processes of institutional change and consequences of water reforms. 
Meaningful comparisons require factors held in common by all cases. By 
comparing factors across and within cases, we identify reasons for the 
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similarities and differences to explain diversity in policy implementation 
and practices. 
The cases will be analysed across and within the two typologies of 
“most similar” and “most different” that the cases represent. Through this 
approach, the study limits the tendency of attributing different causality to 
events. My aim in adopting this approach was to understand diversity of 
local responses and uncover variation in implementation dynamics.  
Map 1.1  
Map of Ghana with study cases  
Note: As at the time the data was collected, Ghana had 10 administrative regions.  
Currently the number of regions has increased from 10 to 16 in December 2018. 
 
I selected six (6) cases from three regions of Ghana: the Central, 
Ashanti, and Northern regions. The topographical and physical conditions 
of each region informed their selection. That is, the coastal areas (central) 
are represented by cases 1 and 2, forest areas (Ashanti) are represented by 
cases 3 and 4, and dry areas (Northern) are represented by cases 5 and 6 
(map 1.1).  
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Table 1.1 
Characteristics of the water supply systems of the six selected cases 
Causal variables  Case 1a Case 1b Case 2 Case 3 
Population of  
community a 
2,012 1,649 2,491 13,800 b 
Size of water system  30m³ steel tank 1a and 1b share 
a water facility 
30 m³ steel tank 90 m³ plastic 
tank, and 60 m³ 
concrete tank 
Number of connections 
(public standpipes) 
5 3 6 26 
Number of private con-
nections 
27 12 21 450 
Length of pipeline  9,150 mm 1a and 1b share 
a water facility 
3,615 mm 4,000,000mm 
Total water production 
(monthly) 
1,677 m3 1a and 1b share 
a water facility 
2,523 m³ 5433m³ 
Per capita consumption  14 litres/ 
capita/day 
1a and 1b share 
a water facility 
24 litres/  
capita/day 
0.4 litres/  
capital/day 
Year of construction of 
water supply system  
2012 1a and 1b share 
a water facility 
2012 2002 
 
Causal variables  Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Population of  
community a 
10,137 11,173 15,581 
Size of water system  18 m³ concrete tank 349 m³steel tank, 
12 m high 
2no.215 m³ steel tank, 
12 m high 
Number of connections 
(public standpipes) 
16 20 47 
Number of private con-
nections 
125 33 42 
Length of pipeline  15,000mm 17,565mm 19,916 mm 
Total water production 
(monthly) 
2883m³ 33,120m³ 38,3611 m³ 
Per capita consumption  10 litres/capita/day 35 litres/capita/day 25 litres/capita/day 
Year of construction of 
water supply system  
2002 2014 2014 
 
a Population figures were based on 2010 Ghana population and housing census.  
b The population excludes the population of a boarding school located on the outskirts of the 
community, though this school also depended on the water system. The school’s population 
was 3,000.  
Source: Author  
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1.6 Data collection 
For this study, I selected two cases from each of the three selected regions, 
representing the most similar cases within regions and most different ty-
pologies across regions. Ghana’s Community Water and Sanitation 
Agency (CWSA) provided background information on the selected cases. 
A number of factors informed case selection: population size; physical 
characteristics and availability and distribution of water sources; distribu-
tion of water points; length of pipeline; size of water supply system; total 
amount of water supplied; and age of the water system. The small town 
water supply system is the unit of analysis in the cases. Table 1.1 presents 
characteristics of the water supply systems in the six communities.  
Data for this study were collected in two phases. The first phase in-
volved collection of secondary data from state actors. These state actors 
include the District Assemblies (DAs) and CWSA. Regional branches of 
the CWSA made first-hand information available on the characteristics 
and performance of the water systems. In the second phase, interviews 
were conducted with small town water operators and key informants 
within each case.  
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in this study: orig-
inal survey research, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, semi-
structured interviews, participant observation and oral histories. These 
methods were employed at each of the six4 field sites, representing the six 
cases selected.  
In all, 37 semi-structured interviews were held. Interview subjects com-
prised 7 traditional actors, 6 water system personnel, 6 water and sanita-
tion management team members, 6 DA personnel, 1 director of water and 
sanitation at CWSA headquarters, 4 regional CWSA personnel, 2 head-
masters of senior high schools, 1 unit committee chairperson, 1 repre-
sentative of a small town water operators’ association, 1 Northern region 
small-town water system personnel, and 1 private operator. Further, 27 
focus group sessions were held, and 673 households were surveyed.  
Another key aspect of the research was participant observation of daily 
access to water and practices emerging from water users’ daily encounters 
with those operating and managing the water systems. This was done by 
personally staying in each of the respective areas for a period of seven to 
fourteen days, to gain first-hand information on day-to-day activities. 
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Pictures were taken and audio recordings made during the focus group 
sessions and interviews.  
1.7 Introduction to the cases  
1.7.1 Case 1 (1a and1b)  
Nyamedom/Asuase water system, representing case 1a and 1b, are located 
in the central region of Ghana in Abura Asebu Kwaman District. Both 
cases had abundant alternative water sources and favourable landscape. 
Case 1a had three localities, namely Kayeifi, Nyammedom and Zongo. 
Case 1b, also had three localities, namely Aboatre, Anafo and Manti-
makibi. The total population of each community did not meet the required 
thresholds to qualify for a small town water facility project, hence the two 
communities were merged.  
The European Union (EU) constructed case 1’s water facility in 2012. 
Members of the two communities contributed 5% of the total cost of wa-
ter supply system. The DA Abura Asebu Kwaman contributed 5%, with 
the remaining balance 90% provided by the EU. 
Case 1a did not have a functioning chieftaincy lineage. The chief of the 
community served as the overlord of the land, holding it in trust, for the 
chief of Abakrampa, an adjoining town. Most inhabitants in case 1a did 
not share common kinship. They were migrants, working at two major 
institutions located in Nyamedom: the Asuase Technical Institute (estab-
lished in 1914) and the Ausase Farm Institute (established in 1962). In 
Case 1b, the traditional chief did have a clear chieftaincy lineage. The ma-
jority of the inhabitants shared a common heritage and had close family 
ties and relationships. There was an influential traditional authority in the 
operations and management of the water system. Both in the pre- and 
post-construction phase. The traditional chiefs had a representative on the 
water and sanitation management teams. 
The water system in case 1a and 1b was under community-based man-
agement. Two sets of water teams were in place in 2010 and 2015.5 There 
were 11 water and sanitation team members.6 Four of the 11 members 
were illiterate, without formal education, and the few who were literate did 
not have the required technical capacity to manage the water system (see 
appendix 12). The water facility was being managed by the following per-
sonnel: a systems operator, a technical operator, a financial officer and six 
water vendors (see appendix 13). 
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1.7.2 Case 2 
Kyearkor water system represents case 2. The water system is located in 
the Central region of Ghana in Mfantsiman Municipal Assembly. Similar 
to case 1, case 2 had abundant water resources with a favourable land-
scape. The total population was 2,491 and there were six public standpipes 
located in various parts of the community: Abom, Anafo, Mangoase, Man-
timakibi 1 and 2 and Onyaase (see appendix 9). The EU constructed the 
water facility, like in case 1, in 2012. Members of the communities con-
tributed 5% of the total cost of water supply system. The municipal ad-
ministration of Mfantisiman contributed 5% of the total cost, with the 
remaining 90% provided by the EU. 
Kyerkor is under the Abeaze traditional area under the paramount chief 
of Abeaze Dominase. The community traces its lineage to a common an-
cestor and the majority of inhabitants enjoy close family ties and relation-
ships. Traditional actors here are active and influential in the day-to-day 
activities of the community. They were thus also highly involved in man-
agement of the water system during the pre-construction phase. The tra-
ditional actors have no representative on the water and sanitation manage-
ment team. 
Case 2 is operated under community-based management. The water 
and sanitation management team in this case was incomplete (appendix 
12). There were three water and sanitation team members. Also managing 
the water facility were two water personnel, comprising an accounts of-
ficer and a plumber, and six water vendors (see appendix 13).  
1.7.3 Case 3  
Wiamaose water system is in the Sekyere South District of the Ashanti 
Region of Ghana. This water system represents case 3. Wiamoase’s topog-
raphy was challenging, hence making it difficult to drill boreholes or con-
struct a hand-dug well. The community had a population of 13,800, ex-
cluding the Okomfo Anokye Senior High School. This school itself had a 
population of about 3,000 and was located in the community and relied 
on its water system. Five DA members represented the community’s five 
electoral areas of Dominanase South, Dominanase West, Amangoease, 
Gyeidi Tanosu and Ankase. Each of these had five community assembly 
units. Together with the DA members, these formed the area town coun-
cils representing the lower tier of governance. The electoral area was 
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represented by the following localities: Adum, Amangoase, Ankase, Be-
henase, Bethlehem, Brofoyedru, Cocoaline, Domenanse, Gyidimission, 
Krobo, Nima, Tanoso and Zongo. 
Wiamaose was one of the few communities that benefited from EU 
small town restructuring projects that started in 1998. Wiamoase water 
supply system was completed and handed over to the community in 2002. 
As part of the condition to qualify for the project, the community had to 
mobilise themselves and pay 5% of the total cost of the water facility. 
Sekyere South District contributed 5% and the EU paid the remaining 
90% of the total cost of water supply system.  
 The community had a recognised chief under Mampong traditional 
paramount chieftaincy. Most community members shared a common her-
itage and kinship. The majority of the inhabitants were farmers and trad-
ers, with the rest being migrants working in organisations in the commu-
nity.  
There was an active and influential traditional authority. This included 
operations and management of the water system, in both the pre-construc-
tion and post-construction phases. A representative of the traditional au-
thority was on the water and sanitation management teams and played an 
active role in management of the water system. 
The water system had 15 water and sanitation team members (appendix 
12). All 15 members were literate. The initial water and sanitation manage-
ment team was put in place in 1998 and stayed in function until 2002. The 
second team was put in place in 2004 and dissolved after most members 
resigned, leaving three members, comprising two men and a woman. A 
third water and sanitation team was put in place in 2011.  
The water facility was managed by seven water personnel (appendix 
13), comprising an accounts officer, a revenue collector and two technical 
operators/plumbers, two security staff. Further, there were 26 vendors. 
Detailed knowledge was high among the water actors regarding the water 
project and rules and regulations, as most staff had been with the water 
system since its inception. 
1.7.4 Case 4 
The Juaso Obogu water system is located in the Ashanti Akyem South 
District of the Ashanti region. This water system represents case 4. Juaso 
Obogu had a population of 10,137.   
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There were four assembly members and 20 unit committee members, 
representing the following electoral areas: Obogu West, Obogu East, 
Kroboline and Salem. The community was represented by the following 
localities: Askifoamantem, Bremaso, Court hall, D/A School, Dentemu, 
Domeabrah Ebonmu, Kroboline, Mission, Police Station Area, Presby 
School, Zongo and Zongo Extension.  
Juaso Obogo faced a challenging topography in some parts of the com-
munity. Distribution of water to these areas was difficult and no alternative 
water sources were available. The rest of the community was located on 
low lands water distribution was easy and there was an abundance of al-
ternative water sources.  
Juaso Obogu water supply system was part of the EU small towns re-
structuring project, which started in 1998, and the water facility was com-
pleted and handed over in March 2002. To benefit from the project, the 
community had to pay 5% of the total construction cost for the water 
system. The remaining costs were distributed as follows: 5% was paid by 
the Ashanti Akyem South District and 90% was paid by the EU. At the 
time of data collection, the water system operated from one borehole. 
There was a second borehole, but the submersible pump attached to it had 
broken down six years ago. The community had a chief in the Ashanti 
Akyem traditional areas. Inhabitants shared strong kinship ties and fol-
lowed a common ancestral lineage. The traditional chiefs were active and 
influential in both the pre-construction and post-construction phases of 
the water project. The chiefs had a representative on the water and sanita-
tion management team and was active in management of the water supply 
system. In the community there was a substantial number of migrant 
workers engaged in gold mining on a small-scale basis.  
The Juaso Obogu water system was under community-based manage-
ment. It had a 10-member water and sanitation management team. In 
1998, the first water and sanitation team was established. That team 
worked until 31 December 2011. A new management team was estab-
lished to replace the old one following public outcry calling for its disso-
lution. Most water and sanitation team members were literate and had an 
appreciable understanding of technical and financial-related issues. Re-
garding water personnel, there were four (see appendix 13), comprised of 
a system manager, an accounts officer, a revenue collector and a technical 
operator, alongside 14 vendors. Apart from the accountant, who had been 
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with the water system since its inception, none of the remaining personnel 
had received training.  
1.7.5 Case 5  
Tatale serves as the administrative capital for the Tatale–Sangule district. 
The Tatale water system is located in this district in the Northern region 
of Ghana. This water system represents case 5 in this study. The commu-
nity population was 11,173.  
There were four assembly members and 25 unit committee members, 
representing four electoral areas, namely, O Section, Kuyuli, Binatabe and 
Nakpali with thirty-four (34) sections. Tatale faced a challenging topogra-
phy for water supply. Its low water table meant that few alternative water 
sources were available.  
Tatale was one of the 30 small town communities that benefitted from 
the Northern Region Small Town Water and Sanitation Project (NORST). 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) financed the 
project. The Member of Parliament for Tatale Township paid the 5% 
community contribution to the cost of the water project. The DA paid 5% 
percent of the total cost, with the remaining 90% provided by CIDA. Im-
plementation of the water project started in 2010. The actual water system 
was completed and handed over to the community in November 2014.  
There were two dominant ethnic groups in the community, with three 
other minority ethnic groups. Each ethnic group shared a common line-
age. Tatale had one paramount chief representing the majority Basare eth-
nic group. The traditional chiefs were active and influential during the pre-
construction phase. The traditional chiefs had a representative on the wa-
ter and sanitation management team. However, the influence of the tradi-
tional chief in management of the water system was low.  
 The main occupations here were farming and trading. The community 
had a substantial number of migrant workers. It also shared a boundary 
with Togo and had a vibrant market.  
Tatale water system was under private-based management. The water 
and sanitation team was established at an early stage of the project. It had 
nine members (see appendix 12). Four of these nine members had a for-
mal education. There were five water personnel staff (appendix 13): a sys-
tem manager, an accounts officer, a revenue collector, a technical operator 
and a plumber, alongside 20 vendors (of whom seven were eventually 
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sacked). All key staff with the exception of the accountant7 had received 
two years’ training before the water system was completed and handed 
over to the community.  
1.7.6 Case 6  
Karaga water system is located in the Northern region of Ghana, in the 
Karaga district. It represents case 6 for this study. Its population was 
15,581. Most inhabitants of the community were Dagombas. The town-
ship comprised the following localities: Daafong, Limanfong, Kan-
bontooni, Kpanafong, Nakohagufong, Nayilifong, Nlaalafong and Yapal-
sifong. There were four DA members, representing the four electoral areas 
of Karaga Central, Karaga West, Karaga East and Karaga North. Tatale 
had a challenging topography and low water table. As a result, there was 
an absence of alternative natural water sources.  
Like Tatale, the Karaga water system was part of NORST, with assis-
tance provided by CIDA. The water project started in 2010 and was com-
pleted and handed to the community in November 2014. The commu-
nity’s Member of Parliament arranged payment of the community’s 5% 
contribution. The DA paid 5% of the cost, and the remaining 90% was 
paid for by CIDA. The system was completed and handed over to the 
community in 2014. At the time of this research, the water system relied 
on two of the four boreholes provided, as two of the submersible pumps 
were not functioning. Water had to be rationed at each public standpipe. 
The community had a paramount chief with other divisional chiefs. 
The main occupation of the residents was farming. A representative of the 
traditional authority was part of the water and sanitation management 
team. Traditional chief were active and involved in the management of the 
water system. Karaga was the administrative capital of the district, and a 
few migrants worked for the various state organisations located within the 
community. 
The water and sanitation team had 13 members and was constituted 
during the early stages of the project, in 2010 (see appendix 12). Two of 
the 13 members had a formal education. There were four members of staff 
(see appendix 13): an accounts officer, two revenue collectors and a tech-
nical operator. Forty-six (46) vendors were active. With the exception of 
the technical operator, all water personnel had undergone training.8  
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1.8 Organisation of thesis 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on water services, and 
chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework that guided this research. 
Chapter 4 examines development of the small town and rural water sector 
in Ghana. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the interactions and practices of ac-
tors in the processes of translating and implementing the NCWSP in their 
own locality. Chapter 7 focuses on institutional entrepreneurs and their 
motivations for engaging in or resisting institutional changes. Chapter 8 
summarises the study findings and presents the conclusion of the research.  
Notes 
1 I use the terms “small town” and “rural communities” interchangeably in this 
thesis.  
2 This study defines institutional change as encompassing the forces that drive 
actors to resist, renegotiate and modify institutions and institutional arrange-
ments.  
3 This study views processes of institutional change as encompassing the con-
scious and unconscious activities of negotiation, decision-making, action and in-
teraction, and practices which actors identified in this study as used by institu-
tional entrepreneurs and change agents to make creative and innovative 
modifications in the way water was governed (Frank and Cleaver 2007).  
4 Two communities, Nyamedom and Asuase, represent cases 1a and 1b. They 
shared a common water system and management team. However, they did not 
share a common traditional governance system or lineage.  
5 At the time of data collection the second team had not been constituted. The 
second team was elected in December 2015.  
6 The water team members observed and interviewed were the first team consti-
tuted in 2010. 
7 The first accountant was trained but resigned and a new officer was recruited.  
8 The current technical operator took the position when the initially trained tech-
nical operator resigned from the job.  He was originally trained as a revenue col-
lector. 
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2 
Rural Water Supply Services and 
Reforms  
 
2.1 History of rural water supply  
The years 1981-1990 were declared the International Drinking Water Sup-
ply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) aimed at providing the world pop-
ulation with safe drinking water and hygienic excreta disposal facilities. 
Nonetheless, studies carried out in this decade and since underline prob-
lems related to operation and maintenance of water and sanitation sys-
tems. In particular, there is a disparity between the ready availability of 
development funds (for construction) and the scarcity of recurrent funds 
(for operation and maintenance). These problems have propelled various 
institutional reforms in the water sector (Feachem 1980: 16, Harvey and 
Reed 2006). 
Many of the unresolved challenges in water supply have been linked to 
a lack of participation among beneficiaries. This led to a general paradigm 
shift (Gleick 2000) from supply-driven and centralised water supply to de-
mand-driven and decentralised water systems, leading to reforms reflec-
tive of the institutional thinking at the time (Fuest 2006). The World Bank, 
for example, promoted demand-responsive approaches. These were 
deeply rooted in neoliberal thinking and sought to minimise state inter-
vention in water sector activities.  
Many reforms in small town and rural water sectors coincided with 
structural adjustment programmes (Harvey and Reed 2004, Koehler et al. 
2015). At the same time, community management principles were being 
promoted. Thus, communities were brought into decision-making pro-
cesses and asked to take part in selection of the technology most appro-
priate to their needs. Beneficiary communities were also asked to contrib-
ute towards investment costs for construction of new water supply 
facilities, and to assume responsibility for the future operation and mainte-
nance of their water system (World Bank 1998). This approach, according 
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to community management proponents, would ensure access and sustain-
able management and maintenance of rural water supply systems.  
Yet, critics have argued that the international community favoured 
community management mainly as a way to reduce state involvement in 
water services provision. Community management was also said to offer 
a convenient way for international actors to produce concrete evidence of 
programme results (output) (Harvey and Reed 2006, Moriarty et al. 2013).  
Despite the criticisms of community management, by the end of the 
international water and sanitation decade substantial progress had been 
registered in terms of new infrastructure development, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa. According to the WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring 
Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (JMP), the majority of coun-
tries met the target of global access to safe water five years before the end 
of the MDG period, which was 2015, and just a few countries failed to 
achieve the target by 2015 (World Bank Group 2017, Moriarty et al. 2013: 
331). In rural communities, access to improved water sources increased 
from 62% in 1990 to 81% in 2010 (World Bank Group 2017, Moriarty et 
al. 2013: 331).  
In Ghana, the first two decades of the 2000s saw rapid development of 
new small town and rural water supply systems. These expanded access to 
safe drinking water among small town and rural communities. According 
to the JMP of 2010, 78% of the population of Ghana had achieved the 
MDG target of access to improved water sources by that time. By 2015, 
that figure had risen to 89% for the combined urban and rural population 
and was 84% for rural communities alone (Lockwood et al. 2016, Lock-
wood and Smits 2011). 
Despite gains made in the water sector, critics have continued to assert 
that the principles of community management and the demand-responsive 
approach had not led to ensured access to safe water. Indeed, sustainability 
of water infrastructure is an issue that still confronts rural water sectors. 
Urgent attention is required to sustain the gains made. Moreover, popula-
tion growth, rapid urbanisation and migration have further increased de-
mand for water, widening the gap between those with access to water and 
those without. The JMP estimates that worldwide, 83% of those without 
access to improved drinking water live in rural areas (WHO and UNICEF 
2013). 
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A large share of the world's population still draws water from precari-
ous sources. Furthermore, the quality of water services presents a disturb-
ing picture. Most water systems are unreliable due to frequent break-
downs, forcing residents to revert to unwholesome sources. Even for 
many who do have access to improved services, the day-to-day reality is 
one of poor service in terms of water quantity, quality, reliability and ac-
cessibility (Lockwood and Smits 2011). 
Moriarty et al. (2013) proposed that in order to ensure universal access 
a shift is needed away from provision of one-time access towards improve-
ment of the quality of services overall. Along similar lines, previous studies 
conclude that to sustain the gains made in rural water supply, continuous 
institutional support is needed for local water actors, accompanied by wa-
ter supply to households and smaller user groups (Harvey and Kayaga 
2003), and private sector service delivery (Harvey and Reed 2006).  
Notwithstanding the issues raised above, it is important to note that 
the focus of the current research is not system sustainability. Nor do I seek 
to evaluate the success of the water reforms in Ghana. Rather, this re-
search seeks to understand how implementing actors relied on existing 
institutions and practices to resist or modify the institutional arrangements 
introduced in line with the principles of community management and the 
demand-responsive approach. Specifically, I look at the implementation 
of the NCWSP, which is a water reform programme targeting small town 
and rural communities in Ghana. This programme, elaborated further in 
chapter 4, likewise adopts principles of community management and the 
demand-responsive approach.  
2.2 Community management of water supply systems 
Evidence indicates that in Ghana, adoption of community management 
and the demand-responsive approach has not led to the institutional 
changes envisaged by international actors and national policymakers. Low 
quality of water services, poor performance of service providers, high rates 
of hardware failure and inability to stay within operations and maintenance 
budgets are some of the challenges confronting the sector (Doe and Khan 
2004, McCommon et al. 1990, Moriarty et al. 2013).  
The objective of community management is to empower beneficiaries 
to take an active role in decision-making processes, such as planning, con-
struction, management, operations and maintenance of their water supply 
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system (Lockwood 2004, Koehler et al. 2015). Community management 
objectives are to be achieved by requiring the beneficiary community to 
pay part of the initial cost of construction of the water facilities, by for-
mation of groups to manage the water system, and by establishment of 
water tariffs adequate to cover all operations and maintenance costs (Mo-
riarty et al. 2013, Harvey and Reed 2006). 
Findings are mixed regarding whether communities thus empowered 
will necessarily take ownership and responsibility for their water facility. 
Some scholars assert that empowering communities may not trigger the 
desire to take ownership and responsibility (Harvey and Reed 2006). A 
number of studies fail to find any direct relationship between community 
ownership and beneficiary willingness to take responsibility for service 
management and recovery of operations and maintenance costs (e.g., 
Tidemand and Knudsen 1989, Cotton and Tayler 1994, Niedrum 1994, 
Bossuyt and Laporte 1995). Nonetheless, water system sustainability is of-
ten dependent on such willingness. Among those arguing the importance 
of community ownership and its direct impact on operations and mainte-
nance, many refer to the influence of individual or private property for 
which a clear procedure for acquisition can be identified, as this is said to 
enhance the sense of ownership (Fuest 2006). For example, Bacho’s 
(2001) study of six communities in Ghana supports the theoretical posi-
tion that a clear procedure for acquiring communal property rights 
strengthens the sense of ownership. This conclusion was affirmed by the 
Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) in a study of water sys-
tems in the Northern region of Ghana. In regard to small town systems, 
CWSA (2002) found a direct relationship between contributions to capital 
costs and appropriate operation and maintenance. Yet, that same study 
found that some communities exhibited a strong sense of ownership and 
responsibility, despite their inability to raise the required capital cost con-
tributions (Fuest 2006). Other CWSA findings point to a weak relationship 
between contributions to capital costs and effective operation and mainte-
nance of water facilities. 
Multiple studies observe that community ownership is not the same as 
individual ownership. Harvey and Reed (2006: 371) provided the follow-
ing reasons why community ownership may differ from individual owner-
ship: lack of a clear or legal identity regarding what constitutes the com-
munity, location of facilities at unequal distance from intended 
beneficiaries, unfairness stemming from differences in ability to pay, 
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disagreements between families and unequal power relations. Further-
more, the perception that the government is solely responsible for opera-
tions and maintenance may still be entrenched, leading to community re-
sistance towards taking on ownership and responsibility for operations 
and maintenance. 
Corroborating the above, studies suggest that differences in the clarity 
of legal ownership versus physical ownership contribute to the challenges 
confronting the water sector. For example, abundant documented and an-
ecdotal evidence points to the appropriation of water system ownership 
by powerful elites. Fuest (2006: 34), for instance, maintained that 
“[O]wnership of piped systems in small towns in Ghana [seems] to be 
more vague and negotiable... [D]epending on the context, the District As-
semblies (DAs), the communities or their chiefs were conceived to be the 
owners.” Claims of ownership can also vary according to the origins of 
the capital cost contributions. Where DAs supported communities to mo-
bilise the 5% contribution to system construction or even fully paid the 
sum they perceived themselves as owners, with the local water and sanita-
tion management teams deemed as holding the systems in trust for the 
DAs. Contributions towards the cost of water systems raise a further un-
resolved question; that is, if the water systems belong to the community, 
then could the chiefs, as custodians, be construed as the legitimate owners 
and thus lay claim to the systems in the future. This institutional structure 
was thus perceived as potentially giving rise to resistance and producing 
future claims and counter-claims for the systems between DAs, water and 
sanitation management teams and chiefs (Fuest 2006, Prado and Trebil-
cock 2009). 
Others have maintained that community management is effective when 
communities have the legal right to assume ownership and responsibility. 
However, in Ghana legal rights to small town water systems are vested in 
the local authorities (DAs). This may explain some of the setbacks expe-
rienced, in which local authorities (municipal assemblies or DAs) have 
taken decisions counter to the interests of the communities (Fuest 2006). 
Limitations of the community management approach, as observed by 
Harvey and Lock (2006), typically begin emerging one to three years after 
a system is transferred to beneficiaries. For this, a number of reasons have 
been identified. First, the voluntarism nature of the community manage-
ment concept prevents recruitment of professional personnel to manage 
the water system. Secondly, there is no formal mechanism for replacing 
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and training technical staff and water and sanitation management team 
members, though these positions regularly become vacant. Thirdly, there 
is a lack of transparency and accountability, which leads to mistrust and 
suspicion of the motives of water system managers. Fourthly, the commit-
tees in charge of the water systems lack any legal status and authority, and 
the communities they serve may lack cohesion. Finally, if there is a lack of 
support from local government staff, the community will be left with a 
sense of abandonment and both existing and potential members of water 
committees demotivated (Harvey and Lock 2006). Adding cost recovery 
to operations and maintenance costs is not realistic, as tariffs are invariably 
too low to even cover day-to-day system expenses, upgrades, rehabilitation 
and future expansion (Harvey 2007). 
Altogether, these issues cast doubt on the suitability of community 
management as an appropriate model for managing small town and rural 
water facilities. Experiences suggest that there is no silver bullet or single 
model that is automatically suitable for water supply in all small towns and 
rural communities (Moriarty et al. 2002). Likewise, in Ghana problems 
seem inevitable in implementing community management principles in 
small town and rural water supply. The current research examines the ex-
tent to which the local social and institutional context and actors have 
promoted or resisted the community management principles under the 
NCWSP. The aim is not to identify challenges and limitations of commu-
nity management. Rather, the objective is to understand the motivations 
and strategies adopted by implementing actors to resist or modify the 
given institutional arrangements.1 Examples of these are the contributions 
required towards the cost of water facilities (5% of investment cost), the 
formation of users groups (e.g., the water and sanitation management 
teams) and the post-construction operation and management of the water 
system.  
2.3 Community participation  
Community participation is often considered a prerequisite for sustainable 
and efficient management of small town and rural water systems. At the 
same time, the very notion of community participation has been labelled 
a buzzword, meaning nothing and meaning everything (Feachem 1980). 
Certainly, community “participation” has an air of ambiguity, and is a 
vague and open concept. It is typically used in a way that incorporates 
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other key concepts, such as “self-help”, “self-reliance”, “user choice”, 
“community involvement” and “participatory planning and develop-
ment”, all of which are similarly ill-defined (Feachem 1980: 19). Other 
scholars note variation in the way participation is interpreted and its pur-
pose defined. The current research defines community participation as a 
consultative empowerment process in which communities are involved in 
decision-making and share control over development initiatives, decisions 
and resources that affect them (Garande and Dagg 2005, Shah 1998, Har-
vey and Reed 2006). Several studies point to community involvement in 
decision-making as a prerequisite to ownership. There is ongoing debate, 
however, around the role of motivation in ensuring future and continuous 
participation (Batchelor et al. 2000). 
Community participation is said to bring multiple benefits: (i) improved 
designs, (ii) reduced construction costs, (iii) reduced costs of operation 
and maintenance, (iv) improved realisation of project benefits and (v) en-
couragement of communities to engage in new development initiatives 
(see Cairncross et al. 1980, Feachem et al. 1978). The above reasons, ac-
cording to Feachem (1980), have been used to justify international donors’ 
preference for community management of rural water systems. 
Notwithstanding the benefits attributed to community participation, 
Feachem (1980) provided reasons why community participation may not 
live up to expectations. First, there may be a lack of information sharing 
and communication between the community and local government staff. 
Secondly, the extra responsibility and cost may place too much of a burden 
on already overstretched and understaffed local governments. In this re-
gard, Feachem (1980) argued for strong local government structures; this 
according to him, would make community participation unnecessary. An 
efficient water supply system, according to Feachem, hinges on efficient 
local government built over many years but not built hurriedly to serve the 
specific needs of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 
Decade (Feachem 1980: 22). Lack of support from local government, ap-
athy and lack of consensus makes local participation in management of 
water systems challenging. 
Another critique of community participation is that it entails a homog-
enous view of communities as having particular social and human capital 
which can be tapped to propel development (Cleaver 1999). Yet, the idea 
of a homogenous community is deceptive, as those who take decisions are 
not necessarily the ones who make the rules. Communities are socially 
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structured, stratified and guided by hierarchical institutions (Ostrom 2005, 
Cleaver 1999).  
Some scholars maintain that the notion of community cooperation and 
ownership is not applicable to all sub-Sharan African communities. First, 
the assumption of a unitary community fails to recognise the complexity 
of local networks of resource use, decision-making and social interaction. 
Secondly, the community is a site of both solidarity and conflict, as well as 
unequal power relations and social structures (Cleaver 1999). Others argue 
that in most communities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, decision-mak-
ing is “vertical and stratified according to power, social status, and eco-
nomic rank” (Elwert and Bierschenk 1988: 102). Unequal power relation-
ships are said to define who, what and how issues are decided (Harvey and 
Reed 2006). Because of unequal power relations, any development inter-
vention must give due consideration to issues of power and politics. There 
is ample evidence that structural and resource constraints within commu-
nities make cooperation challenging. Lastly, the notion of participation 
overlooks issues of motivation and incentives, and impacts on individuals’ 
time are often underestimated or ignored (Cleaver 1999, 2012; Gaventa 
2004; Gbedemah 2011). Based on the above reasons and others, commu-
nity participation may not be successful as a tool to ensure community 
ownership and communities’ adequate management and maintenance of 
water facilities. 
My aim in the current research is not to delve into the challenges and 
limitations of participatory approaches. Instead I look at how actors’ local 
social and institutional environment influences their choices to resist or 
promote community participation principles. In other words, I look at 
what, how and who takes decisions that lead to the embedment of com-
munity participation principles within local institutional and social struc-
tures. The above review helps us to identify possible reasons for actors’ 
behaviour to support or frustrate participatory approaches. In short, this 
research looks at what informs actors’ decisions to engage in some prac-
tices in some situations and engage in different practices other settings.  
 
 
Elite capture  
A foremost critique within the literature on participation is that it leads to 
elite capture (Platteau 2004, Platteau and Abraham 2002, Labonte 2011, 
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Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013, Fritzen 2007). Elite capture connotes situa-
tions wherein decision-making is controlled, public goods are exploited or 
resources appropriated for personal benefit (Ribot 2004, Platteau and 
Abraham 2002). Some scholars argue that elite capture is an unintended 
consequence of participatory initiatives, due to unequal power relation-
ships among actors (Bandiaky 2008, Cleaver 2005, Mosse 1995). Others, 
such as Agarwal (1997), Platteau and Abraham (2002), Cleaver (2005) and 
Bandiaky (2007), also argue that embedded social norms reproduce and 
reinforce power relations and domination by elites at the expense of non-
elites, making it easy for elites to control participatory initiatives or resist 
institutional change (Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013: 5). Stratification of 
communities along lines of wealth, ethnicity, class, political affiliation and 
norms enables some actors to access and control resources. The powerful 
actors then capitalise on their position to their benefit at the expense of 
non-elites (Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013: 3). 
Platteau (2004) maintained that participatory approaches must ensure 
genuine empowerment through capacity building of local actors, in order 
to prevent powerful elites from taking advantage of knowledge gaps for 
their own benefit (see Rahman 1993). Esman and Uphoff (1984) pointed 
out that the use of user groups in community-based projects encourages 
elites to take leadership roles because of the attractiveness of outside fund-
ing, which elites appropriate for themselves using their positions. 
Other scholars (Classen et al. 2008, Long 2001, Saito-Jensen et al. 2010) 
remind us that actors are not static but possess agency to resist elite dom-
ination and control. Countering or renegotiating elite or entrepreneurial 
capture, however, requires state action or an alliance with another interest 
group able to arrest excessive elite control (Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013: 
5). 
Limiting the occurrence of elite capture requires an understanding of 
the local social and institutional context, of actors’ access to information 
and of state actors’ ability to enforce rules and provide institutional sup-
port (Platteau and Abraham 2002). In addition, the extent to which actors 
are involved in decision-making processes and a genuine intention to de-
centralise administrative powers from state to local actors can reduce elite 
capture. 
Notwithstanding the argument that elites capture resources for their 
own benefit, some scholars are of the opinion that the debate on elite 
capture should focus on the nature of actors’ actions (i.e., are the actions 
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benevolent or malevolent), accountability-related issues and outcomes in 
terms of resource distribution (Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013). Platteau 
(2004) pointed out that not all elites profit from public resources or cap-
ture benefits from development projects and aid. There is evidence of 
elites’ use of power inequalities to benefit non-elites (see Ravallion 2000).  
I acknowledge that elite capture is an unintended consequence of par-
ticipatory initiatives due to unequal power relationships among actors. I 
also acknowledge that elite capture can be minimised if actors possess ad-
equate information and have the institutional capacity to manage develop-
ment initiatives, and if there is a genuine intention to decentralise admin-
istrative powers from state to local actors. The focus on elite capture in 
this research seeks to understand practices initiated by elites to resist or 
modify institutional arrangements in the governance of small town and 
rural water supply systems. I hereby argue that actors are not static but 
possess agency to resist elite control.  
2.4  Limitations in implementing institutional reforms: 
Between policy and practice 
There are two schools of thought on what is an effective way to study and 
descibe policy implementation. Top-down theorists (e.g., Van Meter and 
Van Horn 1975, Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983, Mazmanian and Sabatier 
1980) “see implementation as concerned with the degree to which the ac-
tions of implementing officials and target groups coincide with the goals 
embodied in authoritative decision” (Matland 1995: 146). Authoritative 
decisions here are decisions made by centrally positioned actors. Bottom-
up theorists (e.g., Berman 1980, Hjern and Porter 1981, Hjern and Hull 
1982, Hjern 1982, Lipsky 1969) perceive implementation more broadly 
from the perspective of the target population and service delivered (Mat-
land 1995: 146). 
Reasons provided for why the implementation of public policies may 
not achieve the desired objectives differ between the two schools. Top-
down theorists (e.g., Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979) maintain that success-
ful policy implementation is contingent on clear and consistent objectives, 
incorporation of adequate causal theory, financial resources and availabil-
ity of implementing actors with the required skills and capacity (Matland 
1995). 
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Bottom-up theorists, on the other hand, argue that implementers may 
be unable to achieve policy objectives due to interactions between the 
macro level (central policymakers) and the micro level (policy implement-
ers). Most implementation challenges, according to Berman (1978), occur 
at the micro level. Differences between implementing actors’ institutional 
settings and structures are said to account for the variation between policy 
as designed at the macro level and actual implementation (Matland 1995: 
148). Other reasons provided for problems of policy implementation in-
clude the following: (i) countries with ailing government are not commit-
ted to reforms; (ii) lack of the right institutional structures delays the de-
sired impact of institutional reforms; (iii) the context is challenging; (iv) 
there is corruption, neopatrimonialism and a lack of capacity among im-
plementing countries and actors (Andrews 2013). 
For example, empirical findings from the Africa Power and Politics 
Programme (APPP) indicate that institutional incoherence in policy initi-
atives, weak top-down performance and an inhospitable environment for 
local problem-solving are responsible for disparities between reform prin-
ciples, implementation and outcomes (Booth 2009). However, there is am-
ple evidence showing that even if the right rules and institutional frame-
work are adopted, the impact of most policy reforms remains 
disappointing. The explanations provided, however, hardly advance be-
yond long lists of reasons for institutional reform and symptoms of im-
plementation failure. In short, the underlying processes that explain why 
policy change is path dependent and slow to achieve the desired impact 
remain ill-defined.  
In the policy implementation literature, street-level actors or bureau-
crats are cast as the main implementers of policies (Lipsky 1980). These 
actors are said to engage in different practices and strategies to circumvent 
challenges encountered in the course of implementation (Maynard-Moody 
et al. 1990). The implication here is that policy adaptation is required for 
policy implementation. However, street-level actors may take advantage 
of challenges to serve their own interests, which could explain why insti-
tutional reforms may fail to achieve their intended objectives (see, e.g., 
Lindblom 1979). This explanation is unsatisfactory, however, because it 
fails to specify the process through which actors define their problems and 
interests and the strategies they use to resist and modify institutional ar-
rangements. Shifting our focus from the discretion of street-level actors 
to actor agency may provide a better understanding of the motivations and 
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logic behind the actions of those involved. Theory regarding the agency 
of street-level actors can therefore help us to better understand processes 
of policy or institutional change (Maynard-Moody et al. 1990).  
 
Towards explaining processes of institutional change in implementing small town and 
rural water reforms  
In the water literature, contextual factors have been used to justify actors’ 
inability to implement policies and achieve intended objectives. For in-
stance, water sector studies carried out by Saleth and Dinar (2000) in 11 
countries suggest that both endogenous and exogenous factors drive in-
stitutional change. Nonetheless, the processes through which actors de-
fine their interests and make choices are left unspecified. 
Molle (2005), in studies in the Mekong region, showed that implemen-
tation faltered in part because reformers were expert-driven and ignored 
the endogenous negotiation process. As a result, the impacts of reforms 
were not felt, and there was a significant gap between the rhetoric of par-
ticipation and reality on the ground (Molle 2005). 
Likewise, the “going with the grain” governance approach is grounded 
on the notion that neglect of socially embedded institutions is the reason 
for many of the challenges that hinder ongoing interventions in the water 
sector (Rusca and Schwartz 2014). In the same vein, Rusca et al. (2015) in 
their article “Adapting Generic Models through Bricolage” noted that the 
dynamic environment allowed actors to adapt water models to fit the local 
institutional context. Nonetheless, due to unequal power relations, local 
elites were able to capture benefits from new water initiatives, to the det-
riment of others.  
Nyarko (2007: 199) studied drivers of performance in the drinking wa-
ter sector in Ghana. This author provided several reasons for the poor 
performance of urban and small town water supply: inadequate funding 
for investment and operations, inadequate incentive systems, low water 
tariffs, low capacity of water actors and political interference. 
In a study in the Akatsi district of Ghana, Gbedemah (2011) also rec-
ognised weak incentives, alongside a lack of consensus between members 
of water and sanitation management teams and other water system per-
sonnel. These obstacles considerably challenged the adoption of commu-
nity management principles in water governance. 
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Together, these studies outline various factors responsible for water 
reform failures. However, none of these causal factors specify the mecha-
nisms that justify the importance of context. They are, rather, structuralist 
explanations, with actor agency ignored or taken for granted. Investigating 
the role of actors and agency could provide a better understanding of how 
local water actors define their problems and interests and the practices 
they adopt to resist, embrace or modify institutional arrangements for wa-
ter management.  
The community management concept as applied to governing rural wa-
ter supply entails, for example, group formation, definition of rights and 
responsibilities, and clarification of issues of access to potable water and 
management of the water system. These cannot be divorced from the cul-
tural, socio-economic and political environment within which they occur 
(Fuest 2006: 7). These institutional factors constrain actors’ capacity to 
implement institutional reforms. Nonetheless, they also determine the ex-
tent to which actors can resist or promote institutional change (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983, Fligstein and Freeland 1995). Notwithstanding the im-
portance of institutions in constraining and enabling those involved in ac-
tivating their agency, the conditions under which actors use institutions to 
activate their agency are insufficiently accounted for in most water studies.  
The current research fills that gap by examining institutional factors 
driving actors to resist or modify institutional arrangements in implemen-
tation of community management and the demand-responsive approach 
in rural water governance. Specifically, I look at the implementation of the 
NCWSP, which is a water reform programme targeting small town and 
rural communities in Ghana. This programme, elaborated further in chap-
ter 4, upholds principles of community management and the demand-re-
sponsive approach.  
 The contribution of this thesis is three-fold. First, based on the 
NCWSP, it investigates why policies are modified and adapted by local 
implementing actors, thus contributing to the debate on policy implemen-
tation. I look at the role of institutional factors and actors’ access to re-
sources in shaping the implementation of the NCWSP. Understanding ac-
tor agency is crucial to understand processes of institutional change. 
Agency, as used in this research, refers to the capacity of actors to shape 
their environment.  
Secondly, by focusing on actor agency, this thesis advances understand-
ing of how actors define their interests and problems, and how existing 
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institutions enable actors to mobilise resources, to make decisions and to 
adopt practices to modify central government policies. Through this ap-
proach, it contributes to scholarship on the evolutionary nature of policy 
or institutional change.  
Thirdly, this thesis presents new knowledge to deepen our understand-
ing of why and how actors do what they do to resist or modify institutional 
arrangements for rural water policies, particularly under the NCWSP. This 
aids us in understanding the processes and conditions in which institutions 
change, and limits the possibility of misidentifying the challenges facing 
the rural water sector. Furthermore, it looks at how the institutional setting 
influences the choices, preferences and practices that institutional entre-
preneurs ultimately adopted in response to pressure for institutional and 
technological change.  
I use an interdisciplinary lens to explain change in the water sector. The 
focus on institutional factors provides a path to unravel the complexities 
of human nature and human action. In traversing this path, I hope to ar-
rive at a better understanding of why institutional reform in the rural water 
sector proceeds slowly, changeably and in a path-dependent manner. In-
deed, institutions are the foundation of life. They consist of state-led and 
community-led rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and sys-
tems of meaning that define the contexts in which individuals interact with 
each other to perform their roles and carry out their responsibilities 
(Campbell 2004: 1). 
Institutions are the focus of chapter 3. In it, a review of the institutional 
change literature provides us concepts with which to better understand 
processes of institutional change in small town and rural water supply in 
Ghana. Specifically, we seek insight into the roles played by implementing 
actors in resisting or changing institutions and the institutional arrange-
ments under the NCWSP.  
 
 
Note 
1 In this study, institutional arrangements are the governance structures for water 
management, defined as the rules, practices and means used by water actors (state 
and community) in their daily operation and management of small town water sup-
ply systems. These rules, practices and means are interrelated. 
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3 
Theoretical Framework:  
Institutional Analysis and Change  
 
 
This chapter outlines the concepts that form the basis for the discussion 
of the cases examined in this research. First, I provide an overview of three 
major schools of institutional analysis (section 3.1). This is followed by a 
definition of institutions and categories of institutions (section 3.2), and a 
presentation of theory on how institutions change (section 3.3). Mecha-
nisms that can help explain how institutional change takes shape are then 
addressed (section 3.4). Specifically, I look at translation, institutional bri-
colage and institutional entrepreneurship (section 3.5). I provide the con-
ceptual framework for this thesis (section 3.6), which informs and guides 
the research questions and propositions. The chapter concludes with a 
summery on institutional change (section 3.7).  
3.1 Approaches to institutional analysis  
Institutional analysis is deeply rooted in economics, sociology and political 
science. It deals with how individuals and groups construct institutions, 
how institutions function in practice and the effects of institutions on in-
dividuals, on communities and on society at large. This thesis focuses on 
the second aspect: how institutions function in practice.  
There are different approaches to institutional analysis. Thorstein Veb-
len, a foremost scholar of the evolutionary theory of institutions, focused 
on the role of the institution in real life economic processes. He criticized 
scholars who took institutions for granted in their analyses of human be-
haviour, and urged scholars to include institutions in analyses of economic 
and social behaviour (Chavance 2009: 11). Veblen (1899: 129) argued that 
institutions emerge from habits of thought, defined as an outcome of hab-
its of life. Thought styles, according to Veblen, are a key factor in commu-
nity organisation. A primary feature of institutions is their relative inertia, 
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influenced by history and past events (Veblen 1899 cited in Chavance 
2009: 11). 
Peters (2001) distinguished six schools of the “new institutionalism”: 
rational choice, organisational, historical, normative, empirical and inter-
national. Each stresses the important role of institutions in social, eco-
nomic and political activities. Although there are differences in definitions 
and in the relationship posited between actors and how institutions 
change, Peters acknowledged the lack of a clear distinction between these 
schools. I focus here on the first three.  
The major schools of institutional analysis today are the rational choice 
(e.g., Brinton and Nee 1975, Knight and Sened 1998), the organisational 
(e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1991) and the historical (e.g., Steinmo et al. 
1992). The three have both differences and similarities in the way they 
define institutions, the way they perceive how institutions change, their 
favoured causal concepts for explaining how institutions change, their lev-
els of analysis and their theories of actions and constraints in the change 
process (Hall and Taylor 1996).  
Williamson (2000) and North (1990), and other scholars, perceive in-
stitutions as an important indicator in the analysis of economic activities. 
They argued that the market does not always produce efficient economic 
actions, due to the high cost of monitoring. Institutions facilitate and reg-
ulate economic behaviour, hence the need to incorporate institutions in 
analyses of economic behaviour. Rational choice institutionalism views in-
stitutions as comprising formal and informal rules and compliance proce-
dures (North 1990: 3). Actors’ capacity to make rational choices is said to 
be constrained by the availability of relevant information and cognitive 
capacity. Institutions once created become expensive to change. Positive 
feedback creates a particular process of actions which are then “locked in” 
by increasing returns. In other words, a particular way of doing things be-
comes increasingly attractive as more people invest in it. For this reason, 
changing old ways of doing things becomes less attractive and more ex-
pensive (Pierson 2000). Sociologists and political scientists writing from a 
rational choice perspective argue along similar lines as economists. Their 
main contribution to the rational choice paradigm is the “choice within 
constraints approach”, which views institutions as limiting the range of 
choices that individuals can take in pursuit of their interests (e.g., Alt and 
Shepsle 1990, Nee 1998, Scharpf 1997). Other scholars argue that 
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individuals build and change institutions to achieve their interests (e.g., 
Kiser and Laing 2001, Knight 1992).  
Much of the current literature representing the rational choice para-
digm holds that change is evolutionary because it occurs through the path-
dependent mechanism of positive feedback, with increasing returns and 
choice within constraints (Knight 1992, North 1998). Despite the ad-
vances made by rational choice institutionalism in understanding why 
change is evolutionary in nature, this school of thought has as yet failed to 
explain the mechanisms by which institutional change occurs (North 
1998). Examining these mechanisms requires attention for other aspects 
of institutions (e.g., cognitive and normative aspects) that influence how 
actors perceive their interests and make choices (North 1990: 42-44, 
Knight and North 1997, Campbell 2004).  
In organisational institutionalism, the focus is on the role of norms and 
values (informal institutions) in the analysis of institutions. The norms and 
values upheld in the surrounding environment influence the choices or-
ganisations make and the practices they employ to achieve their stated 
goals (March and Olsen 1989). John Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977: 340) 
insisted that “organisations respond to their environment to increase their 
legitimacy and survival prospects independent of the efficacy of adopted 
practices and procedure”. Organisational institutionalism defines institu-
tions in terms of an informal and common cultural milieu, symbolism, a 
taken-for-granted cognitive schema and a formal rule system. It is within 
these constraints that organisations craft institutions for their day-to-day 
interactions (Jepperson 1991: 145). These common frames take the form 
of routines and practices, which enable organisations to assume an iso-
morphic character. Motivation is informed not by instrumental logic but 
by a “logic of appropriateness”. In other words, organisations do not fo-
cus on maximising benefits, but their activities should conform to cultur-
ally appropriate scripts, schema and norms in their immediate environ-
ment. According to Clement and Cook (1999), cognitive scripts and 
schema aid organisations in defining their problems and interests and in 
finding solutions, though this is often unconscious. These scripts both 
constrain and enable organisational actors in their daily interactions 
(Campbell 2004, Campbell and Pedersen 1996).  
Organisational institutionalists perceive institutional change as punctu-
ated equilibrium or a punctuated evolutionary pattern, and evolutionary. 
Change is evolutionary because of the presence of normative and 
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cognitive factors that constrain actors’ capacity to engage in rapid institu-
tional reform (Campbell 2004, Hall and Taylor 1996). A criticism of or-
ganisational institutionalism is that it focuses mostly on the constraints 
imposed by institutional structure, giving less attention to actors and 
agency. Secondly, within this school of thought the distinction between 
cognitive and normative ideas is blurred. Thirdly, it fails to account for the 
mechanisms by which cognitive and normative structure enable and em-
power actors (see, e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Hirsch and Lounsbury 
1997, Hirsch 1997, Stinchcombe 1996, Campbell 1998).  
Historical institutionalism emerged as a reaction to several streams of 
thought in the domain of political science. Historical institutionalism de-
fines institutions as the formal and informal rules and processes that struc-
ture actors’ behaviour (Steinmo and Thelen 1992: 2). The central assump-
tion of this school of thought is that historical and institutional settings 
influence the political behaviour of actors. Furthermore, historical institu-
tionalists reject the rational choice assumption that actors are motivated 
only by material self-interest. They argue that institutions provide the 
frame which directs actors’ preferences, goals and the strategies they adopt 
(Steinmo and Thelen 1992). Feedback received through learning allows 
decision-makers to adjust policies on an incremental basis to suit their 
purposes (Pierson 2000). Compared to rational choice and organisational 
institutionalists, historical institutionalists are more balanced in their work. 
To explain human behaviour, for example, they use both a logic of appro-
priateness or value-based logic (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, Campbell 
2004) and a logic of instrumentality or interest-based logic. 
One criticism of historical institutionalism is that it pays little attention 
to how ideas facilitate rather than constrain action. How actors deliberately 
use underlying norms and values as a frame to manipulate policymaking 
and institutional change is not specified (Campbell 1998). Historical insti-
tutionalist take for granted the processes by which institutions change. 
That is, they fail to specify the working of actors and their agency. In short, 
they use path dependence loosely to explain the evolutionary nature of 
institutional change, without specifying the mechanisms involved (Camp-
bell 1997, 2004). 
 From the foregoing conceptualisation of institutions, each of the three 
schools of thought can be said to have its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Nonetheless, the differences in their approaches to institutional analysis 
make it challenging to derive a meaningful theory of institutional change 
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(Steinmo and Thelen 1992). Notwithstanding the differences in approach, 
many authors have identified the need to combine the strengths of these 
different paradigms to bridge the theoretical gaps, as each is deemed to 
have unique perspectives that help explain how institutions change. The 
current study reiterates this call, and argues for interdisciplinary thinking 
and constructive engagement with all three schools of thought. I draw on 
the strengths of each school to advance our understanding of processes 
of institutional change (Hall and Taylor 1996, Campbell 2004, Scott and 
Meyer 1994).  
The evidence presented above suggests that pre-existing institutions 
constrain actors’ choices, making institutional change path dependent and 
evolutionary. Existing institutions and mechanisms of enforcement con-
strain actors’ capacities to engage in revolutionary change, which is why 
change is usually path dependent and evolutionary (North 1990; Campbell 
and Pedersen 1996; Ostrom 1990, 1991: 10). The institutional change lit-
erature provides additional evidence in Charles E. Lindblom’s (1959) writ-
ings on “the science of muddling through” in public policy. Although 
Lindblom’s focus was not on institutional change, his characterisation of 
public policymaking as “muddling through” implies that people compete 
in the policy arena to satisfy their interests. Because actors compete to 
serve their own economic, political and social interests, the process of pol-
icy remains gradual and path dependent (Lindblom 1979).  
Notwithstanding these constraints, I argue that institutions and mech-
anisms for enforcement provide means for actors to both resist and en-
gage in change. I also maintain that what motivates actors to resist and 
engage in change is informed by economic, political, social and moral con-
siderations. By extension, actors are motivated to resist and engage in 
change by considerations of economics, normative acceptance and cogni-
tive appropriateness. Institutions, as read in this section, make change evo-
lutionary and path dependent. It is therefore necessary to clarify what is 
meant by institutions, how they change, sources of institutional change 
and concepts used to explain the evolutionary nature of change.  
3.2 Institutions  
What are institutions? Scholars differ in their answers to this basic ques-
tion. Some refer to institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interactions” (North 1990: 3, Nelson and Winter 2009). For 
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Hodgson (2006: 2), institutions are “embedded social rules that structure 
social interactions and create stable expectations of behaviour… imposing 
forms and consistency in human activities”. Others define institutions as 
“prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive and 
structured interactions” (Ostrom 2005: 3).  
To Campbell (2004: 1), “institutions are the foundation of life and con-
sist of formal and informal rules, [practices], monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms and systems of meaning that define the context within which 
individuals… and other organisations operate and interact with each 
other”. 
Scott (2001: 51-53) conceptualised institutions through three lenses: 
“regulative (constraining and regularising the behaviour and choices of 
agents); normative (prescribes appropriate actions and activities, e.g., val-
ues and norms); and, cultural-cognitive (they are shared beliefs that con-
stitute the social reality and frames through which meaning is attributed 
to objects and activities)”.  
A common thread running through all of these definitions is the dual 
character of institutions. They both constrain and enable actors in their 
choices. Institutions are expressed through rules, social norms and cultural 
beliefs. Also, institutions provide the structure and resources that actors 
need to perform their roles and responsibilities.  
Aside from the differences between the definitions of institutions, in-
stitutions are often misunderstood and mistaken for organisations. Alt-
hough the two concepts do overlap (Uphoff 1989), there are differences. 
North (1990), for instance, described an organisation as players brought 
together by a common purpose to achieve an objective. They include po-
litical, economic and social bodies. Similarly, Cernea (1987: 15) defined 
organisations as “networks of behavioural roles arranged into hierarchies 
to elicit desired individual behaviour and co-ordinated actions by obeying 
[defined systems] of rules and procedures”. Merrey (1996: 8) described 
organisations as “structures of recognised and accepted roles”.  
Taken together, this thesis arrives at a definition of institutions as con-
sisting of formal and informal rules, resources, practices and monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms (Uphoff 1989) which define the context 
within which individuals operate and interact with each other. Organisa-
tions, in contrast, are actors or agents brought together by a common pur-
pose or higher order actors, such as state government, international actors 
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or local elites, to achieve a desired objective or outcome. The activities 
that enable those involved to achieve the desired goals are defined in terms 
of roles, responsibilities, institutional arrangements and everyday prac-
tices1 (Merrey et al. 2007: 196).  
3.2.1 Categorising institutions  
While definitions of institutions differ between the various schools of 
thought, two major categories of institutions are held in common: formal 
and informal. Formal institutions are “written rules and procedures, which 
are expectations or actions required or forbidden, and enforced through 
third parties, such as courts, legislature, and bureaucracies” (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004: 727). Informal institutions are “socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, and communicated either orally or through symbolic represen-
tations” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). Examples of informal institu-
tions include conventions, codes of behaviour and norms. This category 
of institutions is self-enforcing or self-policing, making it unnecessary for 
a third-party enforcer to ensure compliance (Brousseau et al. 2011).  
Yet, this dichotomous categorisation often turns out to be ambiguous 
and complex, leading to outcomes that are contradictory and vague. It can 
be a challenge to apply the distinction meaningfully in institutional analysis 
(Cleaver 2002, Helmke and Levitsky 2004, Kingston and Caballero 2009). 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) pointed out that the distinction between for-
mal and informal institutions is not unequivocal. For example, many insti-
tutions within the state (bureaucratic norms and corruption) are informal, 
while the rules governing many non-state organisations, such as corpora-
tions and political parties, are widely considered formal. The categorisation 
of informal institutions as self-enforcing or enforced by the group fails to 
account for the fact that certain informal rules are externally enforced, for 
example, by clan and mafia bosses or even the state itself (e.g., in the case 
of organised state corruption) (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). 
Kingston and Caballero (2009) argued that some forms of informal 
rules have a direct influence on actors’ preferences and choices regarding 
formal rules. For example, players’ choices are influenced when a rule or 
practice is perceived as unfair. Also, in some cases, informality may imply 
that rules not written down can be changed through agreement. 
The current study acknowledges the challenges, ambiguities and com-
plexities surrounding the usage and interpretation of institutions as formal 
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or informal. The superficiality of this categorisation makes it challenging 
to apply in this thesis. In reality, they are two arms of institutions that 
coexist and are interrelated, overlapping with one another. Informal insti-
tutions are in part extensions of the interpretations given to formal insti-
tutions, and formal institutions depend on informal institutions for their 
sustainability and durability (Saleth and Dinar 2004). To avoid the chal-
lenges associated with the formal/informal distinction, I use a different 
categorisation of institutions that emphasises where the institutions origi-
nate.  
Thus, state-led institutions are those that originate from the state. For 
this study, state-led institutions include international best practices and na-
tional government-initiated policies and programmes, normally backed by 
the legal and regulatory framework of the state. These institutions are ex-
ogenous to communities but provide guidance and direction to the state 
and affiliated organisations and implementing actors (Sokile et al. 2003). 
State-led institutions evolve through political processes, are centrally de-
signed by the state government and are enforced by third parties. Enforce-
ment mechanisms include regulatory frameworks, programmes, laws, pol-
icy guidelines, manuals, strategy documents, by laws and regulating 
organisations established in accordance with legal and regulatory frame-
works, including the resources (financial and technical) that allow actors 
to perform their roles and responsibilities. 
Community-led or community-embedded institutions2 are my second 
category. These include rules, social norms, cultural beliefs and practices 
determined by localised customs and the tradition and culture of a com-
munity. They are codified (implied or explicit) and transmitted from gen-
eration to generation; they are self-enforcing and are internally generated 
or community initiated (Sokile et al. 2005). In this category are included 
the resources (human and social capital) which the communities rely on in 
their daily interactions. Here “community” implies people living in a spe-
cific social space within clearly specified boundaries and using common 
sources of water or facilities.  
This study acknowledges the state-led and community-led categories of 
institution as two extremes on a continuum. As they can overlap, interlink 
and form hybrids, the distinction is purely analytic. What is important for 
this study is not the distinctive features of state, community or hybrid in-
stitutions. Rather, the current research seeks to understand how a category 
of institutions can facilitate or frustrate actors’ capacity to implement 
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specific policies or programmes, for our purposes, institutional reform in 
small town and rural water supply in Ghana under the NCWSP.  
3.3 Theories of institutional change 
3.3.1 Collective action theories of change 
Schools of thought differ on how institutions change. This study views 
institutional change as a force or process that stimulates actors to resist, 
renegotiate and modify institutions and institutional arrangements. Many 
authors treat institutional change as a centralised collective action process. 
Through combined political bodies, such as the state, community and or-
ganisations, institutions are constructed. Individuals bargain or engage in 
collective action to change rules for their own benefit or for the collective 
good of the group (Kingston and Caballero 2009: 155, Campbell 2004). 
To these, Helmsing (2013) added multilateral and bilateral organisations, 
aid donors and civil society organisations in developing countries as influ-
ential actors in directing processes of institutional change. 
In her studies of governing the commons, Ostrom (1990) maintained 
that for policymakers to overcome problems of collective action they must 
address free-riding, solve commitment problems, arrange for the supply 
of new institutions and monitor individual compliance with sets of rules. 
She also maintained that groups that are able to organise and govern their 
behaviour successfully are marked by the following design principles: (i) 
clearly defined boundaries; (ii) rules that are well matched to local needs 
and conditions; (iii) implementing actors’ participation in rules formation; 
(iv) a monitoring system in place; and (v) a graduated system of sanctions 
with low cost conflict resolution mechanisms.  
Notwithstanding the capacity of actors to successfully govern their be-
haviours, Ostrom (2005) presented a three-level hierarchy of rules that in-
fluence actors’ behaviours and the outcomes of these. The first is opera-
tional choice rules, which guide daily procedures and can change relatively 
quickly. The second is collective choice rules, which change at a slower 
pace and structure the direction of operations and the practices of partic-
ipants. (iii) Constitutional choice rules are the third level. These establish 
collective choice processes and determine who may take part; and are least 
amenable to change.  
Drawing on the foregoing, we suggest that institutions are interdepend-
ent and hierarchical, with change at one level of an institution setting the 
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pace for changes at other levels. Because of the interdependence of insti-
tutions, change is often gradual and path dependent, as opposed to rapid 
and revolutionary.  
3.3.2 Evolutionary institutional change  
A large and growing body of literature treats institutional change as an 
evolutionary process. Within this process, new rules and institutional ar-
rangements emerge through a process of decentralised selection involving 
learning, imitation and experimentation. Through competition, unsuccess-
ful institutions fall by the wayside while successful institutions spread and 
replicate (Kingston and Caballero 2009).  
The concept of institutional evolution borrows core Darwinist princi-
ples of variation, retention and selection. A number of authors claim that 
these evolutionary terms can help us to understand the cultural, political 
and economic dynamics in any institutional change process (e.g., Campbell 
1965, Tilly and Ardant 1975, Hayek 1983, Nelson and Winter 2002 cited 
in Blyth et al. 2011). 
Variation, for example, offers an understanding of how institutions 
change in an incremental way. Existing environmental factors, such as 
availability of information and resources, give some actors advantages 
over others, affecting actors’ abilities to resist and engage in institutional 
change. Although actors are replete with social norms, rules and behav-
iour, their ability or tendency to cooperate hinges on their cognitive ca-
pacities to change or sustain the institutions in use (Kingston and Cabal-
lero 2009: 160).  
Institutional evolutionists maintain that adaptation is an important as-
pect of the evolutionary process of institutional change. Gould (1989), for 
example, argued that major changes in history resulted from the cumula-
tive effect of many small adaptations. On the other hand, big changes can 
result from massive environmental shocks that lead to punctuated equilib-
rium (Blyth et al. 2011: 309). In other words, historical events direct the 
path, choices and selection of rules and actions (Kingston and Caballero 
2009). 
The central assumptions of evolutionary institutional change reflect so-
cial, cultural and economic factors. Institutional change is said to stem 
mainly from human nature. A key contribution in this regard is Veblen’s 
“habits of thought” (Chavance 2009). Habits, according to Veblen, are 
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durable mechanisms that sustain institutions and drive individuals to make 
decisions and act in particular ways. Moreover, actors’ bounded rationality 
stimulates them to fall back on habits. Habits, therefore, make it easier for 
actors to interpret and understand a complex environment (Hodgson 
2004, Kingston and Caballero 2009). The concept of habit has been criti-
cised for its inability to explain actors’ choices and preferences (Hodgson 
2006, 2004). The current study views habits as an important determining 
factor in influencing change. Thus, I look at how the habits of actors pro-
vide a basis for their behaviour, beyond rational motivations.  
Lately, social theorists have given more attention to the role of power 
as a force driving and shaping institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010), for example, argued that disparities in resources enable some ac-
tors to be more capable and have more bargaining power than others. 
These powerful actors dominate institutional change processes, coherently 
affecting the type of institutional change that emerges. Others have argued 
that institutional change does not always reflect the preferences of the 
powerful actors, but are a result of spill-overs or compromises among the 
actors coordinating the implementation of institutional change (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010).  
Shedding more light on the above, the operation of institutions occa-
sionally directs and generates pressure for change. This may happen, for 
example, when distributional inequalities create rivalry among power-
holders, which exerts change pressure (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Hol-
lingsworth and Boyer (1997: 3) argued that institutional arrangements are 
always diverse, because differences in actors’ interests and power affect 
their choices and preferences. The notion of power, in addition to agency 
and socio-cultural norms, helps us to understand why some actors have 
so much influence in the creation of new institutions (Knight and North 
1997, Chang 2002). 
 Helmsing (2013) argued that change can be driven by variation in the 
distribution of resources, such as finances, knowledge and power, and that 
existing institutions influence the strategies that actors adopt to promote 
their own interests or to block change. Furthermore, existing institutional 
structures can confer authoritative resources to one group, to the disad-
vantage of others because of the asymmetry of resources. Institutional 
change then becomes a struggle between groups, with each imposing its 
own interests through the formation of “coalitions”. Sustaining institu-
tions, according to Helmsing (2013), then necessitates institutional change, 
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which is reliant on the following: (i) the existence of competing institutions 
to enable choices and flexibility of the institutions in question to enable 
change; (ii) capacity and role of the state to enforce rules; and (iii) ability 
to compensate losers to prevent them from blocking change.  
With regard to new rules, Gómez (2008) elaborated on four govern-
ance issues that are key to the sustainability of institutions: (i) input legiti-
macy and level of acceptability of rules among implementers; (ii) capacity 
to enforce and ensure compliance with rules; (iii) capacity of rules to solve 
a social dilemma; and (iv) the switching cost associated with new rules. 
From the writings of these scholars, we can affirm that institutions 
change as a result of a confrontation between actors promoting new rules 
and others favouring the status quo. The extent to which change is likely 
depends on the costs and benefits of the proposed change (Kingston and 
Caballero 2009: 156). However, there are scholars who argue that eco-
nomic benefit alone cannot motivate actors to initiate change. For exam-
ple, Gómez (2008) argued that actors’ moral values, worldviews and iden-
tities drive institutional change. I argue that diverse factors drive change 
while acknowledging that these factors are difficult to establish on the sur-
face. As some scholars have argued that change is exogenous, while others 
have focused on endogenous factors, I argue that what drives change is 
both exogenous and endogenous. Nevertheless, these factors on their own 
are not sufficient to clearly understand actors’ motivations for engaging in 
change. I argue that actors’ motivations and logic must be examined to 
determine why they might strive to change, maintain and sustain institu-
tions. These motivational factors arise from economic benefits, political 
interests, moral values and the identities and worldviews of actors (Camp-
bell 2004, Gómez 2008, March and Olsen 2006).  
The institutional change literature is replete with empirical evidence on 
how institutions change in an incremental (evolutionary) manner and 
when change is radical (revolutionary). Following Helmsing (2013), I view 
institutional change as not strictly a spontaneous or deliberate process, but 
rather a combination of both. The existing environmental conditions re-
flected in policies, laws, social norms, cultural beliefs, customs and actors’ 
motivations make institutional change path dependent and evolutionary. 
Most institutionalists use path dependence to explain why institutional 
change is evolutionary in nature. This thesis follows that tradition, ac-
knowledging the importance of history and existing institutions in 
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rendering change path dependent and evolutionary. First, change becomes 
path dependent due to lock-in effects and the high cost involved in chang-
ing institutions, which stimulates actors to persist in their old ways of do-
ing things. Secondly, lack of information constrains actors’ capacity to en-
gage in new innovative and transformational activities. Notwithstanding 
earlier contributions, few studies have accounted for the processes by 
which change does emerge, so as to enable us to understand patterns of 
institutional change. In an effort to close this gap, I look at the way path 
dependence has been used to explain the evolutionary nature of institu-
tional change. I then proceed to investigate the mechanisms or processes 
by which institutional change occurs in an evolutionary fashion.  
3.3.3 Path dependence in processes of change  
Several studies have conceptualised institutional change as a path-depend-
ent process (Martin and Sunley 2006, Hall and Taylor 1996, Thelen 1999, 
Pierson 2000). The main argument put forward is that historical and envi-
ronmental factors play a crucial role in the day-to-day interactions and re-
lationships among economic, social and political actors, hence making in-
stitutional change a function of what exists or has gone before. Path 
dependence is based on three concepts: self-reinforcing mechanisms, 
switching costs and critical junctures. The first two concepts explain the 
continuity of institutions and the difficulty of institutional change. In other 
words, they help explain how institutions, and networks of institutions, 
take shape through self-reinforcing mechanisms and as a result become 
difficult to change. The third concept, drawn from political science, pro-
poses that there are key moments at which radical reforms may occur 
(Prado and Trebilcock 2009, Martin and Sunley 2006).  
Advancing this line of inquiry, Martin and Sunley (2006) used three 
related concepts: “technological lock-in” (associated with Paul David), 
“increasing returns” (coined by Brian Arthur) and “institutional hystere-
sis” (advanced by Douglas North and Mark Setterfield), to explain why 
institutions and institutional arrangements occur in a path-dependent 
manner (Martin and Sunley 2006: 399). They argued that “positive feed-
back” locks in a particular process of actions, because of increasing re-
turns. In other words, the benefits of doing things in a particular way in-
crease, rather than decrease, over time as more and more people invest in 
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that way of doing things. As a result, changing an old way of doing things 
becomes less and less attractive (Pierson 2000). 
Further studies by North (2005) point to three main levels of path de-
pendence in institutional change: the individual level, the institutional level 
and the social level. At the individual level, North (2005) argued that past 
institutional structures reflect a set of beliefs and practices, which makes 
institutional change path dependant either because the proposed changes 
run counter to existing practices or because they threaten existing organi-
sational leaders and entrepreneurs (North 2005, Prado and Trebilcock 
2009: 354). 
At the institutional level, institutional change becomes counter-produc-
tive if interrelated and interconnected institutions are ignored.  
At the social level, North (2005) maintained that formal and informal 
institutions, and their enforcement mechanisms, are critical for the perfor-
mance of any institution. He also argued that while formal institutions can 
easily change through political and state interventions, informal institu-
tions are difficult to change in the short run, as their enforcement charac-
teristics are only imperfectly subject to deliberate control. The literature 
further reveals that interactions between formal and informal institutions 
help to explain why institutional changes are often path dependent and 
why they sometimes fail to produce the intended outcomes (Prado and 
Trebilcock 2009). 
This thesis recognises the concepts of self-reinforcement mechanism, 
lock-in effects and increasing returns (Martin and Sunley 2006, Hall and 
Taylor 1996, Thelen 1999, Pierson 2000), alongside the interconnections 
between formal and informal institutions (North 2005), as providing a 
good starting point for investigating the evolutionary nature of change. 
Some scholars, however, use self-reinforcement mechanisms, increasing 
returns and positive feedback to explain institutional resilience, rather than 
institutional change. As observed in a number of studies, path dependence 
yields two opposing ideas. First, the legacies of the past affect actors’ 
choices and constrain their ability to allow new institutional change. Sec-
ond, the lock-in effect explains resistance to change, rather than how 
change processes evolve. This deterministic reading of the concept blurs 
the processes or mechanisms by which path dependence is involved in 
institutional change (Pierson 2000, Prado and Trebilcock 2009).  
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Most institutionalists have used path dependence to explain why insti-
tutional change is evolutionary in nature. They acknowledge the im-
portance of history and the constraining aspect of pre-existing institutions 
in directing the path of institutional change. Thus, pre-existing institutions, 
such as state policies and actions, power relations and cultural factors, are 
said to constrain actors’ choices and preferences, rendering change evolu-
tionary and path dependent (Campbell 1997, 2004). Kingston and Cabal-
lero (2007) argued that institutional inertia is closely related to history and 
the presence of pre-exiting institutions, which influence the configuration 
of actors’ interests and the bargaining power they can muster to block 
implementation of institutional change. 
In the current study, I similarly acknowledge that the processes in-
volved in embarking on institutional change are constrained by pre-exist-
ing institutional arrangements, specifically institutions, power relations, 
state actions and cultural factors. This, again, makes the outcome of such 
change more evolutionary and path dependent. Nevertheless, the pro-
cesses by which actors determine their choices and preferences remain ill-
defined in most of the institutional change literature (Campbell 1997, 
2004). It important to note that few evolutionary institutionalists 
acknowledge actor agency. For instance, Garaud and Karnoe (2001) in 
their studies, revealed that actors not only reacted to external shocks or 
actions (e.g., national policy), but also initiated changes in the direction of 
institutional development. Nevertheless, most evolutionary institutional-
ists, for example, those who rely on the constraining aspects of institutions 
to explain change, have failed to establish how actors define their prob-
lems and interests, and how they develop their ideas about alternative in-
stitutional arrangements. These, according to Campbell, (2004) are “ana-
lytical black boxes”, concealing important mechanisms underlying 
evolutionary institutional change.  
Failure to consider the mechanisms or processes of institutional change 
prevents us from factoring in the effect of agency in explaining institu-
tional change. The current study suggests that if the processes or mecha-
nisms of institutional change are ignored, institutionalists may end up sub-
stituting their own assumptions and interpretations of actors’ interests for 
those that actually motivate actors’ behaviour. This can be considered a 
major weakness in the work of institutionalists thus far (Campbell 1997, 
2004: 62; Bendor et al. 2001: 188; DiMaggio 1988: 10; Skocpol 1984: 17). 
To address the gap, this thesis seeks to specify the mechanisms or 
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processes that account for institutional change in order to advance con-
vincing theories and empirical arguments to explain change. To contribute 
to this growing area of research, I specifically explore the processes and 
factors that drove institutions to change in my six study cases. 
3.4 Mechanisms explaining institutional change  
As noted earlier, actors respond to an exogenous shock by engaging in 
change only if the benefit of implementing that change outweighs the cost. 
Nonetheless, the presence of pre-existing institutions and enforcement 
mechanisms constrains actors from making a radical change.  
According to Kingston and Caballero (2009), choices are constrained 
both by actors’ inability to access complete information about their envi-
ronment and by the strategies actors adopt.  
The constraints-based explanation of institutional change encourages 
us to concentrate on exogenous factors, with less focus on endogenous 
factors and actor agency. Actors respond to change pressure exerted by 
exogenous factors such as technological developments, economic condi-
tions, shifts in state policies and power struggles. Actors may seek to alle-
viate such pressures by modifying institutional arrangements through, for 
example, bargaining, trial and error, negotiation and other strategies. Most 
of these explanations of institutional change focus on structural aspects, 
with less attention given to agential factors employed by those involved to 
facilitate and resist institutional change (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2003, Se-
budubudu and Molutsi 2009, Leftwich 2010b: 94).  
Recent years have witnessed a growth in the institutionalist literature 
focusing on actors and their agency. The emphasis of these writings tends 
to be the “autonomy of agents [and] their choices”, with innovation pro-
posed as the rightful focus in explaining institutional change (Leftwich 
2010a: 94). 
Factoring actor agency into the analysis of institutions allows us to in-
vestigate how actors define their problems and interests, and how they 
develop the ideas that inform the choices they make between alternative 
institutional arrangements. This is important if we are to understand what 
mechanisms or processes underlie institutional change (e.g., North 1990, 
Campbell and Lindberg 1990). 
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Scholars from the fields of organisational sociology and political sci-
ence have made theoretical and empirical advances in understanding the 
mechanisms and processes that enable institutions to change (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991, Scott and Meyer 1994, Steinmo and Thelen 1992). In 
line with their work (e.g., Hodgson 2005), I too argue for study of aspects 
that enable institutions to evolve. Particularly, I maintain that institutions 
provide actors with the scripts and interpretative frames they use to re-
spond to pressure for change. Existing institutions provide the social 
scripts by which actors define their interests and problems and create so-
lutions that lead to evolutionary institutional change (March and Olsen 
1983; Jepperson 1991: 46; Campbell 1997, 2004). The outcomes of insti-
tutional change processes are incremental and path dependent because ac-
tors can only work with the institutions that are available and known to 
them and considered appropriate and acceptable. Consistent with Camp-
bell (1997, 2004), I propose that we open the black box concealing mech-
anisms underlying evolutionary institutional change. To do this, I first ob-
serve how actors define their problems and interests and how they develop 
strategies towards possible alternative institutional arrangements. Sec-
ondly, my analysis considers endogenous institutions. Following this ap-
proach minimises the risk of substituting assumptions and interpretations 
of actors’ interests for those that actually motivate actors’ behaviour.  
3.5 Explaining processes of institutional change: 
Translation, bricolage and institutional 
entrepreneurship  
This thesis employs translation, bricolage and institutional entrepreneur-
ship to account for the mechanisms and processes underlying the evolu-
tionary nature of institutional change. All three concepts provide an ex-
planation for the enabling and constraining aspects of institutions in 
processes of change. With them, we are thus able to account for the pro-
cesses through which a specific policy is implemented in actual practice.  
Translation is a concept that leaves behind the assumption of the ra-
tionality of actors, though focusing on actors as the main drivers of policy 
change. As shown in much of the policy implementation literature, the 
local social and institutional context influences actors’ capacity to translate 
and implement central government policies. I use the concept of transla-
tion to explore how existing institutional factors influence actors’ capacity 
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to engage in one form of practices rather than other practices when con-
fronted with similar challenges.  
Institutional bricolage emphasises both the constraints and agency of 
actors in finding solutions to challenges (Cleaver 2012, 2001; Douglas 
1987; Campbell 2004, 1997). Although actors are constrained by the local 
social and institutional context (social structure), they find opportunities 
to innovate within those constraints.  
The scholarship on institutional entrepreneurs allows us to focus on 
the involved actors and the resources they employ to resist or promote 
institutional change. It also helps us to understand actors’ choices and 
preferences, such as why they might engage in certain practices in one 
setting and in other practices in another context (Beckert 1999, 2003; 
Kingdon 2002; Schneider and Teske 1992; Sheingate 2003; Helmsing 
2016). 
3.5.1 Translation  
Policy “transfer” is the conventional idea for explaining how policy travels 
from one place to another (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Over the years, 
scholars of organisational studies have adopted the concept of “transla-
tion” to refine understanding of how policies travel. Both concepts are 
similar, as they describe the interpretation given to policies when they 
come into contact with recipients for implementation (Czarniawska and 
Sevón 1996). The difference is mainly one of emphasis. “Translation im-
plies that actors modify innovations to fit their unique needs in time and 
space” (Whittle et al. 2010: 20). Freeman (2007: 429-430), however, main-
tained that translation means transfer. His point is that policy, practice and 
research move through a chain of processes, from formulation and inter-
pretation of ideas to operationalisation and implementation. 
“Translation”, according to Campbell (2004), is similar to “bricolage” 
(see section 3.5.2) in that both involve innovation through a recombina-
tion of institutional elements to solve a problem. While “bricolage is re-
combination of old locally given [elements], translation... involves combi-
nation of new externally given elements received through diffusion as well 
as old locally given ones inherited from the past” (Campbell 2004: 80). 
The thrust of this argument is that the local social and institutional context 
affects the degree of change that is likely to occur. Context, according to 
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Campbell (2004), influences actors’ interpretation and implementation of 
new policies and practices.  
Although policy travel, transfer, diffusion and translation have similar-
ities, there are important differences between them. Freeman (2009) em-
phasised that translation carries more analytical power, as it illuminates or 
makes explicit the distinctions between policy ideas and practices.  
Mukhtarov (2014: 78) provided four major differences between policy 
transfer and translation: (i) Policy transfer is limited to government, while 
policy translation includes all actors involved in policymaking and imple-
mentation. (ii) The more complex the policy ideas, the less probability of 
it being transferred in policy, with contextual factors affecting the capacity 
of actors to implement policy. (iii) Policy transfer happens in a linear and 
prescriptive way, while in translation, no guidelines are available and the 
process is highly contingent on many factors. (iv) Policy transfer is con-
strained by the path dependence of policies or factors exogenous to im-
plementers, while in translation, constraints are socially constructed within 
the context of the application; in other words, both exogenous and en-
dogenous factors constrain implementation in policy translation. (v) Policy 
transfer seeks a “best fit” between polices and context, while translation 
looks to get the “unfit to fit”, constructing solution to the challenges en-
countered (Mukhtarov 2014: 78).  
A key criticism of the conventional approach of policy transfer is its 
assumption of the perfect rationality of actors. Actors or implementers are 
thought to diffuse and enact policies irrespective of their position or situ-
ation. In other words, actors’ social, political and cognitive capacities to 
influence or constrain policy implementation is taken for granted.  
Both concepts are acknowledged as largely bypassing the social con-
struction of problems, in favour of a positivist ideological view (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 1996, 2000). Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) affirmed the view that 
because actors are rationally bounded, they are unable to understand their 
environment. As a result, they base their decisions on mistaken and un-
clear information about the new policy ideas (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 
16). These same authors argued that conventional scholarship on policy 
travel pays insufficient attention to the multiplicity of actors and the effect 
of this multiplicity on how ideas and policies are interpreted.  
The notion of politics of scale has similarly received little attention in 
the policy transfer literature (see also Marston 2000). The interrelationship 
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between the global, national and local is an important indicator for under-
standing policy enactment and implementation (Lendvai, Noémi and 
Stubbs 2007, 2009). Whittle et al. (2010) identified notable differences be-
tween diffusion and translation. The former is said to rest on the assump-
tion that actors are not influenced by the local environment and that in-
novation remains constant, whereas “translation implies that actors 
modify innovations to ‘fit their unique needs in time and space’ and are 
themselves transformed in the process” (Whittle et al. 2010: 19). 
Lendvai and Stubbs (2007, 2009) listed three characteristics of the 
translation process. First, it is dynamic and complex, involving multiple 
actors. Second, the process of translation is continuous, which allows ac-
tors to transfer their knowledge and the effects of power. In short, the 
focus of translation is on representation, power and history (Lendvai, 
Noémi and Stubbs 2007, 2009). Clark (2008) described translation as shed-
ding light on three aspects of policy and practice: (i) it illuminates pro-
cesses of policy translation and transfer; (ii) it explains implementation by 
showing how policy ideas travel to “frontline practices”; and (iii) it throws 
light on the work of actors who mediate between language, context and 
practice.  
Despite the analytical strength of translation in explaining processes of 
change, the logic of action which informs actors’ interpretations and un-
derstandings is not outside the influence of their immediate environment. 
Several studies identify factors likely to influence or constrain the transla-
tion process and consequently the final outcome. Dolowitz and Marsh 
(1996) named three of these as (i) insufficient information about a policy 
or programme; (ii) availability of institutional capacity, resources, finances 
and information on structures; and (iii) actors’ economic, social and polit-
ical ideologies.  
For Campbell (2004), the translation process is constrained by (i) the 
local social and institutional context and the political support provided by 
national actors; (ii) organisational characteristics and the extent to which 
leaders within organisations are committed to implementation of new 
ideas and principles; (iii) the availability of implementing resources in 
terms of financial, administrative and other needed capacities and skills; 
and (iv) power struggle.  
Rose (1993) proposed a number of hypothesises regarding constraints 
on translation: (i) Programmes with a single goal are more likely to succeed 
than those with multiple goals. (ii) Programmes that relate problems to 
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solutions are more likely to succeed than those in which the relationship 
is more blurred, with policies that compromise and threaten the power 
and legitimacy of other implementing actors less likely to be successfully 
translated. (iii) The more information the implementing actors have, the 
greater the likelihood that policies will be translated more substantially 
than symbolically. (iv) When technological innovations are less complex, 
there are fewer ambiguities in policies, and programme translation is 
smoother (Rose 1993). 
It is important to emphasise that the translation process influences ac-
tors’ institutional logic of action. The logic of action entails the motiva-
tions and calculus that direct actors’ choices and practices. For instance, 
economic or political self-interest may influence actors’ choices. In some 
circumstances, actors’ cognitive understanding and discourses on how 
things ought to be organised influence their choices and actions (Campbell 
2004: 84).  
Despite much new knowledge about translation, the focus of the cur-
rent work is not on the semantic debate about what translation stands for. 
In this study, I view translation as the vertical transfer of national policies 
to communities and the way recipients’ local social and institutional con-
text shapes their interpretation and implementation of national policies. 
In this thesis, translation connotes the interpretation given to national pol-
icies, ideas, principles and practices and how these interpretations influ-
ence implementation. Factors that affect and inform actors’ choices and 
practices and the logic underlying their actions are considered part of the 
process of translation.  
 Translation is used to shed light on the processes by which policies are 
enacted and implemented in actual practice. Actors’ practices are recog-
nised as being influenced by the surrounding environment and the logic 
behind actors’ choices and practices. March and Olsen (1996, 2006) con-
firmed such a logic of action as informing actors’ behaviour. The transla-
tion literature further allows us to understand how actors operationalise 
new ideas either for themselves or for others (March and Olsen 1996, 
2006). In addition, the concept of translation directs our explicit attention 
to all actors involved in implementing policy ideas. This helps us to reflect 
on what enables or constrains an actor’s agency and the motivations be-
hind the choices and practices they adopt. 
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3.5.2 Bricolage  
The term bricolage or institutional bricolage has been applied to explain 
the dichotomous characteristic of institutions (both enabling and con-
straining) as well as their tendency to change gradually from within. An-
thropologist Levi Strauss (1966) coined the term intellectual bricolage, 
which Douglas (1987) expanded on to explain the constraining and ena-
bling aspects of institutions. Giddens (1984), Long (2003) and Douglas 
(1987) drew on the concept to explain the relationship between agency 
and structure. Giddens (1984) perceived structure and agency as interde-
pendent; therefore, cautioning us not to place one concept higher than the 
other. His structuration theory emphasises the duality of institutions in 
enabling and constraining actions. Agency is understood as allowing indi-
viduals to interact with their environment in creative ways, although they 
are also constrained by their surroundings. 
Cleaver (2002) used “institutional bricolage” to explain how institu-
tions develop and function, defining bricolage as “a process in which peo-
ple consciously and non-consciously draw on existing social formulae… 
to ‘patch’ or ‘piece together’ institutions in response to changing situa-
tions” (Cleaver 2012: 37). Important aspects of the process of bricolage 
are that (i) it responds to everyday practices through improvisation and 
innovation; (ii) it relies on different attributes such as power, identity, ex-
isting customs and cultural practices; and (iii) it uses a similar arrangement 
for multiple purposes and tasks (Cleaver 2002, 2012). In addition, organi-
sational arrangements invented or borrowed from existing institutions 
must conform to routines or habitual ways of doing things. In other 
words, the pieced together or adopted multifunctional institutional ar-
rangements must be familiar and fit with the accepted logic of practices 
and social relations. This gives the new institutions legitimacy and ac-
ceptance and facilitates the exercise of authority (Cleaver 2012, 2002).  
An important part of the process of bricolage is its dependence on the 
bricoleurs’ hold on an authoritative resource, such as economic (e.g., 
wealth), personal characteristics (e.g., knowledge, power, creativity, elo-
quence) and influence (Cleaver 2012, 2002). 
Cleaver identified three ways by which institutional bricolage takes 
shape: (i) aggregation, defined as recombination of existing institutions or 
socio-cultural institutions with newly introduced institutions; (ii) altera-
tion, defined as improvising ad hoc new institutional arrangements by 
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borrowing from both institutions to fit into a specific context; and (iii) 
articulation, defined as asserting identities and cultural values to resist im-
posed institutional design. Norms, customs, traditions and beliefs play 
many roles in the bricolage process (Cleaver 2012, 2001, 2002; Cleaver, 
Dalton and De Koning 2015). 
 Campbell (2004) defined bricolage as an innovative process in which 
actors construct new institutional solutions by combining elements in their 
repertoire. The process yields new institutions that differ from but resem-
ble old ones (Campbell 2004: 69). Campbell distinguished two types of 
bricolage: substantive and symbolic. Substantive bricolage “involves the 
re-combination of already existing institutional principles and practices to 
address [challenges] and follows the logic of instrumentality” (Campbell 
2004: 67-70). Symbolic bricolage involves recombination of symbolic 
principles and practices consistent with the dominant normative and cog-
nitive principles existing within a social environment. This follows a logic 
of appropriateness whereby the recombined elements must be acceptable 
and legitimate. Generally, bricolage is conceived as an active process in 
which actors make and patch together different institutional elements. 
Overall, the outcome and process of bricolage are not made clear in 
either Campbell’s or Cleaver’s definition, although Campbell comes close 
with the differentiation between substantive and symbolic bricolage. 
Cleaver's conceptualisation of bricolage does not specify the translation 
process that bricoleurs go through to finalise their actions. In addition, the 
relationship between the outcome of implementation and the desired out-
comes, and the logic behind actors’ activities remain unclear. In contrast, 
Cleaver (2002, 2012) observed bricolage in action in natural resources 
management through the everyday practices of the bricoleurs. Cleaver also 
provided a clear view of the processes by which bricoleurs combine dif-
ferent institutions and practices to make changes when the need arises and 
the outcomes of their activities. 
Although Campbell (2004) provided an example of the process of bri-
colage, unlike Cleaver he used bricolage at a higher national level, paying 
less attention to local level policy application. Campbell’s study did not 
move beyond demonstrating the logic of action that informs the type of 
bricolage that emerges. He argued that it is difficult to understand the pro-
cess without a long timeframe to study actors. To understand the pro-
cesses and dynamics of institutional change, he advocated that research 
focus on the everyday practices of actors. This thesis takes up that call. By 
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observing the everyday practices of actors it traces the processes of brico-
lage found in implementation of the NCWSP. 
Many studies in natural resources management use the concept of bri-
colage to understand how change occurs. Sehring (2009) applied institu-
tional bricolage to understand water governance in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. She found that the institutional design of water user asso-
ciations, land distribution and enforcement of irrigation service fee collec-
tion was transformed through selective adoption of rules, laws, regulations 
and informal practices that fit and were compatible with the existing envi-
ronment. Komakech et al. (2012) used the concept to investigate why 
state-led water allocation and management in the Hingilili catchment area 
of Tanzania did not achieve the goal of equitable and sustainable manage-
ment. In this case, good social relations between highland and lowland 
neighbours provided the means for resolving conflict between farmers in 
the different localities (Komakech et al. 2012).  
Overall, evidence does seem to link bricolage with actor creativity in 
making decisions. Bricolage is useful for understanding how actors use the 
institutions within their repertoire to help define their preferences and 
choices. Furthermore, bricolage can help us to understand the influence 
of authoritative and allocative resources on actors’ final choices and the 
consequences of their actions. Nonetheless, the bricolage concept does 
not explicitly demonstrate the processes involved unless we engage in 
long-term study. Campbell (2004), for example, suggested that the social 
organisation and institutional location of actors explains differences in 
practices. Nonetheless, the following important questions remain unan-
swered: Why do actors make one form of bricolage rather than another, 
while being constrained by structures in the local context? How do they 
blend ideas from different places? What conditions trigger actors to use 
their agency? How does control over resources and institutions enable or 
constrain actors’ capacity to initiate or enforce change (Leftwich 2010: 
94)? 
 Campbell (2004) advocated observation of the everyday practices of 
actors to understand the processes involved. Similarly, Cleaver (2002, 
2012) demonstrated that a key characteristic of the institutional bricolage 
process is that it is a response to everyday practices. Cleaver’s types of 
bricolage processes (adaptation, aggregation and articulation) come close 
to exposing processes of bricolage by looking at the outcomes. The main 
questions left out in Cleaver’s explanation of the bricolage process are 
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what informs actors’ choices and why do actors adopt a particular type of 
bricolage. This renders the concept more descriptive, making its applica-
tion challenging.  
The current study defines bricolage as a process of innovation in which 
actors employ existing local institutions to enable a specific or given policy 
to work. This process occurs at the interface of resistance against, enforce-
ment of and finding solutions to challenges faced in implementing new 
policy ideas and technological innovations. The outcome of bricolage is to 
fulfil the interests of particular actors or to ensure the collective good. The 
process of bricolage relies on specific agents that push it forward. I identify 
these actors as institutional entrepreneurs; they use institutions and avail-
able resources to engage in institutional change.  
3.5.3 Institutional entrepreneurs:  
Who are they and what do they do?  
In recent years, the notion of institutional entrepreneurship has received 
increasing attention from scholars interested in accounting for both insti-
tutional and policy change (Galanti and Capano 2015, Galanti 2018, 
Greenwood and Suddaby 2006, Jensen and Fersch 2016, Koene and An-
sari 2013). Institutional entrepreneurship allows us to account for actor 
agency. The entrepreneurship literature views institutional change as en-
dogenously created when actors known as institutional entrepreneurs use 
their resources to realise their interests or to resolve challenges (Galanti 
2018). Explicit treatment of institutional entrepreneurs’ innovation and 
agency allows us to better understand processes of institutional change 
(Sheingate 2003). A focus on actors and agential capability enables us to 
provide an account of the processes by which institutions and institutional 
arrangements develop, change, resist and are sustained.  
Notwithstanding the above, the concept of institutional entrepreneurs 
has generated a number of controversies, as many terms have been used 
to describe the same people. This has rendered the term rather vague, dis-
puted and meaningless (Weik 2011: 466). Terms such as political, bureau-
cratic, policy and institutional entrepreneurs continue to be used across 
various discipline to refer to actors who bring about needed changes or 
negotiate new institutional arrangements that fit within an existing context 
(Beckert 1999, Weik 2011). In political science the focus is on individuals 
who are “creative, resourceful, and opportunistic leaders whose skilful 
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manipulation of politics somehow results in the creation of… new insti-
tution[s]… and [has] transformative effects on policies” (Sheingate 2003: 
188). Sheingate (2003) described such actors as political entrepreneurs. 
Likewise, Dahl (1961) used the term “political entrepreneur” to describe 
cunning and resourceful political leaders whose activities are fundamental 
to the process of political change.  
From a policy perspective, policy entrepreneurs have been described as 
“single (or groups of) individuals or organizations who are willing to invest 
their resources... to promote a position in return for anticipated future 
gain” (Kingdon 2002: 179). Policy entrepreneurs are able to do this by 
changing the established ways of doing things (Mintrom and Norman 
2009). Policy entrepreneurs focus on selling their ideas by defining a prob-
lem and introducing innovation aimed at problem solving (Mintrom and 
Norman 2009: 649-650, Kingdon 2002, Ackrill and Kay 2011). They use 
their access to resources, such as political connections, negotiating skills, 
technical expertise, finances and credibility, to facilitate or create new in-
stitutions (Kingdon 2002, Mintrom and Norman 2009). Mintrom and 
Norman (2009), for example, summarised four characteristics of policy 
entrepreneurship as follows: (i) displaying social acuity, that is, understand-
ing others and engaging in policy conversations; (ii) defining problems and 
finding strategies to resolve the problems; (iii) forging coalitions and rely-
ing on external and internal resources to find strategies to resolve the chal-
lenges; and (iv) demonstrating that the new strategies will work or have 
worked in another place. Other studies have shown that policy entrepre-
neurs are most likely to deliver results when the new strategies are con-
sistent with the local social and institutional context of the implementers 
(Bakir 2009). In other words, while the existing context constrains actors’ 
capacity to make changes, existing institutions provide the means that en-
able actors’ agency.  
Despite the differences, these perceptions of entrepreneurship all in-
volve the use of resources to promote innovation or resolve a problem, 
hoping for future gain (Galanti 2018). From the definitions provided, the 
current research identifies two categories of entrepreneurs: policy entre-
preneurs (similar to the descriptions of entrepreneurs by Kingdon 2002 
and Mintrom and Norman 2009) and political entrepreneurs (similar to 
Dahl 1961 and Sheingate 2003). These views of entrepreneurs best capture 
the nuances of what actors do to resist, change or facilitate institutional 
 Theoretical Framework: Institutional Analysis and Change 57 
 
change given their roles and responsibilities within their communities or 
organisations.  
Institutional entrepreneurship thus highlights the roles of actors and 
their capacity to influence and transform institutional contexts. Institu-
tional entrepreneurship refers to the “activities of actors who have an in-
terest in particular institutional arrangements and... sufficient resources, 
social and political skills, and the social position necessary to initiate and 
create new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire et al. 2004: 
657, DiMaggio 1988, Wahid and Sein 2013). 
I refer to institutional entrepreneurs as individuals or organisations 
who (i) are reactive and respond to challenges or engage in practices that 
resonate with their interests and values; (ii) use various strategies or prac-
tices to respond to the challenges; and (iii) have social and political skills 
and connections to networks, finances and expert knowledge which they 
use to create, facilitate or transform existing institutions. Institutional en-
trepreneurs recombine the elements within their repertoire in a creative 
process of bricolage to form new institutional arrangements. This allows 
them to solve specific challenges, to enforce new policy ideas or to resist 
new institutional change.  
3.5.4 Characteristics of institutional entrepreneurs  
Despite the growing literature on institutional entrepreneurs, scholars 
have yet to agree on a set of characteristics of these actors. Following Di-
Maggio (1988: 14-15), I identify the key characteristic of institutional en-
trepreneurs as their ability to see an opportunity and commit available re-
sources to change, resist or facilitate institutional change. 
The majority of scholars perceives institutional entrepreneurs as 
change agents that support the creation of institutions which are appro-
priate to and aligned with their interests (Dacin et al. 2002: 47) and act 
strategically to bring change (Jensen and Fersch 2016, Weik 2011). They 
do this by reconfiguring “an organisation’s roles, responsibilities, struc-
tures, outputs, processes, systems, technology or other resources” (Bu-
chanan and Badham 1999: 610). This scholarship links institutions and 
agency (Battilana 2006, Battilana et al. 2009, DiMaggio 1988). In other 
words, entrepreneurs find solutions to challenges by engaging in change. 
As change agents, they mobilise the resources necessary to effectuate the 
changes they seek (Jensen and Fersch 2016). They do so through the 
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acquisition of power (Klein et al. 2010), as well as by motivating others to 
join them through what Fligstein (2001) described as social skills.  
 Resources in this thesis are defined as the “structured properties of 
social systems drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in 
the course of interaction” (Giddens 1984: 15). Following Giddens, I iden-
tify two types of resources: authoritative and allocative. Authoritative re-
sources are command over people and over decision-making processes, as 
well as strategies such as policies and institutional arrangements (Giddens 
1984: 15). They also include access to information, knowledge, power and 
influence over a social network, human capacities, institutional factors and 
the position of the potential entrepreneur (Campbell 2004; Cleaver 2002, 
2012). Allocative resources describe the distribution of natural and physi-
cal resources, actors’ command over these resources, and the technology 
and infrastructure in use.  
For Campbell (2004), institutional entrepreneurs’ ability to achieve 
their objectives depends on three interrelated factors: (i) mobilisation of 
supporters through forging new inter-actor relationships to achieve col-
lective action; (ii) mobilising the needed resources in the form of finances, 
information and knowledge; and (iii) the social and institutional positions 
of prospective entrepreneurs and commitment of the entrepreneurs. 
These factors, according to Campbell (2004), are important in explaining 
why one form of entrepreneurship emerges instead of another. They are 
sources of power that stimulate actors’ creativity and innovation in the 
process of institutional change. 
Expanding on this idea, Cleaver (2002, 2012) maintained that bri-
coleurs’ or institutional entrepreneurs’ capacity to engage in change de-
pends on their access to resources. Resources are a source of power that 
sets limits on the kinds of change possible. Power, according to Mintzberg 
(1984: 208), is “the capacity of individuals or groups to effect, or affect, 
organizational outcomes”. Sotarauta (2009) identified four forms of power 
of institutional entrepreneurs as institutional power, interpretive power, 
resource power and network power. Institutional power enables institu-
tional entrepreneurs to use their official position in an organisation to 
force other actors to act differently or to change their preferences. Insti-
tutional entrepreneurs’ interpretive power allows them to rely on their ex-
pert knowledge to convince key persons to change their perceptions of 
their roles and responsibilities. On the use of resource power, institutional 
entrepreneurs’ access to financial resources allows them to facilitate and 
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control processes of institutional change. Network power allows institu-
tional entrepreneurs to use their personal networks to develop initiatives, 
obtain new information and come up with strategies to facilitate institu-
tional change.  
Along similar lines, Helmsing (2013) argued that the ability of actors to 
enable institutional change depends on the resources and the power they 
hold in the field of action concerned. The power available to the group 
for action can be “either financial or knowledge resources as well as their 
political and social networks” (Helmsing 2013: 10). In this thesis, I exam-
ine power in the context of the capacity to act through the exercise of 
agency, which emerges through collaboration and partnership with others; 
that is, “the power to” and “power with” (Gaventa 2006). Specifically, I 
look at power in three dimensions: (i) use of position to control people’s 
thoughts and influence their preferences, choices and decision-making; (ii) 
use of expert knowledge and finances to facilitate change; and (iii) use of 
network powers to develop initiatives and obtain new information and 
strategies to facilitate institutional change.  
Fligstein (1997) argued that actors’ skills are important in the process 
of change, referring to such skills as social skills. “Social skills are the abil-
ity to mobilise co-operation among different actors/networks by employ-
ing their collective interest, preferences, identities, and resources to justify 
actions” (Fligstein 1997: 398, DiMaggio 1988: 15). Veblen called this “hab-
itus”, which he identified as an important tool for analysing the actions of 
other actors (Fligstein 2001: 109).  
The strategies adopted by institutional entrepreneurs also produce re-
sources. These include framing actions, direct authority, agenda setting, 
aggregating interests, maintaining networks and forging relationships with 
other actors to ensure collective action (Fligstein 1997, Hardy and Maguire 
2008). Hitman and Meijerink (2010) found that actors’ capacity to realise 
a transition in water policy involved employment of the following strate-
gies: development of new ideas, building coalitions and selling ideas, rec-
ognising and exploiting windows of opportunity, and orchestrating and 
managing networks. Successful deployment of these strategies for change 
requires special skills, actions and attitudes on the part of the policy entre-
preneur. 
The current study acknowledges that actors’ entrepreneurship or 
agency is enabled by command over allocative and authoritative resources. 
These are understood to include physical characteristics as well as the 
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distribution of water resources and the size of water infrastructure. Other 
resources are existing institutions (both state-led and community-led), 
technical capacity, knowledge and access to information, social position, 
social skills and access to social and personal networks. These resources 
together are a source of power, which allows institutional entrepreneurs 
to resist, modify or facilitate institutional change.  
3.5.5 Motivation for actor entrepreneurship   
Overall, some evidence seems to indicate that problems are a necessary 
precondition for institutional entrepreneurs to emerge. However, a grow-
ing body of literature on institutional entrepreneurship emphasises the 
motivations and logic behind institutional entrepreneurs’ actions as the 
key condition to enable actor agency and engagement in entrepreneurship. 
In this regard, findings from organisational studies have proven useful for 
understanding the factors that motivate institutional entrepreneurship. 
Schneider and Teske (1992) maintained that political and economic factors 
are among the main triggers that stimulate entrepreneurs to be active. 
Some scholars suggest that uncertainties, crises and conflicting objec-
tives of policy; multiple and heterogeneous components of complex sys-
tems; and ambiguous relationships between actors and institutions pro-
vide the opportunity, resources and assets for actor creativity and 
innovation (Sheingate 2003: 186). Others argue that ideology, identity and 
worldview provide the medium through which actors interpret policies 
and shape their choices and practices (Hardy and Maguire 2008).  
Yet, even though most of the institutional entrepreneurship literature 
focuses on the role of uncertainty and motivational factors in generating 
the emergence of entrepreneurship, the motivations and logic behind ac-
tors’ behaviour remain unclear and unaccounted for in most studies.  
March and Olsen (2006) maintained that actors’ motivations must be 
explained both from the perspective of actors’ interests (a logic of instru-
mentality) and actors’ moral and social values (a logic of appropriateness). 
A logic of appropriateness entails embedded ideologies, worldviews, 
norms, identities and cultural values that inform and motivate actions and 
decisions. These embedded, community-led institutions are taken for 
granted by actors, but they nonetheless influence how actors interpret, un-
derstand and give meaning to events (March and Olsen 2006, Campbell 
2004). From an economic perspective (logic of instrumentality), expected 
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economic benefits motivate actors to change an institutional arrangement 
or engage in entrepreneurship. These include but are not limited to goals 
of reducing operational costs, finding a solution to a technological chal-
lenge, dealing with accountability-related issues, and resolving challenges 
related to institutional and technical capacity.  
Similar to other scholars (e.g., Hall and Taylor 1996, March and Olsen 
1989), I argue for the influence of broader factors, beyond merely eco-
nomic justifications. That is, this thesis acknowledges the role of identity, 
social position, moral values, emotions, embedded ideologies, worldviews 
and everyday practices as informing actor agency (Campbell 1998, Cleaver 
2012, Long 2003, Leftwich 2010a, Gómez 2008). These factors influence 
actors’ motivations, logic and final actions and practices. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Campbell (2004), institutional entrepreneurs do not enjoy 
complete autonomy in the kinds of change or innovation they may adopt. 
Likewise, this study recognises that the extent to which entrepreneurs may 
engage in any form of innovation or change depends on their ability to 
mobilise supporters, to overcome opponents and their command over ex-
isting resources. 
By extension, I look at how actors use institutions and their access to 
resources to resist and engage in institutional change or to solve problems, 
irrespective of the constraints imposed by the environment.  
3.6 Conceptual framework  
This study employs three interrelated concepts – translation, bricolage and 
institutional entrepreneurship – to investigate processes of institutional 
change associated with rural water supply under the NCWSP in Ghana. 
Processes of institutional change are defined as the conscious and uncon-
scious activities of negotiation, decision-making, interactions and practices 
which institutional entrepreneurs or change agents use to make creative 
and innovative changes in the governance of rural water supply (Franks 
and Cleaver 2007). The three interrelated concepts are combined to cap-
ture some of the complexities in the interactions found between actors in 
NCWSP implementation.  
Implementation of the NCWSP involves actors from two levels: the 
state level and the community level. Actors at the state level include those 
from ministries and other agencies, international organisations, the private 
sector and local government administration. At the community level, 
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actors include local water professionals (members of the water, sanitation 
and management teams and other water personnel) and water users. These 
actors are responsible for implementing the NCWSP, though they are lo-
cated in different local social and institutional contexts, which influences 
their interactions and capacity to implement the programme (figure 3.1).  
In implementing the NCWSP, contextual factors influence how actors 
defined their interests and problems and how they perceived opportunities 
for change, alongside the strategies they adopted and the practices they 
engaged in to navigate the challenges they faced in the process. Institu-
tional and resource constraints limited implementers’ capacity to realise 
institutional change, while also providing means to allow actors identified 
as institutional entrepreneurs or bricoleurs to resist, modify or change in-
stitutional arrangements under the NCWSP. The processes through which 
actors resisted and modified institutional arrangements occurred through 
institutional bricolage or entrepreneurship.  
Figure 3.1  
Conceptual framework for understanding processes of institutional change 
under Ghana’s National Community Water and Sanitation Programme 
(NCWSP) 
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Translation enables us to understand the implementation of policies in 
actual practices. The surrounding environment and motivations and logic 
influence actors’ choices and practices. Bricolage here implies that actors 
revoke local community-embedded institutions and apply the resources 
available to them to resist or facilitate institutional change. Institutional 
entrepreneurship here implies that actors renegotiate state-led institutional 
arrangements in order to resolve the challenges they encounter in imple-
menting the NCWSP.  
State-led institutions are those designed to realise the objectives of the 
NCWSP. Examples are the 5% contribution required of communities to 
defray the initial cost of the water project, establishment of water user 
groups, and activities to ensure the efficient operation and management 
of the water system (see chapter 4). Community-led institutions are local 
norms, cultural practices and values based on which actors relate to one 
another. In addition, actors’ capacity to engage in bricolage or entrepre-
neurship is reliant on their access to resources (e.g., technical capacity, fi-
nances, power relations, expert knowledge and programme information, 
social networks, social skills and the physical characteristics of the water 
resources at their disposal).  
Implementing actors invoked these existing institutions and resources 
to resist and modify institutional arrangements under the NCWSP. En-
gaging in institutional change was not automatic, however. The motiva-
tions and logic behind actors’ choices and practices and their command 
over resources informed the actions they undertook to invoke their agen-
tial capacity or intentions. Institutional entrepreneurs were motivated by 
normative and cognitive considerations (logic of appropriateness) and 
economic benefit (logic of instrumentality) to engage in bricolage or en-
trepreneurship.  
3.7 Conclusion  
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, institutional change occurs either 
rapidly, as a collective action process, or gradually or incrementally, as an 
evolutionary process. In actual practice, change is seldom linear or 
straightforward. It is a messy blending of different practices influenced by 
structures within the local social and institutional context. The motivations 
and logic behind actors’ choices and practices play a key role in processes 
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of change. Path dependence, structure and agency are useful causal con-
cepts to explain actors’ motivations and agency. Yet, these concepts are 
not convincing enough, as many critics have observed. The thrust of the 
matter is that the mechanisms or processes that enable us to understand 
why change appears in a particular pattern (revolutionary or evolutionary) 
remain unknown in most institutional change scholarship.  
Translation, bricolage and institutional entrepreneurship provide a con-
ceptual link to understand the mechanisms and processes by which actors 
change, negotiate or resist implementation of institutional change. The 
current study seeks to use these concepts to understand how and in what 
ways actors may differ in the choices they make under the constraints of 
structures in their local context. Moreover, I investigate the extent that 
institutional factors and other resources influence actors’ capacity to resist, 
change or promote institutional change. This serves to account for actor 
agency, allowing us to better specify the processes by which institutional 
change is path dependent and evolutionary in nature.  
Notes
1 Everyday practices are multiple, repetitive actions that people engage in and 
which enable access to water to be managed and extended to those otherwise cut 
off from a secure supply (Peloso and Morinville 2014: 122). 
2 The terms “community-led” and “community-embedded” institutions are used 
interchangeably in this study. 
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4 
Development of the Small Town and 
Rural Water Sector in Ghana 
 
 
This chapter provides background information on the water sector in 
Ghana. It first looks at water management and practices during the pre-
colonial and colonial periods. It then examines the historical development 
of small town and rural water supply in Ghana (section 4.2). Section 4.3 
introduces reforms in small town and rural water supply under the Na-
tional Community Water and Sanitation Programme (NCWSP), including 
the institutional framework which provides clarification of roles and re-
sponsibilities under the programme. The chapter ends by looking at cur-
rent trends and challenges in implementing the NCWSP. 
4.1 Customary water management and practices in Ghana  
During the pre-colonial and colonial periods, most people in Ghana de-
pended on natural sources, such as rainwater, rivers, lakes, streams and 
ponds, for water for drinking and domestic uses. To ensure that these wa-
ter resources were sustainably managed, traditional actors, informed by 
customary laws,1 established a number of rules to coordinate water re-
source usage. The activities of these traditional actors were rooted in the 
belief that water is a gift from the gods and must therefore be free and 
accessible to everyone.  
In most ethnic communities in Ghana, the Akan community in partic-
ular, lands are inherited from ancestors and handed down from generation 
to generation. Land and water resources are held as common property and 
not subject to individual ownership. Ownership of land and other natural 
resources is vested in families, communities and “stools” symbolising the 
chieftain’s leadership.2  
Institutional arrangements for water resource management stem from 
customary law, including community norms, customs, beliefs and prac-
tices. These are handed down through the generations, accepted as 
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binding, and regulated and enforced by traditional actors (Burchi 2005, 
Gbedemah 2011).  
According to custom, chiefs3 and other traditional actors are the earthly 
representatives of the ancestors and gods in the spiritual world. Ideally, 
these earthly representatives perform social, religious, administrative and 
judiciary functions. In addition, before colonial rule they were in charge of 
grassroots governance (Bamfo 2000). Traditional actors represented all 
members of the community under their control, and their authority and 
legitimacy was unquestioned. This power allowed them to engage in activ-
ities such as rule enforcement and dispute resolution. For example, dis-
putes regarding water use were traditionally resolved through tribunals 
constituted by the chiefs and elders (Agyenim 2011).  
Reverence for the gods and for the institution of traditional authority 
has given chiefs the influence and legitimacy to enforce community rules. 
For example, they can banish people from the community for non-com-
pliance or non-adherence to rules. As a result, compliance with commu-
nity rules remains high. Examples of such rules include not washing close 
to water sources, keeping the surroundings of water sources clean, not 
farming along river banks and not visiting water sources on specific days 
(like taboo days). Violation of customary laws is considered an offense 
against the gods. Offenders are punished by imposing fines, which are 
payable in cash or in kind to local chiefs, priests or priestesses. The fines 
are to pacify the ancestors and gods so that they do not punish the whole 
community. As a result, most customary laws are self-enforcing, as all 
community members ensure that everyone complies with the rules to avert 
some calamity befalling them all. 
During the pre-colonial period, customary water laws were adequate 
for the management and protection of water resources. However, with the 
emergence of colonisation, accompanied by industrialisation and urbani-
sation, customary laws became inadequate for water governance. The cus-
tomary water laws were sufficient to govern small communities with more 
simplistic domestic uses of water resources. Increasingly, however, more 
urbanised and heterogeneous populations challenged the adequacy and ef-
ficacy of customary laws for water governance (Sarpong 2005). This led to 
the introduction of new laws to govern water use and management. These 
newly introduced institutional arrangements were part of a formal legal 
system which bore a strong resemblance to the governance structures of 
the colonising country (Zaag 2007, Ocloo 2011).  
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The post-independence period saw the creation of laws that reduced 
the influence of customary laws and practices for water management and 
rule enforcement. Ghana’s Water Resources Commission, for instance, 
created by an act of parliament in 1996, weakened the powers of tradi-
tional actors in managing and enforcing customary rules on natural water 
resources. The act abolished the customary ownership of water hitherto 
vested in the “stools” and communities. The state government assumed 
ownership, control and management of water resources and enforcement 
of rules (Water Resource Commission of Ghana 2008).  
The newly established formal rules diminished the authority of the 
chiefs in water management and resource protection. However, the new 
rules did not entirely displace their control and power in water governance. 
Customary laws and practices continued to exist alongside formal written 
rules in water governance. 
As a number of studies observe, it is difficult to draw a clear-cut dis-
tinction between customary laws and formal written laws and rules. Some 
aspects of the traditional system of water governance continue to function 
and flourish up to this day (Sarpong 2005). Despite the changes in gov-
ernance and shifts in the chiefs’ role that have occurred since the pre-co-
lonial era, chiefs continue to play an active role as both regulators and 
enforcers of customary laws, alongside state-initiated rules and laws in 
Ghana’s rural communities.  
4.2 Water infrastructure regulation in the colonial era  
Indirect rule was the main governance system adopted in the colonial era. 
Under indirect rule, both British and traditional governance systems were 
conflated into one governance system. Colonial actors made extensive use 
of traditional authority and actors by forming alliances with chiefs organ-
ised under a native authority for local governance. Under indirect rule, the 
governor enacted laws with the assistance of executive and legislative 
councils made up of Europeans,4 while traditional actors maintained law 
and order and social services locally. It is important to understand that 
although the chiefs were responsible for actual implementation, their de-
cisions were subject to final approval by the British governor, while the 
chiefs received protection from the colonial government5 (Ubink 2008, 
Ocloo 2011). Historical and anthropological studies suggest that by 
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making the position of the chiefs dependent on the recognition of the 
colonial government, the authority of the chiefs was weakened (Bamfo 
2000).  
In regard to water resources, establishment of colonial rule in 1890 led 
to increased use of water for irrigation, transportation and industry. This 
necessitated new rules, and led to the introduction and imposition of new 
institutional arrangements for development and management of water re-
sources (Zaag 2007). 
These new rules did not replace existing customary laws and practices 
but rather complemented customary laws. New institutional arrangements 
for managing water resources took the form of laws and ordinances. Their 
enforcement was in the hands of various ministries, departments and 
agencies under state control (Sarpong 2005). 
A number of laws and ordinances passed by the colonial administration 
sought to control water use and abstraction and guide planning and soil 
conservation. These included the Rivers Ordinance (CAP 226 of 1903), 
the Forests Act of 1927 and the Land Planning and Soil Conservation Act 
of 1953. These laws and ordinances replaced the authority and control that 
traditional actors held in the past, subsequently eroding the powers they 
held in water governance. This process continued into the post-colonial 
period after independence (Agyenim 2011, Odame-Ababio 2003).  
The action of the colonial actors can be perceived from two angles. 
First, there was a recognition of traditional governance, as the chiefs were 
used to enforce colonial law and order. Second, the new laws and ordi-
nances regulated and diminished the powers of traditional actors in main-
taining and enforcing customary laws.  
A number of scholars, however, observe the demise of traditional ac-
tors’ powers and authority differently. Crook (1986: 75), for example, 
linked the demise of traditional actors’ authority to the decolonisation 
process. In Ghana, independent parties and post-colonial elites and lead-
ers, to reaffirm their powers, criticised the chiefs’ relationship with the 
colonial rulers, withdrawing from them the mandate that had been 
granted to them under indirect rule. 
The chiefs’ position was certainly undermined by their allegiance to 
the colonial rulers over their citizens and their dependence on the colo-
nial government for enforcing laws and ordinances. This produced a 
breakdown of the checks and balances inherent in the traditional system 
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whereby chiefs had long been controlled in the course of administering 
their functions. The absence of such checks and balances led to abuses 
of power by chiefs and traditional actors under the colonial regime, 
which undermined relationships between the chiefs and their subjects, 
thereby making the traditional authorities unpopular6 (Bamfo 2000).  
As noted, historical and anthropological studies suggest that making 
the position of the chief dependent on recognition by the colonial govern-
ment weakened the chiefs’ authority. Scholars argue that abolishment of 
indirect rule, too, negatively affected the role of chiefs in local government 
affairs (Crook 1986, Ubink 2008). A common understanding is that the 
role played by traditional actors during the period of colonial indirect rule 
explains some of the policies and laws enacted after independence. For 
example, under the Chieftaincy Act of 1961 chiefs were prohibited from 
exercising and enforcing customary laws unless they had the approval of 
local government ministers (Bamfo 2000). Such actions of post-colonial 
elites further reduced the authority, power and respect that the traditional 
actors had held in the past.  
Despite the significantly reduced authority of the chiefs, their influence 
continues to prevail in current local governance. Chiefs wield much influ-
ence in both rural and urban areas, due to populations’ strong adherence 
to local religious beliefs. These beliefs lie at the heart of the legitimacy and 
authority of the chiefs, and indeed their very existence. However, the co-
lonial government’s past reliance on and manipulation of the legitimacy of 
traditional actors has continued to have significant consequences for the 
direction and decisions of central and local government policies (Miller 
1968).  
Although customary laws are relaxed in most communities, they still 
play a huge role in the day-to-day management of water resources. The 
next section looks at changes that have occurred in the delivery and man-
agement of drinking water during the colonial and post-colonial period.  
4.3 Tracing the institutional development and provision of 
drinking water in Ghana 
Colonial actors are recognised as initiating the first major efforts to im-
prove drinking water supply in Ghana (then Gold Coast). The Hydraulics 
Division of the Public Works Department facilitated construction and 
management of its first water project in Accra, then extending these works 
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to other areas, such as Cape Coast, Winneba and Kumasi. The technolog-
ical make-up of the water system included water pumps, reservoirs and a 
piped water system (GWCL n.d.). 
In 1948, a separate division was established within the Public Works 
Department for rural water development. This division saw the drilling of 
boreholes and construction of wells for rural communities (GWCL n.d.).  
The period after independence ushered in a number of reforms in the 
water sector, in response to the severe drought that had engulfed the coun-
try. Based on studies and recommendations by international actors, the 
Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) was established in 1965 
through an act of parliament (Act 310). GWSC was made solely responsi-
ble for, inter alia, the development, operations and management of both 
rural and urban water supplies (GWCL n.d.).  
Main responsibilities of the GWSC included providing water and sani-
tation services to rural and urban areas, conducting research on issues re-
lated to water and sewerage, constructing and managing water and sewer-
age works, setting standards and prices, and collecting revenue. In water 
management, GWSC adopted a centralised approach. In addition, policies 
on water provision and services were informed by concerns of cost effi-
ciency and the ability of consumers and users to pay.  
The activities of a spectrum of actors such as the central government, 
international donor organisations and NGOs brought about the initial 
transformation of drinking water in rural communities. Rural water facili-
ties expanded from 2,500 in 1957 to some 5,500 by 1984 (Karikari 1996, 
Fuest 2006). Urban areas witnessed a rise from 35 piped water systems in 
1957 to 194 in 1979 (Karikari 1996, Fuest 2006). 
Although GWSC had been given the legal authority to control and 
manage the water sector for both cities and the countryside, the economic 
crises of the 1970s and 1980s made it difficult for the corporation to break 
even. GWSC was under-resourced in terms of both personnel and fi-
nances. As a result, the corporation was unable to expand water infrastruc-
ture and maintain existing facilities (Entsua-Mensah et al. 2007, Nyarko 
2007). 
The various economic crises, however, led to shortages of water in 
small town and rural communities. To remedy these, international organ-
isations, external support agencies and bilateral donors7 proposed a num-
ber of interventions and solutions. Interventions included construction of 
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hand-dug wells and drilling of boreholes to provide additional water (Fuest 
2006). These interventions by international actors coincided with the UN’s 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-1990). 
The aim was to expedite access to safe drinking water for all. The UN 
decade produced a significant increase in external support for improve-
ments in urban and rural water delivery in Ghana (Kleemeier 2002: 4). 
During this period there was a leap in water infrastructure, with GWSC as 
the main actor in charge of management, operations and maintenance. For 
example, the rural sector saw a substantial increase in the number of rural 
water facilities, which rose to some 8,600-9,000 in total by the end of the 
water decade8 (Fuest 2006, Gyau-Boakye 1999, Karikari 1996). 
It is important to note that community participation in the planning, 
construction, operation and maintenance of water facilities was absent 
during this phase. Water governance from 1965 to 1994 took a supply-
driven approach with the central government playing the lead role in urban 
and rural water delivery. Water services were provided at no cost to users. 
In short, water service delivery was a top-down undertaking without com-
munity participation. In addition, new water infrastructure, management 
and maintenance favoured urban areas, where works were more viable or 
politically more impactful than in small towns and rural areas. For in-
stance, in rural areas, repairs of broken-down water facilities were halted 
and pumps sometimes dismantled due to unpaid bills from previous 
maintenance works. This situation greatly burdened the communities af-
fected, which had to revert to unwholesome sources, leading to high oc-
currence of water-borne diseases (Karikari 1996).  
The failure of the supply-driven approach was attributed to lack of 
community interest and ownership of the water schemes, due to the lim-
ited role played by beneficiaries and users in policy design and implemen-
tation of the reforms. Lack of funds, inadequate capacity, low political pri-
ority of water issues, inability to recover operations and maintenance 
costs, and the perception of water being free further affected the sustain-
ability of the schemes, leading to calls for new reforms in the 1990s (Fuest 
2006, Karikari 1996).  
Recognition of the need for water infrastructure that could be sustain-
ably managed led external agencies, together with key policymakers, to 
pursue wholesale reform of the water sector. The centralised and supply-
driven approach had proven ineffective, pushing policymakers to consider 
other strategies. This period coincided with the implementation of a 
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structural adjustment programme in Ghana under the National Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) (1983-1993).  
Under structural adjustment and the ERP, the water sector benefitted 
from huge inflows of investment capital in the form of loans and grants. 
This greatly expanded the country’s water infrastructure. It also led to an 
increase in organisations and affiliate agencies responsible for coordinat-
ing and managing water resources and the infrastructure provided. 
Transformation and improvement of the institutional arrangements 
and framework for the water sector took various forms (CWSA 2008). For 
instance, in 1986 subsidies for operation and maintenance of water facili-
ties were withdrawn and user tariffs introduced. The logic behind the new 
institutional arrangements reflected the overall objective of the ERP, 
which was to introduce efficient management and thereby reverse the eco-
nomic decline the country had experienced. Some scholars have observed 
that the new institutional arrangements sought to transform the role of 
the state from a provider of services to a regulator (Harvey and Reed 2006, 
Moriarty et al. 2013). This was in fact a goal promoted by the World Bank 
and affiliated agencies under structural adjustment and ERP policies. To 
improve the management, coordination and quality of rural9 and small 
town water services,10 a separate, semi-autonomous unit was established 
under the GWSC: the Community Water and Sanitation Division.  
The new institutional arrangements were to improve the maintenance 
and sustainability of water systems. Nonetheless, with the above initiatives 
the challenges facing the rural water sector persisted and services deterio-
rated further. For example, users were unhappy with the new user tariffs 
and therefore resisted payment. Maintenance of facilities became another 
bone of contention, with communities unwilling to pay any price for 
maintenance and the GWSC refusing to repair the facilities until such pay-
ments were made (Fuest 2006, Nyarko 2007, CWSA 2008). 
Though the intervention by international actors increased the number 
of drinking water facilities built, overall it had scant positive impact on 
service delivery. Indeed, many studies confirm that the supply-driven ap-
proach did not lead to sustainable management and maintenance of most 
water facilities. The GWSC was unable to keep up with facilities mainte-
nance, and 40% of water facilities eventually became dysfunctional (Klee-
meier 2002, Nyarko 2007).  
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By the end of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 
Decade, little significant improvement had been made in small town and 
rural water coverage. Most of the water supply facilities that had been pro-
vided had deteriorated or completely broken down. Numerous reasons 
have been provided, like inadequate funding for maintenance and rehabil-
itation works. GWSC also suffered from accountability challenges, cor-
ruption, poor management and inadequate capacity and skills (Eguavoen 
and Youkhana 2008, Nyarko 2007, Fuest 2006, Pilgrim et al. 2004a). The 
situation was worsened by GWSC’s inability to recover operation and 
maintenance costs, due to communities’ refusal to pay user tariffs. Non-
payment was justified by GWSC’s inability to maintain and provide water 
regularly, coupled with the common perception among users that water 
should be free.  
4.4 Water reforms in the 1990s 
Declaration of 1981-1990 as the International Drinking Water and Sanita-
tion Decade was one of the earlier attempts by the UN General Assembly 
to ensure that countries gave priority to provision of and access to safe 
drinking water. 
A key decision taken during this period was to transfer responsibility 
for providing rural water services from central government to local gov-
ernment. As noted, the water reforms undertaken in the early 1990s were 
part of a structural adjustment programme implemented under Ghana’s 
ERP (1983-1993). The reforms were supported by a number of work-
shops with stakeholders, that is, line ministries, local government, the pri-
vate sector, NGOs, external agencies and civil society. This chain of events 
led to development of the NCWSP in 1994 to finally address the water 
challenges confronting small town and rural communities within the coun-
try (Entsua-Mensah et al. 2007, Fuest 2006).  
The NCWSP brought changes in the way water systems were managed. 
In accordance with international policy and the ideology at the time, ad-
ministrative responsibilities in water supply were decentralised to lower 
governance levels. The Government of Ghana was obliged to fulfil the 
following conditions, in line with international best practices: 
▪ to establish regulatory bodies for water supply coordination and 
control 
▪ to open the sector to private participation  
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▪ to separate responsibilities for urban and rural water supply  
▪ to ensure community participation in planning, management, 
ownership and maintenance of the water supply facilities pro-
vided.  
The reforms of the 1990s thus resulted in separation of the rural water 
sector from the urban water sector. In addition, the Ghana Water and 
Sewerage Cooperation changed its name to the Ghana Water Company 
Limited (GWCL), reflecting its new role and mandate. GWCL was tasked 
to manage water facilities in urban areas, while the Community Water and 
Sanitation Division (CWSD) was mandated to coordinate water and sani-
tation delivery to rural areas. In December 1998, the Community Water 
and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) was created by an act of parliament (Act 
564) to succeed the CWSD. The CWSA was mandated to facilitate provi-
sion of safe drinking water and related services to small towns and rural 
areas in Ghana (Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing, 2007). 
At the sub-national level, organisational structures created under the 
CWSA included water and sanitation management committees for point 
sources; water and sanitation management teams11 for small town water 
schemes; and district water and sanitation teams within the respective Dis-
trict Assemblies (DAs). The district water and sanitation teams monitored 
and coordinated the activities of the local committees and water and san-
itation management teams. Other structures created included regional wa-
ter and sanitation teams under the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCC) 
and regional offices of the CWSA. These regional structures were to co-
ordinate, assist and facilitate the district structures, helping them to fulfil 
their respective roles (Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing 
2007). 
The 1990s water reforms presented water as an economic good, thus 
applying the principle of full-cost recovery in determining water tariffs. 
This principle, in addition, implied the need for efficiency in water system 
management. Local government was given a key role in providing water 
to small towns and rural communities. The assumption here was that local 
government was in a better position to identify and respond to consumer 
preferences. Central government agencies, in turn, facilitated and regu-
lated the activities of local government (CWSA 2008). Furthermore, pri-
vate sector involvement was encouraged, with beneficiary communities 
called on to participate in key decision-making processes. Through this 
new institutional arrangement, communities would gain a sense of 
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ownership over their water supply system. The thinking was that this sense 
of ownership would translate into sustainable management and mainte-
nance of the water facilities (Entsua-Mensah et al. 2007).  
4.4.1 National Community Water and Sanitation Programme 
(NCWSP) 
With the National Community Water and Sanitation Programme 
(NCWSP), the Government of Ghana sought to provide safe drinking wa-
ter and sanitation services, as well as means towards improved hygiene, 
for small towns and rural communities. The programme was developed 
with the assistance of the World Bank. The first Community Water and 
Sanitation Programme (CWSP-1, 1994-1999) was implemented with the 
assistance of international development agencies in four regions of the 
country. That programme was soon expanded to cover all of Ghana and 
grew to involve other bilateral donors such as the Danish Development 
Agency (DANIDA) (Fuest 2006). 
As noted earlier, the CWSA was created by an act of parliament (Act 
564) to succeed the CWSD. It was mandated to facilitate and implement 
the second phase of the NCWSP (2000-2009) (Ministry of Water Re-
sources, Works and Housing 2007). That programme phase aimed to re-
verse years of low coverage and unsustainable management and mainte-
nance of existing water facilities within Ghana’s small towns and rural 
communities. The objectives of the NCWSP were three:  
▪ to provide basic water and sanitation services to communities that 
would pay for the operation, maintenance and repair of their facil-
ity, mindful of the need to ensure affordability, equity and fairness 
for the poor and vulnerable 
▪ to ensure facility sustainability through community ownership and 
management and citizen participation in all decision-making, while 
ensuring active involvement of women at all stages of the pro-
gramme and involvement of the private sector in the provision of 
goods and services 
▪ to maximise health benefits by integrating water, sanitation and 
hygiene promotion interventions, calling on communities to se-
lect the water technologies that would provide them the best ser-
vice, with that selection guided by community preferences, 
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affordability and ability to operate and maintain facilities in a sus-
tainable manner (CWSA 2010a, 2014; GoG 2014) 
Ghana’s decentralisation policy and national water policy provided the 
framework for implementation of the NCWSP (CWSA 2014). A shift 
from a centralised approach in water supply services to the involvement 
of stakeholders, including the private sector, local government and com-
munities, reflected the public sector reforms required by the World Bank 
under structural adjustment and the ERP. Another feature of the commu-
nity management approach adopted was involvement of non-state actors, 
such as community-based organisations, NGOs and educational and re-
search institutions, as well as private businesses, in management, operation 
and maintenance of water facilities, as well as in training, well drilling and 
materials supply. Opening up the community water sector to the private 
sector was another aspect consistent with the ideologies of the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund at the time, as they were pushing 
for decentralisation and privatisation to catalyse improved public services.  
At the local level, works departments were created to serve as the tech-
nical arms of the DAs for the delivery of water and sanitation facilities. 
The desire to decentralise the water system to the local level led the CWSA 
to create regional offices to support the works departments of the various 
DAs.  
The decentralised approach was founded on the assumption that a 
transfer of powers from the central government to the DAs would give 
the DAs sufficient power to develop and manage basic water infrastruc-
ture. Under the new institutional arrangement, actors’ roles and responsi-
bilities were to be redefined and their capacities strengthened to match 
their new roles and responsibilities (CWSA 2014). Figure 4.1 presents the 
decentralised governance structure. 
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Figure 4.1  
Decentralised local governance structure in Ghana 
 
 
Source: Braimah and Kheni (2013) 
 
 
The Local Government Act of 1993 transferred authority and respon-
sibility from central government (ministries, departments and agencies) to 
the DAs (local government administrative units). Under the new govern-
ance arrangement, the central ministries and departments would undertake 
policy planning, monitoring and evaluation. Coordinating roles were as-
signed to the regions through the RCC and CWSA regional offices. Met-
ropolitan, municipal and district assemblies12 were made responsible for 
implementation of central government policies. The assumption was that 
the transfer of power from the central government to the DA level would 
enable the DAs to take a central role and responsibility for coordinating, 
monitoring and supporting communities in managing their water facilities 
(MLGRD 2010, Braimah and Kheni 2013). In order to deliver effectively 
on its new roles and responsibilities, the DAs received technical assistance 
in planning, design, construction and supervision from CWSA and from 
private sector organisations. 
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Local water and sanitation management committees and teams were 
made responsible for the day-to-day management of community water 
systems. Alternatively, in consultation with the metropolitan, municipal or 
district assemblies, these teams could contract the services of a private 
firm for management of their water facility.  
Notwithstanding the above institutional arrangements, the decentrali-
sation process brought institutional constraints that have had huge effect 
on the ability of CWSA and the DAs to perform their expected roles. 
These constraints emanate from flaws of the decentralisation programme. 
For example, most national actors are misinformed, planning processes 
are complex and uncoordinated, and roles conflict, while short-term po-
litical interests prevail.  
 Aryee (1997) identified several challenges facing the decentralisation 
framework. First, the decentralisation process has been slowed by the cen-
tral government’s resistance to change, due to its loss of power in the de-
centralised governance system. Secondly, while administrative decentrali-
sation has proceeded, fiscal decentralisation has lagged behind. Thirdly, 
incompleteness of the decentralisation process has left gaps through 
which bureaucrats and politicians can abuse the system to serve their own 
interests. Fourth, institutional structures to hold actors accountable for 
their actions (or inaction as the case may be) remained absent (Amanor 
and Annan, cited in Fuest 2006).  
From the above, it is unsurprising that the DAs, like other state entities, 
have acted with impunity in the water sector. For example, structures es-
tablished to ensure compliance have been bogged down by corruption, 
neglect of duties, rent seeking, nepotism and power struggle.  
Besides, lack of regard for informal structures in the drafting and design 
of policies has contributed further to the challenges confronting water 
policy implementation. Interconnections between state rules and commu-
nity-embedded rules have been ignored or taken for granted in the insti-
tutional reforms. This explains some of the distortions and failings of the 
institutional reforms, dictating the path of institutional change. 
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4.4.2 Institutional arrangements under the National Community 
Water and Sanitation Programme  
A key component of the NCWSP is its emphasis on the demand-respon-
sive approach. Herein, water is viewed as an economic good, implying that 
consumers must pay for water services. In addition, communities decide 
whether they want to participate in water facility projects, demonstrating 
their commitment to the project by paying a 5% contribution to the total 
cost of the proposed water facility. The logic behind this approach is to 
empower beneficiary communities to make choices and decisions as to the 
type of technology and services that best fits their needs (CWSA 2014a, 
2014b).  
Notwithstanding the above, beneficiaries were restricted in their 
choices due to their limited knowledge of alternatives, such as rain har-
vesting systems and protection of existing water sources, which may well 
have been cheaper and easier to operate and maintain (Fuest 2006). The 
guiding principle of the NCWSP was to ensure the economic sustainabil-
ity13 of the water facilities provided. The approach presumed a shift in the 
government’s role from service delivery to monitoring and facilitation, ul-
timately allowing communities to become self-reliant rather than depend-
ent on government agencies for system operation and maintenance.  
A fundamental feature of the NCWSP is its emphasis on community 
ownership14 and management within the framework of decentralised de-
livery. That is, it recognised that communities, as custodians of the land, 
would be in a better position to ensure sustainable management of their 
water facilities if they were involved in all decision-making processes 
(CWSA 2014a, 2014b).  
Basic design requirements for community water facilities15were drawn 
up with which small town water supply facilities had to conform (CWSA 
2010b). As part of the institutional arrangements, the aforementioned wa-
ter and sanitation management committees and teams had to be estab-
lished in each beneficiary community to ensure efficient and sustainable 
facility management.16 These teams would carry out the day-to-day man-
agement of the water system, receiving complementary support from the 
members of the local, or zonal, water and sanitation management com-
mittees (CWSA 2010b). The teams recruited the services of technical and 
financial personnel17 to assist them in their day-to-day operations and 
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management tasks. In addition, the teams set tariffs in accordance with 
CWSA guidelines,18 with final approval given by the DAs. 
Another feature of the NCWSP was its emphasis on public sector fa-
cilitation in the operation and management of water facilities. CWSA, as 
the main coordinating organisation, set standards and developed the pol-
icy guidelines. In addition, CWSA was to provide training and technical, 
professional and financial support to the water and sanitation management 
committees and teams, alongside other actors involved in NCWSP imple-
mentation (CWSA 2014). 
Under the NCWSP, women were actively involved in the design and 
management of the water supply facilities. This was an important aspect 
of the programme given that women and children, boys as well as girls, 
were responsible for fetching water, and this task sapped valuable time 
that could be devoted to school attendance or other economic activities 
(CWSA 2014b: 6-7, 2014a, 2008).  
Most funding for the water facilities developed under the NCWSP 
came from credits and grants provided by international development part-
ners and the Government of Ghana (altogether they paid 90%), the ben-
eficiary communities (5%) and the responsible metropolitan, municipal or 
district assemblies (5%) (CWSA 2014, GoG 2014).  
The project cycle19 for NCWSP implementation began with the launch 
of the programme in the respective DAs. The beneficiary communities 
then met and discussed what type of water technology and management 
options they preferred. The community then made a formal request to the 
metropolitan, municipal or district assembly in the form of an expression 
of interest, facilitated by the private sector (a partner or technical assis-
tance organisation). The DA evaluated all applications and selected bene-
ficiary communities according to the following criteria: evidence of the 5% 
contribution, population size, existing facilities, current economic activi-
ties within the communities and absence of conflicts.  
The partner or technical assistance organisation leading the process 
sensitised and provided all information on the NCWSP programme to the 
beneficiary community. Based on that information, the community pre-
pared a proposal, a facility management plan and a feasibility report for 
funds mobilisation. Towards assurance of efficient water system manage-
ment, a water and sanitation management committee and team were es-
tablished and trained. 
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Although the NCWSP covered water, sanitation and hygiene-related 
issues, the focus of the current study is limited to issues connected to small 
town and rural water supply systems. Issues related to sanitation and hy-
giene, which the NCWSP also covers, are beyond the scope of this re-
search.  
Table 4.1  
Roles and responsibilities of key organisations and actors  
implementing the NCWSP  
Actors/Organisations Roles and Responsibilities  
Development partners  Provide financial, technical and logistical support for NCSWP implemen-
tation  
Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development  
Formulate governance policies and develop sector plans, 
provide management advisory services to the metropoli-
tan, municipal and district assemblies 
Ministry of Water Resources, 
Works and Housing (MWRWH) 
 
Water Directorate (established 
within MWRWH) 
 
Formulate strategies, mobilise resources and ensure sector coordina-
tion, planning, evaluation and monitoring  
 
Coordinate activities of the Community Water and Sanitation Agency 
(CWSA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) and the Water Re-
sources Commission (WRC) 
Community Water and Sanitation 
Agency (CWSA) headquarters and 
regional offices 
Coordinate and facilitate NCWSP implementation  
Metropolitan, municipal and dis-
trict assemblies/works depart-
ments  
Implement the NCWSP, support local water actors through coordination 
and monitoring, provide financial support, and prepare district water and 
sanitation plans in line with medium-term objectives 
Water and sanitation management 
committees and teams  
Operate, manage and maintain water facilities  
Water personnel  Oversee technical and financial management of the water 
system 
Private sector, technical assis-
tance and partner organisations  
Provide training, mobilise community and promote hygiene and sanita-
tion, provide institutional support, construct water facilities and provide 
services  
Community  Express demand for services, including preferences regarding technol-
ogy and service level  
Private water operators  Operate and maintain water supply infrastructures, including electrical 
and mechanical equipment and hand pumps, manage and operate wa-
ter supply schemes 
Source: Community Water and Sanitation Project Implementation Manual 
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4.4.3 Institutional arrangements: Roles and responsibilities of key 
actors  
The decentralisation of water services ushered in different modalities and 
practices, which led to changes in the institutional, financial and regulatory 
framework for water management. The new institutional arrangements in-
troduced an increased number of actors and organisations directly or in-
directly responsible for implementing the NCWSP. The institutional 
framework developed for small town and rural water supply describes the 
expected processes of actor collaboration and coordination. In addition, 
the framework provides clarity on the roles and responsibilities of key ac-
tors and organisations implementing the NCWSP (Table 4.1).20 
To understand the relationships between the various actors in imple-
mentation of the NCWSP, we need to understand the institutional ar-
rangements made for the provision of water in small towns in Ghana (Fig-
ure 4.2).  
Figure 4.2  
Arrangement of institutional actors involved in NCWSP implementation  
Note: WSMT=water and sanitation management team.  
Source: NCWSP Project Implementation Manual (2014) 
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While there was a strong relationship between donors, ministries and 
the CWSA, the relationship between the CWSA and the DAs was weak. 
The DAs legally owned the water system,21 though the physical owner was 
the communities. The water and sanitation management teams operated 
and managed the water system on behalf of the concerned metropolitan, 
municipal or district assembly and beneficiary community.  
There were two ways to operate and manage the small town water sup-
ply systems:22 community-based management and private-based manage-
ment. Community-based management was found in communities, with a 
population less than 10,000. Here, technical and financial staff were em-
ployed for the day-to-day management and maintenance of the water sys-
tem. Private-based management was found in communities with a popu-
lation greater than 10,000. Here, the water and sanitation management 
team in consultation with the DA delegated responsibility for management 
of the water system to a private organisation. The management team then 
supervised the activities of the private organisation, with the management 
team’s activities monitored and coordinated by the works department. The 
CWSA coordinated the activities of the DAs and local water actors 
(CWSA 2010b). 
4.4.4 Relevant policies and legislation for NCWSP implementation  
A number of rules inform and guide NCWSP implementation. These in-
clude policies, acts of parliament, strategic documents, guidelines and 
manuals (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2  
Rules and practices guiding NCWSP implementation  
Type  Document  Purpose 
Policy  National Water Policy (2007), 
Ministry of Water Resources, 
Works and Housing  
Provides the main institutional framework for planning, imple-
menting, coordinating and monitoring the activities and interac-
tions of all water actors  
Acts of 
parlia-
ment  
Community Water and Sanita-
tion Act,1998 (Act 564) 
Specifies the roles and responsibilities of CWSA  
Local Government Service Act 
(2003) 
Describes governance arrangements for decentralising activi-
ties to local government, the various structures established to 
implement the decentralisation programme, and the roles, 
functions and inter-relationships among subnational structures 
and actors  
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 Legislative Instrument of Com-
munity Water and Sanitation 
Regulation (LI 2007) 
 
Provides the regulatory framework which enables and author-
ises the CWSA to develop standards, key directives and guide-
lines to enforce compliance with the acts, norms, standards 
and guidelines to ensure sustainability of water services 
Strategic 
docu-
ments  
Water Sector Strategic Devel-
opment Plan (2012-2025) 
Provides the framework for implementing the chosen vision, 
policy objectives and targets for the water and sanitation sector 
Strategic Investment Plan 
(2008) 
Updates the Strategic Investment Plan (SIP) 2005– 2015 and 
presents a medium-term plan for 2008-2012 
Guide-
lines and 
 manuals 
Small Town Sector Guidelines, 
Design Guidelines, November 
2010 
Sector Guidelines, General, 
November 2010 
 
Small Town Sector Guidelines, 
Operations and Maintenance, 
November 2010 
 
Water Safety Framework, No-
vember 2010 
Elaborates standards to be followed in NCWSP implementa-
tion, covering the following: 
 
- design of water and sanitation systems 
 
- community mobilisation, hygiene and sanitation promotion  
 
- operation and maintenance of water supplies 
 
- water quality and safety  
 
District Operations Manual, 
Volume 1(2014) 
Serves as a reference document for the DAs implementing the 
NCWSP 
National Community Water and 
Sanitation Strategy (2014) 
Provides an overall framework for implementation of the 
NCWSP, sets out the overall strategy to achieve the govern-
ment’s vision for the rural water sector as enshrined in the Wa-
ter Sector Strategic Development Plan (WSSDP) 
Project Implementation Manual 
(2014) 
Provides guidance for WASH project management and imple-
mentation towards realisation of national goals; sets out imple-
mentation rules, procedures and processes to achieve the 
NCWSP objectives 
Cultural 
beliefs 
and prac-
tices  
Rules, social norms,  
cultural beliefs and practices, 
symbols,  
scripts, everyday practices 
Origin of all embedded rules and practices through which com-
munities interact among themselves 
By laws  Model by laws prepared by 
CWSA which communities 
could adapt to prepare commu-
nity-specific by laws to guide 
their day-to-day activities 
Guides service providers and users in how systems are to be 
operated and managed 
Contrac-
tual doc-
uments  
Management contract agree-
ment document  
Legally binding document signed by DAs, water and sanitation 
management teams and private operators detailing how a wa-
ter facility will be operated and managed by a contracted pri-
vate organisation 
Source: National Community Water and Sanitation Strategy (2014: 49-51)  
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4.4.5 Defining rural and small town communities  
Small towns are settlements that are relatively large and dense. They usu-
ally have a population of between 5,000 and 50,000, but can be larger or 
smaller (Pilgrim et al. 2004). Their size enables them to benefit from the 
economies of scale offered by small town piped water systems. However, 
they are too small and dispersed to benefit from conventional urban water 
facilities. Small town water systems require formal institutional arrange-
ments that provide a legal basis for ownership and management. In addi-
tion, the systems must have the capacity to expand to meet growing de-
mand for water.  
Following the NCWSP, the current study defines a small town as re-
ferring to towns and clusters of villages with the following characteristics: 
▪ population between 2,000 and 50,000 
▪ a small town water supply system as their main source of water 
▪ has committed to own, operate and maintain its water supply sys-
tem either itself or by delegating the responsibility to another 
body, such as a private organisation 
▪ sets its own tariffs and other operational policies in close consul-
tation with the DA (Entsua-Mensah et al. 2007: 8, CWSA May 
2004, CWSA January 2010b) 
Communities within the context of this study are defined as groups of 
individuals living in close proximity to each other that are able to identify 
a need (a water supply facility) and come together in the interest of their 
own development. The size of the community determines the nature and 
size of the water project (small town water facility), which can include 
other neighbouring communities that will make direct use of the facility.  
4.4.6 Reflections on NCWSP implementation  
Over the years, there have been significant changes in water provision in 
small towns and rural communities in Ghana. For example, implementa-
tion of the NCWSP increased water coverage from 30% before the re-
forms of 1994 to 64% in 2014. The total number of people served and 
given access to potable water as of 2014 stood at 12,212,073, out of a 
target population of 19,081,524 (http://www.cwsa.gov.gh/cwsa). Never-
theless, a number of studies show the situation on the ground to be less 
positive than these figures suggest, as most water systems are dysfunc-
tional, break down frequently or face serious operational and management 
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challenges (Eguavoen and Youkhana 2008, Karikari 1996, Nyarko 2007, 
Fuest 2006). 
Two decades into NCWSP implementation, a number of challenges 
continue to bedevil the water sector. The difficulties can be categorised 
into three types of constraints: financial, institutional and technical 
(CWSA 2008, 2014b, 2014a, 2010a, 2010b). 
Financial  
A first type of challenge affecting implementation of the NCWSP is inad-
equate budgetary support from the metropolitan, municipal and district 
assemblies for water-related activities (National Water and Sanitation 
Strategy 2014: 3). This has undermined the works departments’ ability to 
monitor and coordinate water activities. Financial support from the DAs 
to the communities has not been forthcoming for major repairs, rehabili-
tation, upgrades and expansion to cover new areas. Moreover, current tar-
iffs are inadequate to cover future replacement costs, to recover opera-
tions and maintenance expenses, or to pay for upgrades, expansions and 
rehabilitation. The irregularity of financial and technical audits by service 
regulators has exacerbated the situation, as revenue from water sales is 
sometimes mismanaged. Non-adherence to financial regulations and in-
sufficient financial accountability to the communities have further threat-
ened the financial standing of most small town water systems.  
The above factors pose a threat to the future sustainability of existing 
small town water facilities. In addition, the national government's inability 
to provide CWSA the resources it needs to carry out its roles and respon-
sibilities has worsened the situation. This has led to the collapse of many 
water facilities, with many of those remaining on the brink of collapse 
(CWSA 2014: 24). 
Institutional  
Inconsistencies in the overall policy framework, such as lack of a uniform 
mechanism for organising financial flows and inadequate information 
sharing and dissemination of project knowledge, have affected coordina-
tion and collaboration within the water sector. The central government's 
inability to support ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the programme, 
coupled with the failure of the DAs and CWSA to provide post-project 
implementation support to beneficiary communities, has caused the situ-
ation to deteriorate further. Local water actors, particularly the water and 
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sanitation management teams and water facility personnel, have been left 
to manage the water systems on their own. New local water actors seldom 
receive training, and old ones lack refresher training and technical support 
(CWSA 2014: 3).  
Cooperation and relationships between state and local actors have 
failed to materialise, again aggravating the situation. For example, the in-
troduction of the new water and sanitation management governance struc-
tures, particularly the local committees and teams, bypassed the customary 
governance represented by traditional actors. Yet, these new actors are 
required to ensure compliance from members of the community. At-
tempts to impose such a formal structure could be perceived as a challenge 
to traditional authority. This has resulted in frequent interference by chiefs 
in the enforcement of rules such as the setting of tariffs, recovery of user 
fees and appointment of members to the water and sanitation manage-
ment teams.  
At the same time, traditional governance structures at the local level 
have continued to show reluctance to support the new institutional ar-
rangements for rural water development, due to power struggles and the 
limited involvement of traditional actors in the early years of NCWSP im-
plementation. As a result, the DAs and CWSA and their regional counter-
parts often become caught up in webs of conflict, and little has been done 
to address the underlying cause of these conflicts (Nyarko 2007, Nyarko 
et al. 2011).  
In addition to the above, politicians and chiefs have taken advantage of 
the tensions and conflicts between DAs and the CWSA to reinforce their 
own power, by controlling implementation of the water reforms. Nyarko 
et al. (2011) found political interference in the management of water sys-
tems. In addition, in numerous cases, tensions and conflicts between DAs 
and water and sanitation management teams have led to the dissolution of 
teams or degenerated into lawsuits to counter such dissolution.  
Furthermore, community members’ perception of water as a resource 
that should be freely accessible and used (with no payment required) still 
prevails. This contradicts the economic notion of water introduced under 
the demand-responsive approach, which emphasises that the full cost of 
water provision and infrastructure maintenance should be recovered via 
tariffs. Under the new institutional arrangements for water supply, com-
munities understood that their 5% contribution to the water infrastructure 
would give them full ownership; hence, that they would not have to pay 
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further for water use. In view of that understanding, community members 
perceive charging fees for facilities maintenance as unjust.  
Several studies point to power struggles between politicians, senior bu-
reaucrats, traditional actors and local elites, as well as resistance from the 
water and sanitation management committees and teams, as the main rea-
sons for the poor performance of small town water supply systems (Fuest 
2006, Eguavoen and Youkhana 2008, Karikari 1996, Nyarko 2007). This 
has undermined achievement of the NCWSP objectives. To curtail some 
of the challenges and ensure the long-term sustainability of water facilities, 
some have suggested that policymakers must pay attention to the larger 
local social and institutional environment. 
Technical  
Further to the above, inadequate support for community water actors has 
affected the operation and maintenance of water facilities. Inadequate 
technical skills and lack of continued training of local water actors have 
aggravated the already difficult situation. Local water actors, for example, 
are unable to carry out routine maintenance, do minor repairs or efficiently 
manage the water systems (Water and Sanitation Strategy 2014: 3). 
Non-adherence to norms, standards, guidelines and practices is another 
major challenge confronting the water sector. Inadequate information and 
knowledge about the NCWSP within the general community and even 
among local water actors has been blamed for the challenges in pro-
gramme implementation. Lastly, the inability of the CWSA and DAs to 
enforce the rules set out to guide NCWSP implementation has under-
mined their capacity to effectively coordinate and bring various stakehold-
ers together to ensure the successful translation and implementation of 
the NCWSP (CWSA 2014: 30). 
 
4.5 Description of the small town water supply systems in 
the six sample cases 
CWSA is mandated to provide water to small town areas of Ghana. “Small 
town water supply system” is the name given to a piped water supply 
scheme constructed for a small town in Ghana. Such water systems are 
not connected to the national urban water network. They serve popula-
tions between 2,000 and 50,000. 
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All of the water systems in the six cases studied draw their water from 
an underground source accessed by drilled boreholes fitted with submers-
ible pumps. Other parts of the water systems include a floating overhead 
reservoir tank located in each community. The size of the reservoirs de-
pend on the size of the population served and the demand for water within 
the beneficiary community.  
In addition, there are transmission and distribution pipelines, public 
standpipes (i.e., central taps where inhabitants can fill containers with wa-
ter to transport to their various homes) and private household connections 
(for individuals who can afford piping to bring taps into their home). Each 
water system is designed for a lifespan of approximately 15 years, and no 
immediate need to expand the system is expected within that period. 
It is also important to note that communities relied on different sources 
of water before construction of the new water supply infrastructure. Ap-
pendix 11 provides details about these sources. 
For the daily operation and management of a water system, a water and 
sanitation management committee is established within each constituency. 
One member of the committee is selected to serve on the water and sani-
tation management team representing that constituency. In all six of the 
cases studied, a water and sanitation management team was in place. Each 
had the required number of members (10-15), as indicated in NCWSP 
strategy documents, but the numbers varied across the cases (see appendix 
12).  
Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 are water systems under community-based manage-
ment. Under community-based management, a water and sanitation man-
agement team takes responsibility for the water system on behalf of the 
community. To assist with the technical, financial and administrative as-
pects of operations and maintenance, the water team recruits technical 
staff who are then responsible for day-to-day system management activi-
ties. Appendix 13 provides details on the staff recruited and their qualifi-
cations. Cases 5 and 6 are water systems under private-based management. 
Here, a private service provider manages, controls, operates and maintains 
the water system on behalf of the community. Under this type of manage-
ment, the service provider must maintain water quality standards, carry 
out repairs, revenue collection, record-keeping and submission of reports 
and expand the system as needed.  
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Notes 
1 Customary laws are the customs, norms, traditions and practices of a given society 
transferred from one generation to the next and accepted as binding (Burchi 2005).  
2 The “stools” are symbolised by a carved stool for the Akan and skins (hides) for 
chiefs in the northern part of Ghana. These are believed to contain the souls of the 
ancestors and represent the traditional authority of the chieftaincy (Ubink 2008).  
3 Chiefs in Ghana comprise subchiefs, queen mothers, linguists, family lineages, 
clan heads, heads of asafo companies, priests and priestesses (Guri 2006). 
4 Some chiefs later became part of the legislative council (Ocloo 2011). 
5 Although traditional actors continued to wield a degree of authority, some of the 
laws were oppressive, hence leading to community resistance and refusal to com-
ply.  
6 Under indirect rule, colonial actors made extensive use of traditional authority by 
forming alliances with traditional chiefs organised under the Native Authority for 
local governance. Traditional actors continued to wield a degree of authority, and 
the colonial government protected them because it depended on the chiefs to col-
lect taxes from their subjects (Ubink 2008). 
7 These included DANIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency and 
the KfW Development Bank in cooperation with the German Agency for Tech-
nical Cooperation, the European Commission and the Japan International Coop-
eration Agency. Others were the Nordic Development Fund, the African Devel-
opment Bank, the UK Department for International Development and Agence 
Française de Développment. 
8 Figures on the total number of rural water facilities differ from source to source. 
9 Rural communities are also known as small communities in CWSA documents. 
The terms “rural community” and “small town community” are used interchange-
ably in this thesis.  
10 Small town communities with a population of 75-50,000 fall under the direct 
control of the respective municipal and district administration and CWSA. Towns 
with a population greater than 50,000 are classified as urban and under the mandate 
of Ghana Water Company Limited.  
11 Appendix 1 provides details on the institutional arrangements for the establish-
ment and composition of water and sanitation management teams.   
12 In addition to the term “District Assembly” (or DA) the term “metropolitan, 
municipal or district assembly” is sometimes used for broader coverage. 
13 Refer to appendix 3. 
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14 The term “ownership” refers to the fact that the facilities are actually the property 
of the district, which holds them in trust for the community and delegates their 
management to the communities (Entsua-Mensah et al. 2007). 
15 Refer to appendix 4. 
16 CWSA (2007) provides a list of activities to ensure that the water and sanitation 
management committees and teams operate and maintain the water system in a 
sustainable and efficient manner (see appendix 5). 
17 Refer to appendix 6. 
18 Appendix 7 and 8 provide details.  
19 Refer to appendix 2. 
20 See appendix 9 for details.  
21 In accordance with section 15 of Act 462, the metropolitan, municipal and dis-
trict assemblies have the power to delegate functions other than their legislative 
functions to substructures, individuals or groups. 
22 Refer to appendix 10. 
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5 
Translating and Enforcing Participatory 
Water Management: From Policy to 
Practice  
 
5.1 Introduction  
In Ghana, principles of community management and the demand-respon-
sive approach informed the development and design of the NCWSP. As 
part of the new institutional arrangements, communities were required to 
help pay for the initial cost of the water infrastructure (a 5% contribution). 
They were required to participate in the governance of their water supply 
facility by forming groups (called water and sanitation management 
teams), and to cover all maintenance and repair costs by setting appropri-
ate water tariffs. The assumption was that such participation by the bene-
ficiary communities would empower them to take ownership of and re-
sponsibility for the operation and maintenance of their water facility. This 
new arrangement would hence translate into efficient and continuous 
functioning of the water facilities built under the NCWSP.  
A number of studies have enumerated several preconditions that are 
integral to the achievement of policy objectives such as those above. For 
example, programme objectives must be clear and consistent, access to 
financial resources needs to be ensured, and implementing actors with the 
required capacity must be available and recruited (see, e.g., Sabatier and 
Mazmanian 1979, 1980; Matland 1999). However, many studies document 
differences between centrally formulated policies and the practices actually 
implemented (e.g., Maynard-Moody et al. 1990, Andrews 2013, Matland 
1995: 148). Factors identified as causing these discrepancies include (i) var-
ying commitments of implementing countries towards policy reforms; (ii) 
insufficient information and knowledge about the policy or programme; 
(iii) differences in implementing actors’ institutional settings and struc-
tures; (iv) inadequate technical capacity and skills among implementing 
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countries and actors; and (v) lack of financial resources, corruption and 
neopatrimonialism (Andrews 2013, Matland 1995: 148).  
Under the NCWSP, we observed similar factors constraining actors’ 
capacities to implement the programme. As this chapter will show, various 
environmental factors influenced actors’ capacity to resist or accept insti-
tutional arrangements, particularly concerning the mandatory contribution 
towards the cost of the water project (the 5% levy) and formation of water 
management groups (the water and sanitation management teams). These 
institutional arrangements were put in place to ensure that beneficiary 
communities developed a sense of ownership of and responsibility for the 
water facilities provided, leading to their carrying out proper management 
and maintenance. Evidence, however, suggests that the institutional 
changes under the NCWSP were slow. Indeed, in all six cases examined, 
little seems to have been achieved in terms of the beneficiary communities 
taking ownership and responsibility for their water system. 
With this in mind, this chapter addresses five key questions: (i) Under 
what circumstances did local actors embrace the principles of the 
NCWSP, and in what other circumstances did they resist or perceive these 
ideas to be a threat? (ii) What practices have local actors adopted to sup-
port or to frustrate NCWSP implementation? (iii) To what extent have the 
practices adopted empowered citizens to take ownership and responsibil-
ity for operations and maintenance or led to elite capture? (iv) What are 
the motivations and logics behind actors’ choices and practices? (v) Can 
we describe actors’ actions as a process of institutional bricolage?  
5.2 Promoting community participation  
5.2.1 Contributing to the capital cost of the water project  
As part of the institutional arrangements under the NCWSP, each partic-
ipating community was required to contribute 5% of the capital cost of 
the water facility.1 This section focuses on how the local social and insti-
tutional context influenced actors’ acceptance or resistance of the 5% con-
tribution. It demonstrates that differences in local contexts did influence 
actors’ interpretation and implementation of the 5% levy.  
In accordance with community management principles, policymakers 
perceived the 5% contribution towards the cost of the water facility as 
necessary to ensure users’ collective ownership of the project and to stim-
ulate them to take responsibility for operation and maintenance of their 
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water facility. The assumption was that due to the 5% contribution, bene-
ficiary communities’ would perceive the facility as their own and be dili-
gent in ensuring proper operation and maintenance. The new institutional 
arrangements were also designed to enable citizens to hold local water ac-
tors accountable for their decisions in day-to-day management of the wa-
ter system. Proponents of community management argued that this new 
arrangement would ensure efficient management, continuous access and 
reliability of water flow.  
Yet, an important prerequisite of institutional arrangements under the 
community management approach is that they must be consistent with the 
existing local social and institutional context. Nevertheless, in Ghana, the 
local social and institutional environment in many cases constrained actors 
in implementing the new institutional arrangements.  
Under the NCWSP, to govern a rural water supply facility, the commu-
nity had to form an oversight group, define rights and responsibilities, and 
establish rules of access to potable water and for management of the sys-
tem. However, these activities cannot be divorced from the cultural, socio-
economic and political environment within which they occur (Fuest 2006: 
7). Thus, in our six sample cases we found that the local social and insti-
tutional context of the implementers explained much of the variation 
found in implementation of the 5% contribution. Indeed, the local insti-
tutional context and pre-existing institutions invariably played an im-
portant role in the choices made and practices adopted by local actors.  
First, inadequate knowledge and lack of access to information on the water reform 
influenced how beneficiaries interpreted the 5% levy and the practices 
they adopted. Interviews with community members suggest that most 
members of the community perceived the water infrastructure just like any 
other government project, such as schools, roads, hospitals and markets, 
as provided at no direct cost to users. Besides, the maintenance of these 
facilities was considered to be the responsibility of the state and local gov-
ernment organisations. As a result, users considered the 5% levy as unfair 
and fiercely opposed it. This was confirmed by comments made at a 
women’s focus group discussion:  
In the past, we did not contribute towards the construction of water facili-
ties. The District Assembly constructed and maintained all water facilities at 
no cost to us. It was free, what has changed now (Women’s focus group, 
case 2, Kyerkor, 3 June 2015)?  
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From the above, collective participation appears to be inconsistent with 
the known practice by which the state government takes responsibility for 
the entire cost of building and maintaining water facilities provided. Be-
fore NCWSP implementation, the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corpora-
tion (a state agency) was directly responsible for development and mainte-
nance of rural water infrastructure. This was done at no cost to the 
beneficiary communities (Karikari 1996). As a result, the requirement to 
pay 5% of the total cost of the water infrastructure in the form of a levy 
was new to most residents. Many resisted or refused to comply with this 
institutional change.  
On the other hand, some users opposed payment of the 5% levy be-
cause they believed it to be a trick played by local government and water 
actors to steal money from citizens for their own personal benefit. After 
all, they knew very well that the state government provided water facilities 
at no cost and with no local contribution needed. Interviews with com-
munity members confirm that low levels of trust between citizens and 
government actors likely triggered resistance: 
You see they connived with some staff at the District Assembly to force us 
to pay the 5% levy when the government is providing the water for free 
(Group interview, case 1a, Nyamedom, 25 May 2015). 
Other findings demonstrate that inconsistencies in implementation of 
the 5% levy across communities informed users’ choices and actions. Us-
ers could not fathom why they had to comply with the 5% levy when 
neighbouring communities had been exempted from paying the contribu-
tion or had the actual percentage slashed by half:  
We do not understand this whole thing of paying a levy to get water when 
there is water all over the community. Some neighbouring communities paid 
nothing to get the same water projects in their communities. So why must 
we pay? Are we not also Ghanaians (Women’s focus group, case 2, 4 June 
2015)? 
These finding are in line with evidence from cases 5 and 6, in which 
Members of Parliament paid their respective constituency communities’ 
5% contributions through a DA common fund.2 The inconsistencies in 
implementation of the 5% levy justified users’ argument that the contri-
bution was illegitimate and a ploy by local water actors to cheat them.  
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 In contrast to cases 1, 2 and 4, users in case 3 embraced payment of 
the 5% with less resistance. In that case, difficulties experienced in the past 
in accessing water meant that the new water facility was felt to be an urgent 
need, which explains beneficiaries’ high enthusiasm and support for the 
new institutional arrangements. Past experiences and challenges in access-
ing water informed these users’ motivations and logic, which translated 
into support for the new water facility by payment of the 5% levy:  
In the past, we went through difficulties in accessing water. We had to wake 
up as early as 2 AM to search for water to avoid long queues in the morning. 
We had to travel a long distance and climb hills, which are very steep. In the 
dry season, we even had to sleep in the streams to get water. It was a painful 
experience. Therefore, when we heard that the government was about to 
construct the small town water facility we were happy and ready to pay any 
levy to get the water to our community. The water project was a blessing to 
us (Women’s focus group, case 3, Wiamoase, 26 July 2015).  
Focus group discussions with school children revealed similar senti-
ments about the challenges of accessing water in the past: 
In the past we were always late to school due to long queues we had to join 
before we had water. On some days, we had to skip school to search for 
water. It was a terrible experience and, therefore, when we heard that we 
would have a new water facility we were happy (Focus group, Islamic DA 
Primary, case 3, Wiamoase, 27 June 2015). 
Some evidence suggests that users’ rejection of the 5% levy may have 
stemmed from a poor understanding and lack of access to detailed infor-
mation about the intent of the contribution.  
Nonetheless, the physical characteristics and the nature of water resources ac-
counted for some of the variation in implementation. The urgent need for 
water influenced how beneficiaries interpreted payment of the 5% levy 
and the practices they adopted in response to it. Thus, the extent to which 
new water projects were needed to satisfy users’ daily water needs deter-
mined to some extent the bargaining power they brought to bear in ac-
cepting or resisting the 5% contribution. Users with scarce alternative wa-
ter sources (cases 3, 5 and 6) and those in urgent need of water were more 
committed, as reflected in their enthusiasm for paying the 5% levy, com-
pared to users with access to sufficient alternative water sources (cases 1 
and 2). These latter opposed implementation of the 5% levy.  
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The above is reflected in our observations in case 4. Here, some parts 
of the community had an urgent need for water. They welcomed the pro-
ject and paid their share of the levy. Other parts of the community had 
alternative sources of water (e.g., hand-dug wells or boreholes); they op-
posed payment of the levy. Users offered the following rationale at a focus 
group session:  
Those of us staying in Ebonmu and beyond have a lot of stones in the 
ground, making it difficult to construct hand-dug wells. We have to go to 
Krobo line to get water. In addition, most of the streams closer to us, which 
we relied on in the past, have dried up because of the expansion of the 
community and human activity close to this source. The new water system 
was therefore needed to enable us to have water closer to us (Women’s fo-
cus group, case 4, Juaso Obogu, 9 August 2015). 
Similarly, in cases 5 and 6, unfavourable topography and scarce alter-
native water sources, alongside a high incidence of guinea-worm disease, 
exacerbated the challenges faced in accessing water. The need for new wa-
ter infrastructure was urgent. Although users were enthusiastic about the 
water project, the poverty level in the communities constrained their abil-
ity to pay. This led to the decision by Members of Parliament to absorb 
the payment requirement:  
The water situation was so bad in the dry season, we had to spend days to 
get a bucket of water. We had to dig the mud and wait for the water to 
gather before we could fill our containers and this could take the whole 
night. The experiences affected our economic activities as economic time 
was wasted in search for water. We appealed to several politicians and the 
DA to get water and, therefore, when we heard that we were going to have 
a new water system we were very happy and were ready to provide our sup-
port both financially and in kind. It was an answer from the gods (Group 
interview, case 5, Tatale, 15 October 2015). 
The comments above show that actors’ level of acceptance or rejection 
of the 5% levy depended on the existing context. In particular, availability 
of alternative water sources (in cases 1, 2 and 4) influenced users’ assess-
ment of the situation and consequently how they interpreted the new pol-
icy requirement of a 5% contribution.  
However, many studies have found that users do not always become 
collective owners or collectively take responsibility for implementing wa-
ter reforms. In any policy change process, the presence of enforcers is key 
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to ensure compliance. In our case, too, the availability of enforcers was 
integral in ensuring compliance with the 5% levy in cases where there was 
resistance. The practices of key local actors, like traditional chiefs and 
“project champions” were observed in this study to influence users’ com-
pliance with the 5% levy. These actors, which can be characterised as in-
stitutional entrepreneurs or bricoleurs (see also chapter 7), played im-
portant role in implementation of the 5% levy.  
Strategies adopted by local actors to enforce implementation of the 5% 
contribution are not the subject of this chapter. Rather, the focus is to 
understand what facilitated and ensured compliance among users who had 
rejected payment of their share of the levy. Also, we examine the extent 
to which actors were capable of enforcing implementation of institutional 
reforms and the extent that this resulted from the influence of existing 
institutions and past historical factors. The next section describes how ac-
tors (especially traditional actors) through community-embedded institu-
tions compelled collective participation among water users who resisted 
payment of the 5% levy. Whether this led to collective ownership and re-
sponsibility and translated into efficient management of the water system 
will be discussed later in this thesis. 
5.2.2 The role of local actors: Promoting collective ownership 
and responsibility  
The ability to sustain, maintain, modify or resist institutional change de-
pends on the capacity of actors to enforce implementation (Brousseau et 
al. 2011). The presence of enforcers is thus key to ensure compliance in a 
policy change process. This study observed that though some users re-
jected the idea of the 5% contribution, traditional actors used their social 
position to employ community-embedded institutions to ensure compli-
ance.  
The chiefs were not given a formal role or responsibilities under the 
NCWSP. For instance, they were not stipulated to be part of the water 
and sanitation management teams (see also section 5.3). However, they 
could participate in the activities of the teams as an observers without the 
right to vote in key decision-making processes. 
Despite this limitation, the chiefs’ position as political and administra-
tive leaders of the community enabled them to influence and enforce im-
plementation of collective participation, as in the case of the 5% 
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contribution. Though most users in cases 1, 2 and 4 opposed payment of 
the levy, the chiefs and other influential local actors ensured compliance 
by invoking existing community-embedded institutions. In case 2, for ex-
ample, access to funeral rites for citizens was tied to payment of the 5% 
levy. In other words, each household had to pay its share of the 5% levy 
before chiefs and the funeral committee would grant land for the affected 
household to bury its dead. Interviews revealed the power of this enforce-
ment means: 
It was a quite difficult moment for me; they [the chief and the funeral com-
mittee] refused to give me the approval to get the land to bury my mom, 
because some of my siblings had not paid the water levy. Everyone in my 
family had to fulfil their part of the 5% levy before we had the approval to 
get a portion of land to bury our mom late in the night. It was so disgraceful. 
I still remember the embarrassment we went through as family members. I 
still remember the pain (Group interview respondent, case 2, Kyerkor, 5 
June 2015). 
The practice of denying family members land for the burial of dead 
relatives was to prevent free-riders and ensure the collective action that 
was deemed necessary to propel development:  
Kyerkor community has high communal spirit, given that decisions taken 
collectively are not to be violated. To ensure compliance we put in place 
some measures to deter defectors. These are part of practices and means to 
ensure citizens comply with rules. Recently when we wanted electricity in 
this township we applied the same rule (DA member, case 2, Kyerkor, 7 
June 2015). 
Similarly, in case 1b traditional actors and other local leaders3 played a 
major role in ensuring compliance. Like in case 2, defaulters were denied 
land to bury their loved ones. Nonetheless, in case 2, traditional actors 
expanded the network of those required to pay the 5% levy to include not 
just those actively residing in the community but also citizens living in big 
cities and abroad:  
We expanded the network of those that must pay the levy to include those 
staying abroad and in the big cities. The argument is that those outside the 
community occasionally visit the community. Once they are here, they will 
use water and, therefore, they must also contribute, irrespective of their 
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place of residence (Interview with traditional chiefs and elders, case 1b, 
Asuase, 29 May 2015). 
In contrast to the above, in case 4, the 5% levy was applied through the 
chiefs and other government organisations, such as the police and the 
courts. Defaulters were served a summons to appear before the court:  
Each section had a water committee in charge of collecting the levy. If you 
refuse to pay they report you to the police and [you are] subsequently taken to 
court to demand payment. The inclusion of the courts put a lot of fear in people 
and made everyone pay (Women’s focus group, case 4, Juaso Obogu, 9 August 
2018). 
In sum, we can conclude that users complied with the 5% contribution 
out of fear or injustices that they would face if they defaulted on the col-
lective commitment. From the evidence gathered, however, enforcement 
of the 5% contribution does not seem to have promoted collective own-
ership and responsibility, as assumed under the NCWSP.  
Contribution of the 5% levy may not have translated into community 
ownership and responsibility for the future maintenance of their water 
system. However, this study found that shame and the stigma of forfeiting 
land rights to bury loved ones, or fear of being locked in prison, motivated 
users to pay the levy (cases 1, 2 and 4). An urgent need for water (cases 3, 
4, 5 and 6) did instil an urgency to pay, but even in these cases, there is 
little indication of a willingness among users to take ownership and re-
sponsibility for the water projects provided.  
Evidence of a lack of ownership among users and their failure to take 
responsibility for their water system was clearly demonstrated by users’ 
refusal to participate in water-related activities. For example, there was a 
lack of participating public at durbars, and few were willing to take up 
water-related positions. According to survey results, communities with al-
ternative water sources (cases 1, 2 and some parts of case 4) continued to 
rely on these alternative sources for their daily supplies (figure 5.1). Such 
practices made it difficult for water actors to break even, as lower patron-
age raised the unit cost of water. Yet, the water systems in communities 
with scarce water resources (case 3 and some parts of case 4) were over-
stretched due to increases in population. Moreover, the tariffs established 
were too low to allow for system upgrades and expansions to cover newly 
developed localities within the communities. This meant that most users 
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in newly developed localities had to rely on unsafe sources for their daily 
water needs.  
Figure 5.1  
User dependence on public standpipes or private household connections 
compared to alternative water sources 
Source:  Author 
 
 
Evidence further shows that users did not take part in decision-making 
and were not consulted on key decisions confronting the water systems. 
Lack of knowledge and information about the NCWSP may explain users’ 
apathy towards water-related activities. Survey results presented in figure 
5.2 indicate that most users indeed had little knowledge and information 
about water system governance, though such knowledge and information 
was to empower them to play their roles effectively.  
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Figure 5.2 
Users in possession of sufficient information to understand and play their 
role in water facility governance 
 
Source:  Author 
 
Community members appear to have done little to hold local water 
actors accountable for their activities. Providing public accounts of the 
financial and technical status of the water system was a key institutional 
arrangement put in place to ensure transparency among local water actors. 
However, survey results indicate that, with the exception of case 1b, public 
accountability was virtually absent (figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3  
Users’ knowledge of public accounts issued by water actors regarding water 
system technical and financial status 
Source: Author 
 
Community members may have been ignorant of their roles and re-
sponsibilities in demanding compliance with accountability standards. Or 
they may have lacked the resources (e.g., power and influence) to ensure 
compliance from water actors. If users were aware of their roles and re-
sponsibilities, unequal power relations and social structures may have con-
strained their capacity to demand compliance. The question of unequal 
power relations raises another important issue, discussed further in section 
5.3, which is the chiefs’ involvement in the various new institutional ar-
rangements, particularly the formation and activities of the water and san-
itation management teams. 
5.2.3 Formation of water and sanitation management teams  
So far, this chapter has examined mainly how users interpreted the idea of 
the 5% contribution to the water supply facility and the practices emerging 
from their interpretations. It also investigated local actors’ employment of 
community-embedded rules to ensure compliance.  
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This section looks at the reliance of powerful traditional actors on com-
munity-embedded institutions to meddle in the formation and activities of 
the water and sanitation management teams.  
 As described in chapter 4, institutional arrangements under the 
NCWSP required creation of new groups, specifically, water and sanitation 
management teams. These new entities existed side by side with traditional 
political structures. The new institutional arrangements excluded tradi-
tional actors from active participation in these new structures, though tra-
ditional actors were highly influential in grassroots governance. Tradi-
tional actors could participate as observers in the water and sanitation 
management teams, but they had no right to vote. Despite these limita-
tions, this study found that the chiefs wielded substantial influence on and 
interfered with the composition and activities of the management teams. 
For example, in some cases they dissolved water and sanitation manage-
ment teams, or meddled in their day-to-day management of the water sys-
tem.  
In case 2, for example, chiefs replaced members of the water and sani-
tation management team4 with their own representatives who were loyal 
to both the traditional actors and the ruling government. These new mem-
bers were perceived by the community to be cronies of the chiefs, who 
would allow the traditional actors’ access to and control over management 
of the water system. Interviews with key informants5 confirmed this ob-
servation:  
We were perceived as sympathisers of the past government. As a result we 
will sabotage the new government. So, the chief together with some power-
ful people in the community decided to appoint new members that would 
support the chiefs and newly elected government (Informant, case 2, 
Kyerkor, 4 June 2015). 
It is surprising that although the water and sanitation management 
teams were supposed to be apolitical, chiefs and politicians nonetheless 
treated membership as a political appointment, hence justifying their con-
tinued interference. This finding supports the conclusions of other stud-
ies, such as Fuest (2006). That author found similar interference of chiefs 
and politicians in the composition of water and sanitation management 
teams after the 2004 general presidential and parliamentary elections in 
Ghana. 
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 In case 4, the chiefs replaced members of the water and sanitation 
management teams after complaints by users dissatisfied with the team’s 
performance. Both men’s and women’s focus groups revealed concerns 
about the poor performance of team members and allegations of corrup-
tion and mismanagement of the water system. They had called for the 
members to be replaced with more competent and dedicated functionar-
ies: 
The previous water team did not provide public accounts of their financial 
and other activities. They must provide an account to us on how they use 
the revenues accrued from selling water to us. The water belongs to us, so 
we have the right to know how our money is utilised. Also, they had over-
stayed their term, and therefore we pushed for their dissolution by com-
plaining to our chief to take action (Women’s focus group, case 4, Juaso 
Obogu, 9 August 2015). 
In this case, the decision to replace the water and sanitation manage-
ment team was made collectively by the chiefs and community assembly 
members.6 The chiefs were perceived as arbitrators responsible for ensur-
ing peace and taking the lead in resolving conflicts. These expectations 
stem from existing cultural practices, which legitimise interventions by 
chiefs in water activities. Various interviewees provided justification for 
the chiefs’ interference in water and sanitation management team activi-
ties:  
We had to dissolve the previous water team and select people that everyone 
in the community including us [chiefs] can trust. The former team was not 
transparent and accountability to the community was very poor. As leaders 
in the community, we must ensure that the MWST [water and sanitation 
management team] is following the rules. It is our duty to make things right 
(Interview with traditional actor, case 4, Juaso Obogu, 10 August 2015). 
Other evidence points to a perception among some water actors that 
the chiefs and local elites replaced members of the water and sanitation 
management teams with their own favourites for nefarious reasons. In-
deed, not all community members supported the chiefs’ interference in 
the teams’ membership: 
The chiefs and MWST [water and sanitation management team] are part of 
the rot. In our last and only public meeting, we realised that the chiefs to-
gether with members of the MWST have borrowed or taken money from 
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the water accounts for their personal use. Changing the membership is a 
strategy in order to reduce the tensions and rot that is visible to everyone 
but we cannot speak-up due to fear and intimidation. The new members are 
still reporting to the traditional actors but not to us so what has changed 
(Group interview, case 4, Juaso Obogu, 7 August 2015)? 
In case 3, a large number of water and sanitation management team 
members resigned from their positions, which justified the chiefs’ steps to 
reconstitute the team. The traditional actors appointed new members to 
fill the vacated positions. As required under the NCWSP institutional ar-
rangements, selection and appointment of management team members 
was to be participatory, and include all members of the community, facil-
itated by the DA. Notwithstanding this provision, the chiefs were ob-
served as taking advantage of the situation by appointing their own repre-
sentatives to the vacancies.7 Evidence gathered indicates that the chiefs 
appointed interim members from whom they had received favours in the 
past, and then opposed the establishment of a new water and sanitation 
management team when the need emerged:  
The traditional actors were comfortable with the interim WSMT [water and 
sanitation management team]. They had control and were involved in every 
decision in the day-to-day management of the water system. We are not 
allowed to use revenue from the sale of water for non-water and sanitation 
related activities. However, we know that the WSMT financed the activities 
of the chiefs, irrespective of whether they fell under water and sanitation 
activities or not (Water and sanitation committee member, case 3, Wia-
moase, 30 July 2015). 
Town council members did make numerous attempts to effectuate par-
ticipatory processes in electing new water and sanitation management 
teams in the following year.8 However, the chiefs resisted such attempts 
until the district administration stepped in to reinstate the process, in line 
with the NCWSP guidelines. Likely, the chiefs were comfortable with the 
interim water and sanitation management team because their economic 
desires were being satisfied. As long as the water system continued to op-
erate and provide water to residents, no new, elected water and sanitation 
management team was considered necessary.  
In contrast to cases 2, 3 and 4, chiefs’ interference, in the activities of 
the water and sanitation management teams was low in cases 1, 5 and 6. 
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For example, in case 1, the chiefs encouraged the water and sanitation 
management team to serve another term after its first term ended:  
It was announced at a community meeting that the MWST [water and san-
itation management team] term had ended and those interested should ap-
ply. However, the entire community unanimously agreed that the current 
team continue for another term. Most people were satisfied with their work 
(System manager, case 1, Nyamedom, 25 May 2015). 
The wording of the above comment is ambiguous. There are other pos-
sible explanations for the lesser interference by the chiefs in the water and 
sanitation management teams’ activities. The current study found that in 
case 1 the chiefs had a good relationship with the water and sanitation 
management team. The team consulted the chiefs on all major issues con-
fronting the water system. In short, the chiefs in case 1 were involved in 
key decision-making processes and, therefore, had fair knowledge and in-
formation on the day-to-day running of the water system. Further inter-
ference in the activities of the water and sanitation management team was 
unnecessary.  
This behaviour of the traditional actors raises an important proposition 
found in the policy implementation literature, that is, implementation is 
smoothened when information and knowledge about a policy or pro-
gramme are clear to interested agents and when leaders are supportive of 
the policy or programme. Traditional actors’ knowledge about the day-to-
day running of the water system made it unnecessary for the chiefs to in-
terfere or disrupt the management team’s activities.  
In case 6, the water and sanitation management team’s more cordial 
relationship with the traditional actors, compared to case 5, rendered the 
chiefs’ interference with water and sanitation management activities un-
necessary. Evidence suggests that the strained relationship between the 
water and sanitation management team and the chiefs in case 5 was due to 
mistrust between the two actors. Notwithstanding their differences, the 
chiefs were reluctant to interfere in the activities of the water and sanita-
tion management team, due to the reliance of social relationships on trust 
and peaceful coexistence. This study could not gather enough evidence to 
really understand the behaviour of the chiefs in case 5 and its conse-
quences for the management team’s activities. This was due to the short 
length of time that the water system had been operational (it was just a 
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year old9 at the time of the research). For comparative purposes, the water 
system in case 1 was more than three years old.  
The above narratives indicate that the chiefs’ motivations influenced 
their acceptance of or opposition to the composition and activities of the 
water and sanitation management teams. Economic and social motives in-
fluenced the extent to which the chiefs interfered. As noted earlier, policies 
that compromise and threaten the power and legitimacy of existing actors 
are less likely to be accepted; policies that reinforce actors’ legitimacy and 
authority are more likely to receive support and acceptance (Cleaver 2012; 
Cleaver et al. 2014; Campbell 1997, 2004). Similarly, as established in this 
study thus far, if economic advantages of local actors, such as the chiefs, 
come under threat, these actors are likely to resist new institutional ar-
rangements, for example, replacing water and sanitation management 
team members with own representatives who will succumb to their de-
mands.  
It is important to note that it was not only the chiefs who resisted or 
interfered with the composition of the water and sanitation management 
teams. Other local actors who had been influential in the earlier stages of 
NCWSP implementation became members of the water and sanitation 
management teams or water personnel. Similar to what was observed 
among chiefs, these influential actors or “project champions” (to borrow 
Andrew Matt's 2013 term) had disproportionate control over the manage-
ment teams’ membership and activities. This control and capture of the 
management teams by project champions was observed in all cases, but 
was most pronounced in cases 4, 5 and 6. In cases 5 and 6, for example, a 
few members of the water and sanitation management teams who had 
been “project champions” effectively dictated water activities, with the 
rest of the members largely disregarded. Although project champions’ role 
was less dominant in the rest of the cases, the voluntary nature of the work 
of the water and sanitation management teams acted as a general disincen-
tive, making the majority of members rather inactive. In all six cases , we 
observed that a few management team members controlled water activi-
ties.  
In summary, this research found variation in how the 5% contributions 
were implemented and how the water and sanitation management teams 
were formed and conducted their activities. First, implementation differ-
ences were found to be associated with the local social and institutional 
setting within the beneficiary communities. The local setting largely 
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determined how local actors defined their problems and the steps they 
took to resolve challenges emanating from pressure for technological and 
institutional change. Secondly, community members’ inadequate 
knowledge and information about the NCWSP partially explains the dif-
ferences found in implementation. Thirdly, differences in the physical 
context, particularly local topography and access to water resources, di-
rectly influenced actors’ choices and preferences. Fourthly, the extent to 
which a particular idea threatened or reinforced influential local actors’ 
legitimacy and powers informed their actions to either resist or support 
new institutional arrangements for the governance of rural water facilities.  
Notwithstanding the above, a key question remains unanswered: To 
what extent did implementation of the NCWSP lead to institutional 
change? Did the project succeed in making water users active participants 
in water system management, willing to contribute to the future operation 
and maintenance of their system?  
5.3 Discussion 
This chapter has sought to understand implementation of the 5% contri-
bution and formation of the water and sanitation management teams. The 
5% contribution was applied differently in the six cases studied, and for-
mation of the water and sanitation management teams similarly varied.  
On the question of what accounts for this diversity in implementation, 
our findings suggest that the absence of information on the NCWSP was 
a main trigger for implementation differences. Some beneficiary commu-
nities misunderstood the idea behind the 5% levy, conceiving it as a means 
for state officials to cheat water service users (cases 1, 2 and 4). 
Inconsistencies in implementation of the 5% levy between neighbour-
ing communities seemed to justify users’ allegations of wrongdoing and 
their reluctance to comply with the new institutional arrangements. Fur-
ther observation, however, suggests that physical characteristics and the 
extent to which beneficiaries had access to alternative water sources also 
informed users’ choices. As shown in this chapter, those communities that 
rejected the 5% levy had access to alternative water sources, hence making 
the new water project and expected institutional changes of little concern 
to them.  
However, communities without adequate alternative water sources 
(case 3) embraced the idea of the 5% contribution and complied with less 
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resistance. Evidence suggests that it was this urgent need for water that 
propelled many users’ final choices and actions. Furthermore, users in 
cases 1, 2 and 4 complied with the 5% levy due to fear and stigma attached 
to being denied land to bury loved ones. Survey results show that the ma-
jority of users were ignorant of the rationale behind the 5% contribution. 
Moreover, they were unaware of the rules and their own responsibilities 
with regard to the water system. It would therefore be difficult to assert 
that compliance with the 5% contribution indicates a collective sense of 
ownership and responsibility for the water system, and empowerment of 
users to hold local water actors accountable for their activities. The results 
of this study, rather, confirm observations from earlier research that found 
no direct relationship between community contributions and collective 
ownership and acceptance of responsibility for covering future costs of 
operating and maintaining the water system (Bacho 2001, Fuest 2006).  
We also demonstrated that local actors’ capacity to resist or support the 
new institutional arrangements, particularly the 5% contribution and par-
ticipatory formation of the water and sanitation management teams, relied 
on influential local actors invoking community-embedded institutions. 
This finding is consistent with the conclusions of earlier studies and sug-
gests that institutions expressed through rules, social norms and cultural 
beliefs influence actors’ interpretation and understanding of events. Not-
withstanding these constraints, these pre-existing institutions also provide 
actors means for resisting, accepting or modifying institutional arrange-
ments (North 1990; Hodgson 2006; Campbell 1998, 1997, 2004). 
Most chiefs embraced the idea of the 5% contribution, as it was con-
sistent with local values and the community practice of encouraging col-
lective action to propel development. The 5% contribution appeared sim-
ilar to practices used in the past to finance and support other community-
initiated projects. Nonadherence to the 5% contribution was considered 
unacceptable, as it challenged norms and cultural values which frown on 
opportunism, cheating and any shirking of community responsibility 
(North 1990).  
As demonstrated, the chiefs’ ideologies and values influenced their in-
terpretation of the NCWSP principles, which they translated into their 
support and acceptance of the 5% contributions. By ensuring that resi-
dents complied with the 5% levy, the community gained access to im-
proved water infrastructure. The net effect was to enhance the chiefs’ im-
age and reinforce their powers as leaders of their community. Gaining 
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access to new water infrastructure also boosted the chiefs’ social standing 
and identity among their peers in neighbouring communities. A modern 
water system was associated with innovation and power, to which not all 
communities had access due to the competitive nature of the process of 
acquiring a water system project. Most chiefs supported implementation 
of the 5% levy because it confirmed their own role and responsibility as 
an important development broker. It was therefore understood to fall to 
these traditional leaders to ensure that development advanced under their 
leadership.  
Though some users were forced to contribute to the water project 
(cases 1b, 2 and 4), their attitude towards collective ownership and respon-
sibilities was no different from that of users who gladly complied. With 
regard to participation in water management activities, similarly low levels 
of participation were found in all of the cases: those in which the 5% con-
tribution was paid via the Members of Parliament common fund (cases 5 
and 6), those supported by external actors (case 1b), and those who vol-
untarily paid the contribution (cases 3 and 4). Most users were apathetic 
towards water activities, while unequal power relations within the commu-
nities constrained actors’ ability to demand compliance from water actors 
and thus to fulfil their formal roles and responsibilities.  
Contrary to expectations, the chiefs perceived establishment of the wa-
ter and sanitation management teams as a threat to their own authority 
and control over water-related activities. This explains their resistance to 
the free election of water and sanitation management team members, as 
apparent in cases 2, 3 and 4. In cases 2, 3 and 4, chiefs resisted formation 
of water and sanitation management teams because they perceived the 
teams’ functioning as a threat to their own leadership role in the commu-
nity. These chiefs replaced the elected team members with their own rep-
resentatives as a way to reinforce their own authority and control over 
water-related activities. The practices of these chiefs corroborate the idea 
of North (2005) who argued that institutional change becomes difficult if 
proposed changes run counter to existing belief systems or threaten cur-
rent leaders (North 2005, Prado and Trebilcock 2009). In circumstances 
where current beliefs exist side by side with proposed new institutions, 
modifications to the new institutions become inevitable or change is ren-
dered largely ineffective.  
Considering the way water resources were governed in the past (see 
chapter 4), the existence of the water and sanitation management teams 
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alongside traditional structures can be construed as a threat to the legiti-
macy of the chiefs. In contrast to the findings in cases 2, 3 and 4, the 
current research found no evidence of traditional actors’ interference in 
formation of the water and sanitation management teams in cases 1, 5 and 
6. The chiefs in these latter cases perceived the management teams as an 
extension of their own political and administrative structures. Hence, they 
saw no reason to interfere in the teams’ activities or membership. In short, 
the activities of the teams were incorporated and entangled with the eve-
ryday practices of the chiefs. The relationship between the chiefs and the 
water and sanitation management teams therefore became blurred. For 
both actors, the most important thing was that their activities be in the 
interest of the community as a whole. This finding is consistent with other 
research, which found that when pressure for institutional change affects 
the current distribution of resources powers struggles are likely to arise 
(Campbell 2004).  
These findings will help us to understand the role of institutional en-
trepreneurs, elaborated in chapter 7. Their capacity to resist or to renego-
tiate new institutional arrangements is embedded in their command of and 
access to resources. The findings here further enable us to appreciate the 
role of existing local institutions in processes of institutional change. The 
chiefs’ position of social and political leadership, in some cases, provided 
them the authority to justify invocation of their own rules to replace the 
established process for forming the water and sanitation management 
teams. Elsewhere, the chiefs employed community-embedded institutions 
to ensure that users complied with the 5% contribution, as required under 
the NCWSP. 
The actions of these chiefs in support of implementation of the 5% 
contributions, however, contradict findings from previous studies, which 
argue that institutional change becomes counterproductive when policy-
makers ignore interconnected institutions and organisations (North 2005). 
Even though the above assertion is consistent with the actions of the 
chiefs in interfering with the composition of the water and sanitation man-
agement teams in cases 2, 3 and 4, we found no interfere by chiefs in the 
composition and activities of the management teams in cases 1, 5 and 6.  
These findings must nevertheless be interpreted with caution. The ra-
tionale behind the 5% contribution was not just to financially offset the 
cost of the water project, but more importantly, to ensure collective par-
ticipation of the beneficiary community in the water project. This, 
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according to supporters of community management, should translate into 
efficient operation and maintenance of the water system. Evidence gath-
ered here, however, indicates that most chiefs supported implementation 
of the 5% levy as a means to ensure that their community gained access 
to a reliable source of potable water. Though not explicitly stated, the no-
tion of collective responsibility and participation was not a priority among 
the chiefs and other influential actors.  
On the question of whether we can describe the actions of those in-
volved as a process of institutional bricolage, these findings suggest that 
the ability of the chiefs to rely on their social position and community-
embedded institutions to frustrate or promote institutional arrangements 
under the NCWSP is consistent with the concept of institutional bricolage. 
Chiefs’ ability to initiate change was dependent first on their social posi-
tion, which provided them the resources to activate their agential capacity. 
Among these resources were existing customs and cultural practices that 
legitimised the chiefs’ actions. Consistent with the concept of bricolage, 
this study construes the actions of the chiefs as a response to the chal-
lenges that arose in implementing the NCWSP. While most of these chiefs 
had the power to resist or to accept institutional changes, we found that 
the attitudes adopted differed in each of the six cases studied. This obser-
vation is consistent with Cleaver (2012, 2002), who maintained that 
adopted practices or institutional arrangements must be familiar and fit 
within the accepted logic of practices and social relations. This, according 
to Cleaver, gives the newly adopted practices legitimacy and acceptance 
and facilitates the exercise of authority.  
The ability of the chiefs to use their position to influence institutional 
arrangements, as shown in this chapter, has important implications for the 
path dependence of institutional change. Elite control and capture of wa-
ter activities can be a major factor in rendering institutional change slow 
and path dependent. This study found that in most of the case study com-
munities water-related activities were controlled by a few local actors, pri-
marily chiefs and local water actors (members of the water and sanitation 
management teams and water personnel).  
One issue that emerged from the case studies is the dearth of account-
ability. A key aspect of the institutional arrangements under the NCWSP 
is a yearly reportage to the public accounting for water expenditures and 
the technical status of the system. Knowledge of any such reports was rare 
in the six cases studied (see figure 5.3). In cases 1 and 3, some 
114 CHAPTER 5 
 
accountability reports were available. Nonetheless, even here participants 
said they were unable to fully scrutinise water actors’ activities, due to the 
absence of important documents, such as bank statements and details of 
expenditures. In some cases, practices were observed to have changed, 
with water actors now reporting only to the chiefs instead of to the com-
munity as a whole (e.g., in case 4). In cases 2, 5 and 6, there was little 
evidence of any form of community meeting for accountability purposes.  
Figure 5.4  
User involvement in decisions on water and sanitation  
management team composition 
Source: Author 
 
Taken together, these observations support a key criticism of commu-
nity management and community participation approaches in water man-
agement; that is, water governance cannot be separated from power and 
politics (Rusca and Schwartz 2014, Harvey and Reed 2007). As shown in 
this chapter, unequal social power relations and “economic rank” (Elwert 
and Bierschenk 1988: 102) determine who can and cannot make decisions. 
Unequal power relations implies that community members may be unable 
to question local elites about their activities and the decisions they make – 
even if in some circumstances these activities and decisions have been 
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detrimental to the efficient management of the community water system. 
My survey results confirm that members of the community were not in-
volved in decisions affecting their water system. For instance, users did 
not participate in appointing water and sanitation management team mem-
bers, overseeing expenditures or adjusting tariffs (see figure 5.4).  
The assumption of a unitary community in possession of the social and 
human capital needed to propel collective action is misleading. Indeed, 
structural and resource constraints were common among the water actors 
studied, challenging coordination and cooperation in water activities. Ev-
idence derived from our cases confirms that the communities studied were 
heterogeneous and stratified along the lines of wealth, ethnicity, class and 
political affiliation, making collective action less straightforward (Lund 
and Saito-Jensen 2013: 3). Some scholars maintain that the absence of ef-
ficient local government structures, such as for information sharing and 
communication, alongside the unavailability of necessary staff at the local 
government level, may overburden implementing actors (Feachem 1980: 
22). The extra responsibilities and costs that accompany oversight of com-
munity management inevitably undermine water-related activities.  
Finally, the lack of incentives and the voluntary nature of membership 
in the water and sanitation management teams accords with a criticism 
raised in community participation scholarship. That is, it explains why just 
a few local water actors have captured and control water activities (Cleaver 
1999, 2012; Gaventa 2004; Gbedemah 2011).  
These obstacles have hindered achievement of the NCWSP objectives, 
again rendering institutional change slow and path dependent. The above 
results, however, should be interpreted with caution. It is possible that 
respondent biases may have affected our findings. For instance, actors 
may have sought to justify their lack of action by claiming an absence of 
knowledge about the institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, at least two 
of this chapter’s findings are undoubtedly significant: (i) institutional 
change has been slow and (ii) the NCWSP has been unsuccessful as a tool 
to promote community ownership and responsibility. Implementation of 
the programme has not translated into the efficient management of small 
town and rural water facilities in any of the six cases studied.  
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5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter provided evidence that actors’ interpretations of the NCWSP 
differed in each of the six cases studied. These differences explain the var-
iations found in programme implementation. Inadequate information and 
knowledge about the NCWSP and the extent to which a new water supply 
system was urgently needed affected actors’ choices and the practices that 
emerged. In addition, the extent to which the new institutional arrange-
ments introduced under the NCWSP were consistent with local values, 
worldviews and everyday practices influenced key local actors’ capacity to 
support or resist institutional change.  
The construction of a new water supply system was dependent on the 
role of the chiefs, particularly their support for and enforcement of the 
5% community contribution. As a primary enforcer of community rules, 
the chiefs used the 5% contribution as an opportunity to reinforce their 
own power within their community. Contrary to the intention of the 
NCWSP, some chiefs perceived establishment of a water and sanitation 
management team as a threat to their own leadership role as a develop-
ment actor. They thus rejected the community-based, participatory elec-
tion of these management teams, in some cases replacing them with peo-
ple and arrangements that better served their own needs. Clearly, NCWSP 
implementation was interrupted by the chiefs’ perception of themselves 
as the main actor in charge of development of the community. Any activ-
ities that conflicted with the chiefs’ roles and responsibilities thus became 
subject to resistance and renegotiation. However, NCWSP aspects that 
enhanced the identity and image of the chiefs were promoted and main-
tained, in line with the existing institutional arrangements.  
In all six cases, the motivations and logic behind local actors’ choices 
and practices determined the path of NCWSP implementation. The cul-
tural values and norms embedded in everyday practices provided the 
means which enabled local actors to exhibit agency. Taken together, these 
factors rendered institutional change in the governance of small town and 
rural water supply slow, in contrast to the expectations of the NCWSP.  
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Notes 
1 Demand for a water facility was to be operationalised through payment of a 5% 
contribution to the capital cost of the system. This was a necessary condition to 
enable a community to benefit from a water project. 
2 Members of Parliament can receive 4% of the total common fund allocation for 
purposes of initiating development projects in their constituencies (gha-
namps.com/news-events/details).  
3 Funeral committee members and lower governance actors. 
4 This incident occurred after a change in government in the 2008 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. 
5 This key informant held a position in the dissolved water and sanitation manage-
ment team in case 2.  
6 Assembly members liaison between the local government administration (the 
DA) and the community. They are elected and appointed and play a critical role in 
community development. Assembly members participate in the work and activities 
of the DA, such as attending meetings and contributing to decision-making (A 
Guide to District Assemblies on Ghana). 
7 The interim water and sanitation management team was made up of the three 
continuing members and two new staff: a system manager and an accountant. The 
interim team operated the water system for six years.  
8 Assembly members and unit committee members representing lower arms of 
government.  
9 At the time of data collection, the water system was just a year old and the first 
water and sanitation management team’s term had not expired.  
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6 
Renegotiation of Institutional 
Arrangements from Policy to Practice 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Chapter 5 concluded that local actors’ capacity to resist or accept new in-
stitutional arrangements, specifically the 5% contribution and participa-
tory election of the water and sanitation management teams, was depend-
ent on the information they possessed on the NCWSP; the urgency with 
which a new water supply was needed; the extent that the institutional 
arrangements under the NCWSP were consistent with local values, 
worldviews and everyday practices; and the influence of local elites. This 
chapter examines how the local social and institutional context influenced 
local actors’ capacity to manage their water supply system and the practices 
they adopted to manage the challenges that arose.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the NCWSP was deeply rooted in neoliberal 
thinking, originating as it did in late 1990 and promoted by the World 
Bank. The programme brought new institutional arrangements and decen-
tralisation of administrative responsibilities in the water sector to lower 
government levels. The water and sanitation management teams and local 
water personnel were responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
water supply systems. The DAs and CWSA were charged with monitoring 
and supporting the water and sanitation management teams in carrying 
out their tasks (MLGRD 2010, Braimah and Kheni 2013). The new water 
supply facilities operated by one of two main management models: com-
munity-based management and private-based management (for a discus-
sion of these see section 4.4).  
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.2 examines how 
local water actors managed their water system using the private-based 
management approach and emerging practices adopted to navigate the 
challenges that arose. Section 6.3 presents a similar investigation of water 
system management among water actors using the community-based 
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approach. Section 6.4 looks at practices adopted by water vendors to man-
age public standpoints under both management approaches. Each section 
seeks to answer four questions: (i) To what extent did actors’ technical 
capacity, skills and access to information and knowledge about the 
NCWSP constrain or enable them to manage their water supply system? 
(ii) What practices or strategies have actors adopted to navigate the chal-
lenges they have faced in managing their water supply system? (iii) What 
motivational factors and logic have informed actors’ choices and the kinds 
of practices adopted? (iv) Can we describe the practices and strategies of 
implementing actors (i.e., local water actors) as a bricolage?  
6.2 Renegotiating institutional arrangements: From 
community-based to private-based management  
As shown in numerous studies, local actors’ implementation of externally 
set policies depends largely on the technical and institutional capacity of 
the implementers, the complexity of the technological innovations, local 
knowledge and information on the policy or programme, and the commit-
ment of leaders (Rose 1993, Mukhtarov 2014, Campbell 2004). Moreover, 
implementing actors alter and modify institutional arrangements when 
constrained by the local social and institutional context. Whereas scholars 
are aware of actors modifying institutional arrangements, the motivations 
and logic driving actors’ actions are not well understood. An investigation 
of actors’ motivations could help us to learn why actors’ make certain 
choices and take certain actions in particular contexts.  
Chapter 4 suggested that communities make choices that are appropri-
ate to their needs, such as in contributing towards investment costs for a 
water facility and assuming responsibility for future operations and 
maintenance. Yet, despite the above provision, this study found that the 
technical capacity of local actors was inadequate to successfully manage 
their water supply system, either by themselves or to delegate that respon-
sibility to a private organisation. To bridge the technical capacity gap that 
became evident, actors in cases 5 and 6 decided to switch management 
approach from community-based to private-based management. Though 
local water actors had initially opted for community-based management, 
poor management of the water system forced state actors to intervene. 
The current study found that disparities between local water actors’ actual 
capacity and their technical needs had a bearing on how they managed the 
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water systems (see also appendixes 12 and 13). In multiple cases, capacity 
gaps led to poor management and underperforming water services. 
Under the NCWSP, all decisions related to water system management, 
including procurement of services from a private company, were to be 
initiated by the water and sanitation management teams. State actors, 
mainly the DAs and CWSA, were to facilitate and coordinate the teams’ 
activities. In cases 5 and 6, however, serious deficiencies in the technical 
capacities of local water actors were recognised. To avert a total break-
down of the water systems, state actors1 stepped in, concluding an agree-
ment to change the management model, reassigning management tasks to 
a private service organisation. The private management option was to ad-
dress the capacity gap faced by local water actors in managing their water 
system.  
Such influence of state actors on the procurement process for private 
water system management services is inconsistent, however, with the 
given institutional arrangements. These mandated community participa-
tion in any such decision-making. An interviewee justified the state actors’ 
intervention as follows:  
In 2014, our first external auditor hinted that Karaga water system [case 6] 
was not up to the task. The auditors warned us that if care was not taken, 
the system would collapse. Although we knew from the onset that the re-
quired capacity to manage the water system was lacking, we allowed them 
to select their preferred management option. We had to allow them to take 
decisions and fail rather than impose a management option on them. It was 
a painful decision but necessary if we have to put community participation 
in action. But looking at the current situation, we must take control (Inter-
view with NORST personnel, Tamale, 27 October 2015). 
Apart from controlling decision-making processes, this study found 
that some local practices differed from the set institutional arrangements 
for engaging the services of a private operator. For example, the services 
were outsourced to an existing organisation in the region (Pumptech), 
contravening the public procurement guidelines, which stipulated compet-
itive bidding. Two rationales were used to justify the state actors’ actions. 
First, a private organisation from the region was said to be better posi-
tioned to respond to local needs than an organisation from elsewhere. Sec-
ondly, a local organisation was considered to have the advantage of local 
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knowledge and greater familiarity with the challenges within the region 
than an organisation outside the region.  
A worker from the Northern Region Small Town Water and Sanitation 
Project (NORST) described the state actors’ actions as follows: 
We realised that advertising the proposed call for expressions of interest 
would lead to many contractors from the southern part of the country who 
do not have local knowledge. This would make it difficult for local private 
operators to qualify. We must also enhance the capacity of our private local 
water organisations. By controlling the procurement process, we can settle 
on firms that we can trust and are flexible, compared with the situation of 
dealing with more mature and experienced firms. Based on these reasons, 
we unanimously offered Pumptech2 Limited the position. Pumptech, in our 
opinion, was the best candidate because over the years they were involved 
in the maintenance of small town water systems in the region. We can trust 
Pumptech to deliver to our expectations (Interview NORST personnel, Ta-
male, 27 October 2015). 
Another reason for controlling the decision-making process was re-
vealed in an interview with a staff member from the regional CWSA and 
NORST:  
We realised that direct management of the water system by the WSMT [wa-
ter and sanitation management team] was inefficient making the need for an 
urgent solution crucial. We had to come together [the DA, NORST and 
CWSA] and act quickly to find a solution. Therefore, we started with a series 
of meetings, although we followed the guidelines for engaging private water 
operators. Our current situation and conditions in this region meant that we 
had to change things to suit our peculiar needs as a region (Interview 
NORST, 27 October 2015).  
Other evidence shows that state actors also controlled what went into 
the agreement document between Pumptech Limited and the community. 
For example, (i) Pumptech was to retain staff recruited by the water and 
sanitation management teams, (ii) Pumptech was to train all existing staff, 
and (iii) staff were to sign a performance agreement against which they 
could be evaluated. One puzzling question is why state actors decided to 
negotiate with the private actor on the specifics of the agreement. On this, 
NORST and CWSA staff provided clues:  
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Our decision to influence the process was to ensure that the private organ-
isation is controlled and doesn’t take advantage of the institutional and tech-
nical gap. The water system is quite new and therefore we need to safeguard 
the interest of the community (Interview with NORST and CWSA staff, 27 
October 2015). 
Another important finding is that 10% of the total revenue was set 
aside for monitoring and maintenance purposes. According to a repre-
sentative of NORST, the aim of this arrangement was to safeguard water 
system functionality. In other words, it sought to ensure that the DAs and 
CWSA had access to adequate financial resources to monitor and coordi-
nate management of the water systems: 
Although, we have finished the project, we have few resources which we think 
is important to enable us to bring these actors together [CWSA and DAs] to 
train them. This is necessary to beef up their technical capacity and not to allow 
the private sector to have a field day. CWSA and DA are the main teams re-
sponsible for monitoring the private operator. We have put aside 10% of total 
revenue to enable these actors to fulfil their core mandate without the usual 
difficulties of lack of financial resources that have bedevilled most local gov-
ernment organisations. Most projects never had financial support for monitor-
ing purposes only. These are new which we, NORST, advised should be in-
cluded in the contract. This will make the DA and CWSA not have excuses if 
they fail to monitor the activities of the private operator (Interview with 
NORST personnel, Tamale, 27 October 2015). 
Apart from changes made by NORST, an interview with the water and 
sanitation management team pointed to additional changes implemented 
by Pumptech: (i) the commission for vendors was fixed at 10% instead of 
20%3 and (ii) the amount allocated for future replacement and expansion 
of the water systems was reduced from 20% to 10% of total revenue. 
When I asked state and local water actors about these revised provisions 
they appeared stunned by them and alleged that some of the changes were 
made by Pumptech without their knowledge. In my interview with Pump-
tech, they justified changes in the contractual agreement by the inadequate 
technical capacity and skills of local actors. This, they said, constrained 
their efforts to comply with the original institutional arrangements. These 
conditions, according to Pumptech, were unknown to them before they 
started implementation. They therefore had to make adjustments in the 
agreement to accommodate the challenges they faced:  
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We realised a lot of challenges in the way the water system was being man-
aged. The biggest challenge we faced was the local dynamics mixed with 
politics in the management of the water system. Secondly, there was the 
need to build their capacity, as most staff did not have the requisite capacity 
to manage the water system. For example, poorly kept records, revenue 
from the sale of water unaccounted for by vendors, mishandling and mis-
management of pumping water-to-water reservoirs leading to high electric-
ity cost. As a private organisation, we need to break even and not make 
unnecessary losses. We therefore had to find alternatives (Interview with 
Pumptech staff, Tamale, 28 October 2015).  
Implementation of the new institutional arrangements was thus con-
strained by institutional and technical capacity gaps among local water ac-
tors. Moreover, a lack of understanding and fair assessment of the institu-
tional and technological changes frustrated local actors’ ability to manage 
their water system. Under the NCWSP, the water and sanitation manage-
ment teams were responsible for (i) recruiting personnel (financial, admin-
istrative and technical); (ii) monitoring and supervising water personnel 
(see also appendix 9); and (iii) making decisions on the day-to-day man-
agement of their water system. These requirements presume that the water 
teams have sufficient technical and financial knowledge. Otherwise, they 
would hardly be in a position to coordinate and supervise the water per-
sonnel or private organisations under their control. Not only did the water 
management teams have inadequate capacity to ensure proper monitoring 
and coordination, the job of the water management team member was not 
remunerated with a fair wage, leaving little to motivate members for their 
efforts. Members of the water and sanitation management teams received 
only an allowance for attendance at meetings, and even this stipend hinged 
on the availability of funds. The voluntary nature of the position and lack 
of remuneration explains why more technically savvy and administratively 
experienced persons failed to step forward to take up this role.  
As becomes clear from these observations, the capacity required of lo-
cal water actors did not correspond with the actual capacity available. This 
prompted state actors to intervene. Nonetheless, the motivations behind 
state actors’ decision to step in merits scrutiny. Our observations suggest 
that, at least in cases 5 and 6, problems that arose in the operation of the 
water systems brought functionality concerns to the fore. To avert a crisis 
due to malfunctioning of the water systems, state actors took it upon 
themselves to step in and make decisions to ensure continued water flow.  
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It is important to note that private sector participation was an integral 
aspect of the NCWSP objectives. The state actors’ interventions were con-
sistent with the new institutional arrangements, which required communi-
ties with a population of more than 10,000 to employ the private-based 
management model as the preferred management approach (see also ap-
pendix 10). Communities with a population of more than 10,000 had a 
larger water system (this applied to our cases 3, 4, 5 and 6). A larger water 
system required more professionalism in its management, which was rec-
ognised to be lacking among local water actors.  
The mismatch between the technical needs and actual capacities of lo-
cal water actors was further exacerbated by a lack of continued training to 
enable local actors to execute their roles satisfactorily. All these challenges, 
taken together, made it very difficult indeed for local actors to manage 
their water system efficiently, making state actors’ intervention necessary. 
State actors and Pumptech went so far as to modify the given institutional 
arrangements for managing the water systems under private-based man-
agement, to fit the communities’ institutional and technical needs. Not-
withstanding the changes made to the institutional arrangements for water 
system management in cases 5 and 6, a key question is whether the changes 
did in fact translate into the efficient management of the water systems. 
Did the state’s and private company’s actions improve the quality of water 
supply services? I return to this question in section 6.5. First, we explore 
how local water actors operated and managed their water system under 
the community-based management approach.  
6.3 Modification of institutional arrangements: 
Renegotiating community-based management  
This section looks at how local water actors in cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 handled 
the challenges they faced. As pointed out in the previous section, the com-
mitment of implementing actors, the institutional and technical capacity 
of actors and the extent to which water actors had a fair understanding of 
and knowledge about the institutional reform programme were important 
driving forces for institutional change (Mukhtarov 2014, Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996, Campbell 2004). These factors influenced how actors inter-
preted institutional arrangements for managing their water system, conse-
quently informing actors’ choices and practices.  
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For example, in cases 3 and 4 the water systems were to be placed under 
private-based management due to the size of the communities and the 
water system needed to serve them, as the populations exceeded 10,000 
(see appendix 9). The technical requirements and specialisation needed to 
manage such a larger water system meant that community-based manage-
ment was inadequate. Available evidence, however, shows that the water 
systems in these communities were in fact under community-based man-
agement at the time of this research.  
Local mistrust of private organisations may explain why local water ac-
tors in cases 3 and 4 resorted to community-based management instead of 
private-based management. The general perception within these commu-
nities was that private organisations would not necessarily bring any spe-
cialised skills. Most private organisations were thought to be primarily 
concerned with how much they could get from the community through 
management fees, depriving the communities of revenues for future ex-
pansion of their water system. Local water actors therefore believed that 
the financial position of their water system would be threatened if they 
opted for private-based management. This justified their choice for com-
munity-based management. 
Furthermore, small town and rural water supply systems were dealing 
with unrealistic tariffs and inadequate revenues from water sales, alongside 
higher than expected costs for water production. This left the financial 
situation of most water supply systems tenuous. Due to this ongoing situ-
ation, local actors came to view private-based management with suspicion 
and as riskier than the community-based model. This too justified local 
water actors’ preference for community-based management, despite their 
own limitations in terms of technical and financial capacity and skills to 
manage the water system professionally.  
Interviews conducted with water and sanitation management team 
members confirmed this finding:  
Most private companies take a huge percentage of total revenue. We have 
witnessed many failed private management in other neighbouring commu-
nities. In Wiamoase, water is scarce. This makes us vulnerable if we choose 
private management. For example, the private company will always find ex-
cuses to shirk their responsibilities when there is a major problem affecting 
the water system. The consequences and effect of such unexpected prob-
lems will not be felt by the private company, unlike us (Water and sanitation 
management team member, case 3, Wiamoase, 30 July 2015).  
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Interestingly, in case 3 state actors, that is, CWSA and the DA, also 
perceived private-based management as unnecessary. These state actors 
shared many of the perceptions of private organisations expressed by local 
water actors. This led them to prefer community-based management as 
well, so they did not compel water system actors in cases 3 and 4 to adopt 
private-based management. Evidence suggests that private-based manage-
ment was unnecessary as long as the DAs were able to provide local water 
actors with technical and financial support and frequently monitored local 
water actors’ activities. The matter thus appears to not be one of commu-
nity-based management versus private-based management, but rather of 
getting local water actors the tools they need to manage their water system 
efficiently:  
It is only when the community is not committed and supportive that you 
opt for private management. The issue is that private-based management 
also comes with its own challenges. A huge percentage of the revenue goes 
to the private operator, and in a situation where the DA and local water 
actors do not have an understanding and capacity of how private-based wa-
ter management works, the private water actors may take advantage of the 
institutional capacity gap. Wiamoase water issues are a sensitive matter we 
cannot take risks on. If we [the DA] take our roles seriously by monitoring 
and offering the needed support, local water actors are capable of managing 
the water system (DA staff, case 3, Agona-Ashanti Region, 2 August 2015). 
Although local water actors in cases 3 and 4 had relatively better insti-
tutional and technical capacity, compared to the other cases, the large size 
of the water systems put substantial pressure on local actors to manage 
their system efficiently. In other words, the high capacity of the water sys-
tems, alongside the fast growth of the population in the beneficiary com-
munities, challenged local water actors’ capacity to manage their water sys-
tem professionally. Poor financial records; water revenues unaccounted 
for; stealing and corruption; inefficiencies in billing and collection of water 
tariffs; traditional actors/chiefs’ interference in the recruitment of ven-
dors; and unpaid bills were some of the challenges that local water actors 
encountered.  
Unexpectedly, evidence demonstrates that the technical and financial 
support given to local water actors was inadequate and that training was 
virtually absent and monitoring infrequent in the two water systems. To 
bridge the technical and financial support gap, local water actors instead 
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acquired knowledge and training from a network organisation called the 
Association of Small Town Water Operators (ASTWO) (table 6.1). Prac-
tices adopted by local water actors from ASTWO included the following: 
(i) new accounting software for managing the revenue and expenditure 
reports; (ii) performance agreement forms signed with vendors with two 
witness serving as guarantors; (iii) vendor commissions paid through the 
bank; (iv) continued training for all local water actors; and (v) water per-
sonnel required to keep a maximum amount of GH50 in the office, with 
the remaining balance to be taken to the bank.  
Local water actors in cases 3 and 4 did acquire training from CWSA in 
financial reporting and related issues.4 However, ASTWO encouraged its 
members to introduce greater professionalism to their accounting prac-
tices. For example, ASTWO encouraged its members to adopt different 
practices for financial reporting than those recommended by CWSA. 
Members’ reasons for adopting the new ASTWO procedures were ex-
pressed by a local water actor as follows: 
The new accounting software developed by the association allows us to be 
efficient in the collection of water bills from our customers. We have about 
450 private consumers and 26 public standpipes. The reporting format de-
veloped by CWSA demanded that we collect revenue from vendors daily. 
This is not an easy task and not feasible looking at the size of the community 
and number of vendors we have to deal with daily (Interview with water and 
sanitation management team, case 3, Wiamoase, 30 July 2018).  
Justifying the need for small town water systems to adopt community-
based management instead of private-based management, the ASTWO 
chairperson observed that the training of all local water actors would 
bridge the capacity gap. Local actors would then be able to independently 
manage their water system professionally. With the required institutional 
capacity developed, local water actors would not need to delegate the re-
sponsibility to a private organisation. On this, the chairperson of ASTWO 
had the following to say: 
Placing a water system under private-based management is not the best op-
tion. Past practices make it unattractive and a huge risk for small town water 
systems. In this community, Ejura, our population is over 30,000. Yet we 
are managing the system using the community-based option. There is an 
urgent need for members to be more proactive and look within themselves 
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to provide the training necessary to navigate through the challenges they 
face as water operators (ASTWO chairperson, Ejura, 28 October 2015). 
Table 6.1  
Historical development of the Association of Small Town Water Operators 
(ASTWO) 
The Association of Small Town Water Operators (ASTWO) is a network of small town water operators located in 
various parts of Ghana. It was formed in 2005 as a measure to bridge the technical capacity gap among local wa-
ter actors. The various water projects initiated under the NCWSP had unique and particular needs. However, the 
training provided was uniform, without variation to serve the specific needs and interests of each project (e.g., in 
terms of technological design and accessories). Frustration experienced by some system operators in the Ashanti 
region due to this lack of tailored offerings led to creation of ASTWO to bridge the gap. The technical and finan-
cial experiences and skills of members were pooled together and made available to one another to provide 
needed technical know-how. ASTWO has been active in providing training for its members. Local actors in cases 
3 and 4 have benefitted from this training. These association initiatives fall outside the purview of the sector 
guidelines, which state training as the sole responsibility of state actors such as CWSA and DA units.  
Source: Interview with the ASTWO chairperson, Ejura, 28 October 2015 
 
It is important to point out that the inadequacies of the training on 
offer was the main reason for setting up ASTWO in the Ashanti region of 
Ghana (see table 6.1). Local water actors from cases 3 and 4 were mem-
bers. In interviews conducted for the current research, ASTWO’s chair-
person asserted that local water actors needed to be innovative and free to 
change their approach towards managing their water system: 
The gap in capacity and other political influences makes our network im-
portant. Through our innovative skills we introduce new ways of doing 
things. For example, we train our managers to understand and appreciate 
certain features of the water systems. We organise a course for each category 
of staff, that is, accountants, technical operators and plumbers, focusing on 
the particular needs that will make them efficient. We look at the need be-
fore we offer training. This is necessary because no training has been organ-
ised by CWSA or DA since 2005. In a nutshell, the association looks within 
itself for skills and technical know-how, which we tap to train others to 
come up to the required level. Some are very good, and others are weak. 
The good help to bring the weak up (ASTWO chairperson, Ejura, 28 Oc-
tober 2015). 
For example, as a measure to ensure accountability and reduce unnec-
essary interference by powerful local elites, in case 3 vendors sign a 
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performance contract for a year. That contract provides a basis for evalu-
ating their performance: 
Vendors in the past were recruited based on their affiliation with powerful 
persons in the community. This made it difficult for past water operators to 
hold them accountable or dismiss them for poor performance. We as new 
water team are more professional in our roles and responsibilities compared 
to our predecessors. As part of restructuring the water system and reducing 
such unnecessary interferences, we decided to take up this new direction to 
avoid losses in revenue (Interview with water and sanitation management 
team member, case 3, Wiamoase, 30 July 2018). 
In regard to case 4, this study could not gather enough evidence from 
state actors to explain why water management was under community-
based management. Like case 3, this author’s observations and interviews 
with local water actors suggest that the risk of losing revenues to a private 
organisation was a major consideration in the preference for community-
based management:  
We do not receive the necessary support from the DA. We therefore have 
to figure things out by ourselves to manage the water system. As far as we 
know, we are on our own. Since the death of our last technical officer, we 
have been relying on the engineer from the neighbouring community at 
Juaso for technical support and assistance. Also, we get some support from 
the Association of Small Town Water Operators (Interview with water and 
sanitation management team member, case 4, Juaso-Obogu, 11 August 
2015). 
Whereas local water actors in case 3 introduced new practices for man-
aging their water system, local water actors in case 4 were less innovative. 
For example, the water personnel in case 4 opposed the application of 
ASTWO financial software and other modifications to improve water sys-
tem management. When asked why, water staff justified their decisions as 
follows:  
We do not understand the WSMT [water and sanitation management team]. 
They are always bringing new things differently from the way we did things 
in the past. We prefer to use the old way of accounting for our revenues 
taught by CWSA. The new software is complicated. We do not understand 
how to work with it (Interview with water personnel, case 4, Juaso-Obogu, 
11 August 2015). 
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The actions of the water personnel support the idea that changes be-
come path dependent when proposed changes reduce or threaten the 
powers of existing actors or distribution of resources (North 2005, Prado 
and Trebilcock 2009). In case 4, water personnel felt threatened by the 
innovations suggested by ASTWO for managing financial records, hence, 
their resistance. They preferred to stick to their old practices.  
Even though local water actors in cases 1 and 2 also adopted commu-
nity-based management and were confronted with technical challenges, 
local water actors did not introduce new institutional arrangements com-
parable to those introduced by local actors in case 3. We will now focus 
on the differences between cases 3, 5 and 6 and cases 1, 2 and 4.  
There are several possible explanations for the differences in local ac-
tors’ behaviours. First, the size of the water systems presents particular 
challenges, and local water actors do not always have the capacity to man-
age larger and more complex systems. Secondly, the scarcity of alternative 
water sources and local water actors’ urgent need for a new water source 
motivates them to work hard to navigate the changing institutional ar-
rangements and challenges they face in managing the water system, as 
shown in cases 3, 5 and 6.  
Actors were driven by economic motives in cases 3, 5 and 6. They 
sought to ensure efficient management of their water system. They intro-
duced greater professionalism into water system management, as they 
were keen to avoid a total system breakdown. This finding mirrors those 
from earlier studies, and suggests that actors will modify institutional ar-
rangements to achieve a substantive goal; particularly, to reduce transac-
tion costs, to manage labour relation problems or to improve the quality 
of services (Campbell 2004).  
Similarly, local water actors recombined existing institutional principles 
and practices to address challenges they faced in managing their water sys-
tem. Specifically, they did this to find solutions to high operational costs, 
low revenues, large amounts of water revenues unaccounted for by ven-
dors and capacity-related challenges in cost-effective operation and man-
agement. 
Unlike in cases 1 and 2, alternative water sources were less available in 
cases 3, 5 and 6, implying that a breakdown of the new water supply facility 
would have a devastating effect on users. Difficult access to alternatives, 
however, put pressure on local water actors to find low-cost management 
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strategies that would ensure continuous functionality of their water sys-
tem. Community members in case 4, which was similar to cases 3, 5 and 6 
in relation to population and water system size, further confirmed the ur-
gent need for water as a driver of institutional change. First, the availability 
of alternative sources in some parts of the case 4 community reduced pres-
sure on some local water actors to modify institutional arrangements. Sec-
ondly, water personnel there rejected innovations proposed by ASTWO, 
because some of them were benefitting economically from the current in-
efficiencies in water system management.  
Taken together, these results suggest that even though the technical 
capacity of actors may have driven changes in institutional arrangements, 
these were insufficient to drive actors to innovate. The physical character-
istics and nature of the water resources available and the logic behind ac-
tors’ choices and practices were also important in determining the actions 
that actors ultimately took.  
6.4 Renegotiating institutional arrangements:  
The case of water vendors  
So far, this chapter has focused on practices adopted by state and local 
water actors to manage their water systems. This section discusses prac-
tices water vendors undertook to fulfil their duties. Vendors are defined 
as the people in charge of managing the public standpipes. They had two 
main responsibilities: (i) to control the opening and closing of public 
standpipes and (ii) to collect money from users when they fetched water. 
Revenue collectors then picked up daily sales earnings from the vendors. 
In return, the vendors received a 10%-20% commission on the amount of 
water sold.  
The NCWSP introduced new technologies that made the handling of 
water more hygienic and easier than with the boreholes and hand-dug 
wells previously available. Notwithstanding these advantages, the new 
technologies used in the small town water supply systems brought tech-
nical complexities. For instance, a water meter was mounted onto all pub-
lic and private taps to measure water distribution to each. This meant that 
vendors had to have some basic education, as they had to be able to read 
and interpret the meter, and thus account for all water sold. Evidence 
shows, however, that the educational level of the majority of the vendors 
was inadequate to implement this task. This led to tension and conflict 
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between the vendors and the revenue collectors, as discrepancies often 
arose between expected earnings and actual earnings from water sales. The 
vendors felt that the revenue collectors were taking advantage of their il-
literacy to cheat them, while the revenue collectors were under the impres-
sion that the vendors were feigning ignorance, using illiteracy as an excuse 
to shirk their responsibilities and cheat.  
Focus group discussions with vendors confirmed these perceptions:  
We have not been trained, especially the new ones. All that we were told is 
how the water meter5 works. But as you know, most of us have not been to 
school, so we do not understand how it works which is a worry for most of 
us. You see, when the revenue collector comes to collect the money we 
cannot challenge them. They know more than us. So if even he is cheating 
us it is difficult to know (Focus group discussion, case 3, Wiamoase, 30 July 
2015). 
Vendors in case 4 shared similar sentiments. They too pointed out that 
their inability to read and write made them vulnerable to revenue collector 
deception:  
With the exception of the vendor at the standpipe closer to the Presbyterian 
Church, most of us are not trained. Most of us have difficulty in understand-
ing how the water meter works. As a result, we agreed to fixed daily sales. 
Before that, there was always disagreement between the revenue collectors 
and us. Because most of us cannot read, they take money from us and write 
different things in their books. But how can we challenge them when we do 
not know how the water meter operates (Interview with vendor, case 4, 
Juaso Obogu, 5 August 2018). 
Vendors in cases 5 and 6 also expressed a sense of vulnerability, be-
cause of their inability to understand how the water meter operated. As a 
result, misunderstandings invariably arose regarding the readings from the 
meters and the actual quantities of water sold:  
We have not been trained on how the water meter works and do not un-
derstand how the water meter works. We know our roles and responsibili-
ties, such as not to give free water, collect money from users on water sold, 
reduce waste and not to allow water to overflow. Although we follow this 
instruction to prevent water loss, we still make losses. This is very frustrating 
(Focus group discussion, case 5, Tatale, 17 October 2015). 
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Except for four of us who can read and write, the rest of us can neither read 
nor write. The new private organisation has indicated to us that they will not 
tolerate any losses. They will take every pesewa from us if we make losses. 
We confronted the staff on our challenges. In response, they ask our sons 
to help us in reading the water meters. The whole process is quite difficult 
for us. If our sons have not been trained how can they teach us? Also they 
may not be available all the time (Focus group discussion vendors, case 6, 
Karaga, 24 October 2015). 
This study also observed that the NCWSP did not provide clear guide-
lines on processes for recruiting vendors and their training needs. For ex-
ample, the recruitment process, training and the content of training were 
not stated explicitly in the policy guidelines. Neither were the vendors’ 
specific roles and responsibilities clearly stipulated in the policy guidelines. 
Some local water actors claimed that they had trained their vendors. Evi-
dence shows, however, that such training was not systematic, but rather, 
ad hoc and centred on what was expected from the vendors, such as the 
opening and closing of the public standpipes and remuneration for man-
aging the public standpipes. The mismatch between vendors’ capacity and 
the actual skills needed is overlooked in the policy documents. 
District Works Department personnel confirmed these observations:  
The recruitment of the vendors is also a contributing factor to the present 
challenges we face in managing vendors. Most of the vendors operated 
boreholes in the past, which do not have a water meter compared to the 
current water system. Again, vendors were recruited based on trust. As a 
result, revenue collectors do not question the vendors’ credibility. Given 
that, this new arrangement is quite aligned and different, and therefore, de-
tailed understanding and training is vital for an appreciation of the new tech-
nology which is aligned with what they knew in the past (District Works 
Department personnel, case 5, Tatale, 19 October 2015).  
Vendors engaged in different practices to resolve the challenges they 
encountered in managing the public standpipes. These practices differed 
from the institutional arrangements formally set for standpipe manage-
ment. Nevertheless, they did enable vendors to cope with the challenges 
they faced in day-to-day operation of the standpipes. The sections below 
examine some of these everyday practices with which vendors navigated 
the management challenges they faced.  
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6.4.1 Everyday practices to manage challenges (1):  
Adjusting measuring buckets  
Vendors engaged in particular practices to minimise the effect of their in-
ability to understand how the water meters worked and the consequences 
of this lack of understanding on their daily commission earnings. For ex-
ample, vendors modified the buckets used for selling water. The vendors 
decided when a bucket was full and the price users were to pay for a bucket 
of water. Information gathered from informal group discussions provides 
evidence of this:  
Why must they [vendors] use their own containers to determine the quantity 
of water we get? They have created their own rules and created marks on 
the bucket provided by the WSMT [water and sanitation management team] 
to indicate where the water should reach. We do not understand some of 
these vendors. I thought a bucket of water must be full to the brim. Some 
of us do not buy from the vendor close to the water office. I prefer going 
to Aunty Mary’s because she allows you to fetch your bucket to fill the 
bucket full (Group interview, case 3, Wiamoase, 22 July 2015). 
Apart from defining the level to which a bucket could be filled, some 
vendors allowed customers to use their own containers. In that case, the 
vendor and user negotiated the amount to be paid for the water:  
Some vendors have created their own rules and allow others to use their 
bucket to fetch the water.6 We also see different prices sometimes applied, 
depending on the type of the container one brings to fetch water and also 
sometimes depending on the relationship between the vendor and user. For 
example, a gallon of water is 15p and a black basin, depending on the size, 
is 10p and 20p (Focus group discussion, case 3, Wiamoase, 26 July 2015).  
 It is important to note that while in case 3 vendors showed physical 
evidence of a bucket marked to reflect the quantity of water one would 
get, in case 1, there was no such physical evidence of a marked bucket. 
Vendors further used a water hose to reduce spillage and control the flow 
of water (photo 6.1).  
 Renegotiation of Institutional Arrangements from Policy to Practice 135 
Photo 6.1  
Public standpipe with bucket used for measuring water and hose  
to control the flow of water  
 
6.4.2 Everyday practices to manage challenges (2):  
Adjusting opening and closing times for public standpipes  
While discrepancies between meter readings and expected revenues in-
formed vendors’ actions in case 3, this study found different motivations 
driving vendors’ actions in cases 1 and 2. Vendors’ biggest problem in 
these latter cases was low demand for water at the public standpipes. The 
low demand affected vendors’ commission, making the job of water seller 
unattractive. As a result, vendors adjusted opening and closing times, so 
that they could engage in other economic activities to augment their com-
mission earnings.  
The majority of vendors in cases 1 and 2 instituted their own opening 
and closing times. These times were inconsistent with the times negotiated 
between the vendors and the local water and sanitation management 
teams. Reduced opening hours affected users’ ability to have reliable ac-
cess to water, even forcing some users to revert to alternative sources:  
The vendors are not adhering to the agreed time for opening and closing 
the public standpipes. This affects our punctuality at school (Focus group 
discussion youth, case 1a, Nyamedom, 27 May 2015).  
Other users in case 1a expressed similar sentiments:  
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I wake up very early in the morning, between 4.30 and 5.00, to get the kids 
ready for school and also prepare food for the morning. But the taps are 
not open on time. Sometimes at 6.30 (Group interview, case 1a, Nya-
medom, 26 May 2015).  
Figure 6.1 presents survey results confirming these claims.  
Figure 6.1  
Users’ evaluation of opening hours of public standpipes (% of respondents) 
Source: Author 
 
In case 1b, 60% of those interviewed indicated that they were indiffer-
ent to the opening hours of the public standpipes. This was followed by 
58% in case 2 and 44% in case 1a. For these respondents, it is difficult to 
judge whether the opening hours were generally convenient. Here it must 
be noted that vendors in these cases were inconsistent in the times that 
they opened and closed the public standpipes. This, too, made it difficult 
to objectively evaluate the vendors’ daily schedules. Nonetheless, 59% of 
those surveyed in case 67 rated the daily opening and closing times as poor 
and 27% were indifferent. In contrast, among users in cases 3, 4 and 5, 
72%, 81% and 85%, respectively, perceived opening hours as good. 
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Regarding vendors’ punctuality, in case 1b, 72% of those surveyed ex-
pressed indifference regarding vendor punctuality, followed by 54% in 
case 2, 52% in case 6 and 48% in case 1a. Respondents in cases 3, 4 and 5 
were more satisfied with the vendors’ punctuality, with 62%, 86% and 
79%, respectively, characterising it as good. In case 1a, 52% of respond-
ents rated vendor punctuality as poor, as did 34% in case 2.  
Figure 6.2  
Users’ perceptions of vendor punctuality (% of respondents)  
Source: Author 
 
It is important to note that deviating from the arrangements agreed 
with the water and sanitation management teams was done solely at the 
initiative of the vendors in cases 1, 2 and 3. However, in case 4, both local 
water actors and vendors initiated new institutional arrangements for ven-
dors’ accounting for water sales. The new arrangements were to minimise 
tension and conflicts between revenue collectors, vendors and users. For 
example, in case 4, half of the water meters were dysfunctional. Thus, ser-
vice providers could not use them to calculate revenues. Daily expected 
sales were instead based on a fixed amount imposed on each vendor de-
termined by the location of the public standpipe.  
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6.4.3 Moral and community-embedded institutions:  
A disincentive to change institutional arrangements  
We observed that in some of the cases, particularly cases 5 and 6, the ven-
dors’ actions were not always informed by economic and selfish motiva-
tions. Even though vendors in these cases faced similar challenges, such 
as lack of appropriate containers8 to determine and measure the quantity 
of water sold, these vendors did not modify the given institutional arrange-
ments, though they accumulated losses.9  
The majority of the vendors in cases 5 and 6 continued the given insti-
tutional arrangements. The only exception was one vendor in case 5 who 
adjusted water tariffs based on the containers brought by users to draw 
water (40-50 litres). That vendor justified his actions as follows:  
I do not understand why they [water actors] collected the 40 litre containers 
and did not replace them with the 30 litre containers they wanted us to use. 
And they expect us not make losses? To avoid making losses, I took my 
own initiatives. I have maintained the previous 40 litre as the main source 
for measuring water. However, I have increased the price to 20 pesewas 
instead of 10 pesewas as instructed by management. And for a Kuffour gal-
lon (25 litres), I charge 10 pesewwas. I need to get money and not to make 
a loss (Vendor, case 5, Tatale, 20 October 2015). 
There are several possible explanations for this result. The vendors’ 
actions were informed by their values and worldview regarding collective 
goods. Difficulties in assessing water in the past put vendors in a position 
where their sense of moral obligation came to outweigh their economic 
interests. Vendors did not want to deviate from the given institutional ar-
rangements and understood their responsibility as to make water accessi-
ble to everyone, irrespective of the challenges they themselves faced in the 
day-to-day management of the standpipes. The institutional arrangements 
for operating the standpipes were to ensure a reliable water supply, by 
guaranteeing consistency in opening hours and when users could access 
water. Based on this logic most vendors in cases 5 and 6 decided not to 
engage in any practices that would contradict the set institutional arrange-
ments. The behaviour of these vendors contradicts the general perception 
of actors as being motivated purely by their own economic good, particu-
larly to deviate from policy guidelines, as observed in cases 1, 2 and 3. 
Although vendors in cases 5 and 6 faced challenges, their assessment of 
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the situation did not lead them to engage in practices contrary to the es-
tablished institutional arrangements.  
Yet, vendors in case 3 did adjust bucket sizes and prices as a means to 
bridge the gap between expected revenue and actual revenue. Vendors in 
this case could not adopt the practice of reducing opening times, as there 
were no alternative water sources nearby. Users could therefore be ex-
pected to resist any attempt by vendors to close the public standpipes. 
Indeed survey results indicate high vendor punctuality in cases 3, 4 and 5 
(see figure 6.2). However, in cases 1 and 2, where there was a lack of urgent 
demand, vendors could more easily close the tap to engage in other eco-
nomic activities. Hence, the survey found a large number of users’ dissat-
isfied with vendor punctuality in those cases.  
In sum, we can conclude that vendors’ capacity to manage public stand-
pipes depended on their skills and training level and their knowledge about 
how to read and interpret the water meters and calculate daily revenues. 
While these conditions did trigger some vendors to modify the given in-
stitutional arrangements, vendors’ personal motivations were found to be 
important in determining their final choices and practices. In cases 1, 2, 3 
and 4, a primarily economic rationale motivated vendors’ action. Vendors 
were interested in improving their commission earnings, as there were of-
ten discrepancies between readings from water meters and the revenue 
they expected. Hence, vendors either found ways to make more money 
through the public standpipes, such as by cheating users, or they closed 
the tap to engage in other economic activities.  
It is important to understand that the vendors’ actions may have been 
motivated by a genuine concern to find solutions to the challenges they 
faced, in order not to lose their position as vendors. However, it must be 
recognised that the job of a water vendor was unattractive because of the 
low remuneration and incentives it offered. Qualified candidates were 
therefore unmotivated to take up the position. The job attracted mainly 
illiterates who could hardly be expected to understand how the water me-
ters worked and keep accurate records, even if they had received the re-
quired training.  
Findings also indicate that the extent to which vendors engaged in spe-
cific practices (or did not do so) was dependent on local water actors’ abil-
ity to enforce the given institutional arrangements. For instance, in cases 
1 and 3, revenue collectors enforced readings from the water meter to 
determine the revenue expected from the vendor. Hence, many vendors 
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there engaged in practices like adjusting bucket fill levels and revising wa-
ter fee schedules. Vendors could then make more profit by reducing the 
quantity of water sold to users for the same fees.  
In case 2, enforcement was relaxed and vendors manipulated standpipe 
opening times in order to engage in other economic activities to supple-
ment their daily commission earnings. Enforcement was stricter in cases 
5 and 6, and few vendors in these cases were found to have modified the 
institutional arrangements they had been given. In addition, community-
embedded institutions and practices based on trust and social cohesion 
dissuaded vendors from engaging in practices that would inhibit commu-
nity members from getting access to water.  
This chapter began by demonstrating that a gap in technical capacity 
and skills, alongside inadequate training and institutional support, con-
strained local actors’ capacity to manage their water system. It then went 
on to describe how local water actors and the local social and institutional 
context influenced the kinds of practices adopted in response to the chal-
lenges encountered. The discussion section below looks back at the issues 
raised by this chapter in relation to the larger questions posed in this re-
search.  
6.5 Discussion  
On the question of what accounts for differences in the management of 
water supply systems, this study has so far found that the local social and 
institutional context influences actors’ ultimate actions and practices. Ac-
tors’ prospects for changing the institutional arrangements by which they 
managed their water system were determined by (i) access to alternative 
water sources, (ii) actors’ institutional and technical capacity and (iii) the 
commitment and support of implementing actors.  
In cases 5 and 6, institutional and technical capacity gaps among local 
water actors constrained their ability to manage their water system. These 
gaps eventually triggered state actors to step in, coming to local water ac-
tors’ assistance. State actors negotiated for new institutional arrangements 
under private-based management and controlled the contracting process. 
Similarly, in cases 3 and 4, local actors' weak technical knowledge and skills 
constrained their ability to manage their water system efficiently. These 
local actors found solutions by relying on ASTWO, a national network of 
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small town water operators. This organisation provided tools as well as 
technical training to improve members’ performance.  
Again, as the example of the vendors shows, an absence of training and 
poor understating of their roles made it difficult for water actors to carry 
out their responsibilities. Vendors faced losses, because they did not un-
derstand how the water meters worked. This led to tension and conflict 
between vendors and revenue collectors on the earnings declared and ex-
pected. This motivated some vendors to modify institutional arrange-
ments, for example, by adjusting water bucket sizes, revising prices and 
changing public standpipe opening times. 
These findings corroborate Campbell’s (2004) notion that actors are 
more likely to pursue or resist institutional change and engage in other 
practices when newly given institutions or institutional arrangements af-
fect the existing distribution of resources. As shown in this chapter, state 
actors (in cases 5 and 6) and local water actors (in case 3) modified insti-
tutional arrangements for water resource management, to ensure the con-
tinued operation of the water supply system. In cases 5 and 6, local water 
actors claimed they were not part of the initial tendering process, but they 
ultimately accepted private-based management. Evidence further suggests 
that local actors were primarily concerned with maintaining the function-
ality of the water system; hence, their decision to collaborate and not resist 
the changes made by state actors. Past challenges in acquiring water played 
a crucial role in informing state and local actors’ decisions to change insti-
tutional arrangements, in order to preserve the functionality of the water 
system.  
The practices and innovations engaged in by actors in cases 3, 5 and 6 
are consistent with the findings of similar studies, which conclude that 
when players recognise their own bounded rationality, they experiment 
with institutional innovations and attempt to mimic successful institutions 
elsewhere (Ostrom 2005, Kingston and Caballero 2009). Actors in cases 
3, 5 and 6 recognised their inability to manage their water system in a cost-
efficient manner. This led to their reliance on the network organisation (in 
cases 3 and 4) and on Pumptech (in cases 5 and 6) to fill the gaps in tech-
nical, operational and financial competency.  
This study found that actors were not motivated only by capacity-re-
lated constraints. For example, in case 4, although water personnel lacked 
the capacity to manage the water system efficiently, they contested insti-
tutional modifications proposed by the water and sanitation management 
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team. The practices of the water personnel in case 4 can be described in a 
similar vein as other studies, which construe institutional change as a con-
frontation between those promoting new rules and others favouring the 
status quo (Kingston and Caballero 2009: 173). As argued in many studies, 
actors do not accept new ideas without questioning, reflecting and reacting 
to the new policy ideas (Mukhtarov 2012). Actors can resort to individual 
bargaining and engagement in conflict or collective action to resist institu-
tional and technological changes for personal benefit or for the collective 
good (Kingston and Caballero 2009, Mukhtarov 2014, Brousseau et al. 
2011).  
This chapter demonstrated that some water personnel felt threatened 
(economically) by introduction of new computer software for monitoring 
financial records. Perhaps their refusal to accept the new program was re-
lated to the fact that the software could expose shoddy dealings. This is 
consistent with the path-dependence literature, which points to the mech-
anism of self-reinforcement and the switching cost involved in adopting 
new practices as making it economically irrational to support change 
(Prado and Trebilcock 2009, Martin and Sunley 2006). Local water per-
sonnel may have resisted change because the old way of managing the 
water system better served their economic interests, and the effects of the 
new institutional arrangements could be a threat to those. 
The activities and behaviour of local water actors in cases 3, 4, 5 and 6 
corroborate Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996) argument that translation pro-
cesses are constrained by (i) inadequate institutional capacity, resources, 
finances and information on structures and (ii) the economic, social and 
political ideologies of actors. Similarly, as demonstrated in this chapter, the 
local social and institutional context of beneficiary communities shaped 
the decisions made by state and local water actors on how the water supply 
systems should be managed. Water actors modified the institutional ar-
rangements for water system management to improve implementation of 
the NCWSP. Their renegotiation of institutional arrangements was meant 
to adapt the arrangements to the local social and institutional context of 
the beneficiary communities.  
Even though the institutional context of beneficiaries constrained and 
shaped their interactions, embedded institutions also provided opportuni-
ties for actors to modify institutions (North 1990, Hodgson 2006). These 
institutions are expressed through rules, social norms and cultural beliefs, 
and provide the structure in which and mechanisms whereby actors make 
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and implement decisions (Scott 2001, Ostrom 2005, Campbell 2004, 
Hodgson 2006, North 1990). In the current study, too, water actors relied 
on existing institutional arrangements, though they also modified given 
institutions and institutional arrangements to suit their local situation.  
Notwithstanding the above, external factors driving change are not suf-
ficient to explain actor agency. What actors ultimately do, as shown in this 
chapter, is dependent on their motivations and logic (March and Olsen 
2006, Go ́mez 2008, Helmsing 2013). On the question of the motivations 
and logic behind actors’ choices and practices, the current study suggests 
that economic considerations do stimulate actors to modify institutional 
arrangements. The lack of an alternative water source in cases 3, 5 and 6 
meant that water was an urgent need; hence, water actors worked hard to 
ensure customer satisfaction, revenues from water sales and minimisation 
of water unaccounted for. Through the new practices, local water actors 
were better able to cope with the challenges that came with technological 
and institutional changes under the NCWSP.  
Similarly, state actors were motivated by the need to ensure that the 
private organisation (Pumptech) did not take advantage of the weaknesses 
and technical inadequacies of the local water actors. In addition, by ensur-
ing that Pumptech retained and trained all existing staff, they aimed to 
upgrade water personnel’s capacity and to retain institutional memory. 
With this new approach, local water actors were to be prepared to manage 
the water system on their own in the future. Like the actions of local water 
actors in case 3, economic considerations motivated local actors to seek 
professional support from ASTWO and motivated state actors’ invocation 
of private-based management in cases 5 and 6. Both actors sought to en-
sure the efficient and professional management of the water system (cases 
3, 5 and 6). While professionalism and efficiency was also a challenge for 
local water actors in case 4, some local actors rejected any new institutional 
arrangements, as they considered them to be unbeneficial to them. 
In cases 1, 2, 3 and 4, vendors modified institutional arrangements for 
managing the public standpipes due to their need to make more money. 
They adjusted water bucket sizes and prices in cases 3 and 4 and modified 
opening and closing times in cases 1 and 2. Vendors changed institution-
alised rules and engaged in new practices in direct response to the everyday 
challenges they faced. Vendors were motivated by the desire to maximise 
their own economic benefit, sometimes by cheating users, and they imple-
mented practices to offset losses they might incur. According to principal-
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agent theory, vendors may not always be at a disadvantage due to a capac-
ity gap; they might take advantage of gaps in implementation to serve their 
own personal interests. This finding corroborates March and Olsen's 
(2006) notion that actors’ motivations can be explained by rational and 
economic concerns (the logic of instrumentality). This logic can be said to 
apply to the state actors in cases 5 and 6, to local actors in case 3 and to 
the water vendors in cases 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
Vendors in cases 5 and 6, however, refused to engage in new practices, 
as they considered it morally unacceptable to engage in any practice that 
would deny users water. Instead, normative and cognitive considerations 
(the logic of appropriateness) (Campbell 2004, Gómez 2008, March and 
Olsen 2006) informed the choices they made. Vendors acted in these cases 
to maintain social cohesion. 
Notwithstanding the above, institutional change remains highly de-
pendent on the resources that actors possess. Such resources (see section 
3.5.4) provide the toolkits with which actors (institutional entrepreneurs) 
can effect changes, as further elaborated in chapter 7. The local social and 
institutional context of the implementers (local water actors) in all of our 
six cases constrained their ability to translate the NCWSP into actual prac-
tice. At the same time, local conditions determined how these actors in-
terpreted and the extent to which they did or did not modify institutional 
arrangements for managing their water system.  
To what extent, can we classify the practices of water actors as brico-
lage (Campbell 2004; Cleaver 2012, 2002)? The evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that the practices these actors embraced to change insti-
tutional arrangements are not bricolage. The practices employed by state 
and local water actors are consistent with the principles of the NCWSP. 
Changing the institutional arrangements to private-based management (in 
cases 5 and 6) and community-based management (in case 3) can be better 
described as instances of translation. The changes made to institutional 
arrangements were temporary arrangements to ensure that private-based 
management and community-based management fit local social and insti-
tutional conditions. This finding mirrors those of other studies in the 
translation literature that examine how recipients’ local social and institu-
tional context shapes their interpretation and implementation of national 
policies (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000; Whittle et al. 2010: 19). 
In case 3, the capacity of local water actors was inadequate to manage 
the water system using community-based management. However, local 
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actors’ exposure to a larger network of operators provided them access to 
technical support and training. Local actors’ reliance on ASTWO's profes-
sional and technical support, in this case, improved customer satisfaction 
and the technical, operational and financial performance of the water sys-
tem. In cases 5 and 6, inadequate technical capacity of local water actors 
triggered a change from community-based management to private-based 
management. The introduction of professionalism to the management of 
water facilities is consistent with Harvey and Lock’s (2006) argument that 
the voluntarism nature of the community management concept provides 
little room for recruiting professionals with the capacity to manage a sys-
tem effectively.  
The absence of mechanisms for replacing and training local water ac-
tors once positions are vacated is a further factor that worsened the situa-
tion in many beneficiary communities. In addition, a lack of transparency 
and accountability led to misgivings and distrust of water and sanitation 
management committees. Finally, inadequate support from local govern-
ment staff led to a sense of abandonment and demotivated existing and 
potential local water actors. These challenges are consistent with argu-
ments raised in the policy implementation literature on the activities of 
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky and Bureaucracy 1980, Lipsky 2010). 
Street-level bureaucrats are said to engage in practices to circumvent the 
challenges they encounter in the course of implementation (Maynard-
Moody et al. 1990).  
All of the above implies that policy implementation invariably requires 
policy adaptation (e.g., Lindblom 1979). All these factors were observed 
among local water actors in the current study. Hence, I describe water 
actors’ practices not as institutional bricolage but as negotiation or modi-
fication of institutional arrangements. These practices were strategies em-
ployed to manage the challenges encountered in the course of implement-
ing the NCWSP.  
Nonetheless, an important question that remains is the extent to which 
the renegotiated institutional arrangements guarantee efficiency and func-
tionality of the water system. In other words, will the changes ensure that 
water actors have enough revenue for operation and maintenance, for up-
grades and for future expansion of their water supply system?  
The future, in this regard, looks troubled for all of the water supply 
systems examined. Financial resources were limited for managing and ex-
panding the water systems to incorporate new users. While the water 
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systems under community-based management (cases 1, 2, 3 and 4) had 
retained all revenue after deduction of expenditures, those under private-
based management (cases 5 and 6) were paying 70% of their revenue to a 
private actor in management fees. With much of the revenue going to the 
private manager, and considering that the water system was only a year 
old, the community seems to be bearing a disproportional amount of risk 
compared to the private organisation. The argument made is that a new 
water system does not require much maintenance, and depreciation is low. 
Yet, particularly for such a young system, providing service contracts on a 
piecemeal basis (two years) without tying the private organisation to any 
future commitment is risky, and the community will face the consequences 
in the future. Considering that there is no clause within the contract to pin 
Pumptech down for a future commitment, there is a real danger of Pump-
tech declining to renew the contract as the system ages and needs more 
care. In that case, it could be challenging for system managers to contract 
another private organisation for future repairs and maintenance.  
While the water system in case 3 had a relatively good financial stand-
ing, it was nonetheless insufficient to cover the costs of system upgrades, 
rehabilitation and expansion to newly developed localities in the commu-
nity. These findings mirror those of Harvey (2007), who also concluded 
that policymakers need to provide full cost determinants for rural water 
supply. Only with these can we know what costs communities and state 
and external actors can recover. Currently the tariffs for all of the water 
systems are inadequate to cover operations and maintenance, future ex-
pansion and rehabilitation. This has implications for the institutional 
changes envisaged under the NCWSP. We foresee that any further insti-
tutional changes are likely to be slow and show little progress in terms of 
improving the quality of water services.  
Evidence gathered in the current study indicates that water system qual-
ity remains a general problem (see appendix 14). The majority of users in 
cases 1, 2 and 4 continued to rely on unwholesome sources due to disrup-
tions in the opening times of public standpipes and the continued availa-
bility of free alternative sources. In other circumstances, the inability of 
water actors to expand and upgrade water facilities left residents reliant on 
contaminated sources nearby (see figure 5.1).  
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6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter examined how the local social and institutional context influ-
enced actors’ capacity to manage their water supply system and the prac-
tices they adopted to manage the challenges they encountered. Factors that 
influenced actors’ acceptance of new institutional arrangements were the 
information actors possessed on the NCWSP; the urgency with which a 
new water supply was needed; the extent to which the institutional ar-
rangements under the NCWSP were consistent with local values, 
worldviews and everyday practices; and the influence of local elites. How-
ever, actors motivations and logic were also key determinants of the kinds 
of change and practices that emerged. Moreover, the extent to which ac-
tors emerged as change agents or institutional entrepreneurs, as described 
in the next chapter, depended on their command over resources. None-
theless, an important contribution of the current study is the finding that 
the availability of alternative water sources was closely correlated with the 
degree of agency exhibited by actors and their propensity to innovate in 
management of their water supply facility. Improving the quality of water 
services and avoiding water facility breakdown informed the actions and 
practices of both local water actors and state actors. In some cases, the 
presence of alternatives, or the scarcity water sources, determined ven-
dors’ actions. In other cases, actors’ ideologies and cultural values deter-
mined the actions and strategies they ultimately employed.  
Notes 
1 These include the Regional Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA-
NR), the DA and NORST. 
2 A private company was made to prepare a proposal and take responsibility for 
operation and maintenance of the water systems in cases 5 and 6. 
3 Commissions paid in case 5 were not consistent. They ranged from 20% to 5% 
depending on the whims of the water personnel and the water and sanitation man-
agement team.  
4 The guidelines and formats for accounting under the community-based manage-
ment model were inadequate for larger systems (for a population greater than 
10,000). Also, training provided for accounting staff was suitable for smaller com-
munities under community-based management and not for the larger communities 
and systems to be managed by private service organisations. 
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5 The meters measure the volume of water sold daily, for which the vendor must 
account to the revenue collectors. The meters serve as the basis on which vendor 
commissions are calculated. 
6 Two water taps are usually provided, so two users can fetch water at the same 
time. But the vendors are usually given only one bucket to  measure the water.  
7 Two of the four submersible pumps in case 6 were not functioning. Therefore, 
water was being rationed to 2-4 days each week at each public standpoint. 
8 The vendor used to have 40 litre containers to measure water under community-
based management. However, that container was confiscated by the new private 
manager, to be replaced with a 30 litre container. At the time of the interview, no 
replacement container had yet been provided. 
9 Water meters were adapted for the sale of 30 litres of water for 10 pesewas. Com-
missions were based on 10% of the total volume of water sold.  
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7 
Displaying Entrepreneurship: The Role 
of State and Local Water Actors in 
Processes of Institutional Change 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The capacity of actors to modify, resist, maintain and enforce institutional 
change depends on factors embedded in the community. As indicated thus 
far, the local social and institutional context constrained actors’ capacity 
to translate and implement the NCWSP. Foremost among these contex-
tual factors were the institutional and technical capacities of implementers, 
the urgency with which a water supply facility was needed, knowledge and 
accesses to information on the NCWSP and the support and commitment 
of community and organisation leaders. Yet, these factors were not only 
constraints; they also provided resources to enable actors, the so-called 
institutional entrepreneurs, to engage in institutional change processes.  
The emergence of challenges in implementation is necessary but not 
sufficient to motivate actors to display their agency and control over re-
sources, to emerge as institutional entrepreneurs in resisting, modifying 
and facilitating institutional change. The actors classified as institutional 
entrepreneurs in this study engaged in several practices and strategies in 
response to challenges they faced in implementing the given institutional 
arrangements and satisfying their interests.  
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated, consistent with other research, that 
reformers’ inability to achieve the desired outcome was because the new 
policy ideas did not fit with the implementing communities’ local social 
and institutional context, leading actors to pursue new institutional ar-
rangements and practices (Andrews 2013, Campbell 2004). Actors modi-
fied the new policies to “fit their unique needs in time and space and [were] 
themselves transformed in the process” (Whittle et al. 2010: 19). In other 
words, actors were conscious of their environment and sought to change 
institutional and technological arrangements that were inconsistent with 
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their existing environmental conditions, interests, ideologies and 
worldviews. As found in all six cases under study, actors responded to 
institutional and technological changes differently, due to pressure from 
their environment. While there was some awareness of actors’ roles in en-
gaging in entrepreneurship, the details of their entrepreneurship warrant 
further scrutiny.  
This research defines institutional entrepreneurs as individuals or 
groups of individuals that collectively employ practices and strategies to 
navigate institutional and technological challenges. These individuals or 
groups represent various organisations with different roles and responsi-
bilities. Of primary interest as institutional entrepreneurs are representa-
tives of government agencies, international agencies, local water organisa-
tions and traditional organisations with the following characteristics: (i) 
they are reactive and respond to challenges and (ii) they renegotiate, mod-
ify and transform new policy ideas introduced by external and state actors. 
We distinguish traditional actors, state and affiliated actors, local water ac-
tors and vendors as displaying forms of entrepreneurship that were often 
different from the institutional arrangements given under the NCWSP.  
Institutional entrepreneurs are the driving force behind practices and 
strategies employed to change or modify institutional arrangements that 
are inconsistent with the local social and institutional context. These 
change actors engage in institutional entrepreneurship or bricolage by 
combining institutional principles and practices to resist, modify or facili-
tate institutional change (Campbell 2004). This chapter takes a closer look 
at institutional entrepreneurs’ activities and practices. This will enable us 
to understand what characteristics, motivations and resources allow insti-
tutional entrepreneurs to engage in bricolage or institutional entrepreneur-
ship. 
A key means of understanding the innovations of institutional entre-
preneurs is by observation of actors’ everyday practices. Everyday prac-
tices provide a window for explicit analysis of why and how institutional 
entrepreneurs engage in institutional change. In other words, they enable 
us to understand why implementation is rapid and leads to big changes in 
some contexts, while being slow and path dependent in other contexts 
(Pierson 2000). Through institutional entrepreneurs’ activities, we can ac-
count for the processes and mechanisms by which institutional change is 
path dependent and gradual or rapid and revolutionary in nature. The ac-
tions of institutional entrepreneurs enable us to understand actors’ 
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preferences and choices and the motivations and logic behind them. 
Moreover, institutional entrepreneurship allows us to incorporate power 
into our analysis of institutions (Helmsing 2013). Power takes the form of 
resources with which institutional entrepreneurs block, enforce, promote 
or change institutional arrangements.  
This chapter examines, in turn, the various actors engaging in institu-
tional entrepreneurship in relation to implementation of the NCWSP. 
Each section looks at the characteristics of an institutional entrepreneur, 
alongside the practices and strategies they adopted to achieve their objec-
tives and the motivations or conditions informing their actions. What re-
sources of institutional entrepreneurs have enabled or constrained them 
in enforcing, modifying, frustrating and promoting the implementation of 
institutional change? 
7.2 Displaying entrepreneurship: Chiefs as enforcers of 
state-led institutions  
This section examines how the chiefs in all of our cases displayed entre-
preneurial characteristics (i) in enforcing the 5% contribution towards 
construction of the water facility and (ii) in controlling the composition of 
the water and sanitation management teams. How institutional entrepre-
neurs perceived themselves determined the direction and strategies they 
could cognitively imagine and initiate (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, North 
and North 1992, Rusaw 1998). Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2) introduced a 
number of strategies that chiefs adopted to ensure compliance with the 
5% levy. One of these, found in cases 1b and 2, was to link access to land 
for burials to fulfilling payment of the 5% levy. In case 4, chiefs collabo-
rated with state and political organisations to enforce compliance. Chiefs, 
as indicated earlier, had long been in charge of grassroots governance and 
community development (Bamfo 2000). Given that role, traditional actors 
perceived ensuring residents had reliable access to potable water as within 
their role and responsibilities; hence, the need to enforce payment of the 
5% levy. As observed in chapter 4, these political leaders were traditionally 
responsible for enforcing rules for the management of natural resources, 
including water; and they were still exercising that role up to the time of 
this study. Enforcing payment of the 5% levy was therefore perceived as 
legitimately within the power they held and the authority of their leader-
ship position.  
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One might therefore ask to what extent the chiefs in cases 1b, 2 and 4 
perceived themselves as institutional entrepreneurs or as agents to facili-
tate institutional change in the water sector. A chief in Kyerkor expressed 
some of the reasons for enforcing the 5% levy:  
According to the health personnel, the rivers surrounding the community 
are responsible for the high guinea worm disease. As leaders in the commu-
nity, it is our duty to ensure that we get clean water. The new water project 
will help us to reduce guinea worm disease in the community. So we had to 
find all means to make people pay the 5% levy in order to get the water 
system constructed (Chief, case 2, Kyerkor, 7 June 2015). 
Chiefs’ actions to enforce citizens’ payment of the 5% levy are con-
sistent with key characteristics of change agents; that is, they supported 
the creation of institutions that they considered appropriate and aligned 
with their interests (Dacin et al. 2002: 47) and they acted strategically to 
bring change (Jensen and Fersch 2016, Weik 2011). The chiefs in cases 1b 
and 2, supported construction of a new water facility because it would 
ensure that residents had access to a hygienic water source; in cases 3, 4, 5 
and 6, the chiefs supported the new water facility because it would guar-
antee residents access to a more reliable water source. These actions of the 
chiefs were consistent with their role and responsibilities to ensure the 
development of their communities and provide for the well-being of citi-
zens within their jurisdiction.  
On the question of their motivations, these can be characterised as 
both political and economic. Schneider and Teske (1992), similarly, iden-
tified political and economic reasons as informing entrepreneurs’ actions. 
Moreover, the chiefs’ capacity to use existing local social institutions to 
enforce the 5% levy stems from most chiefs’ perception of the enforce-
ment of rules being an integral part of their political role to prevent free-
riders:  
We have the responsibility to maintain the unity and peace that exists here. 
This community has a strong communal spirit, which we have exhibited in 
the past. We cannot fail. We had to ensure the project is realised and com-
pleted. If we fail in our capacity to recover the 5% levy, the District will 
never take us seriously. And it goes against us as leaders who are in control 
of its citizens (Chief, case 1b, Asuase, 29 May 2015). 
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Thus, through the objective of complying with the 5% levy, the chiefs 
reinforced power relations. They also demonstrated their capacity to en-
force development initiatives by institutionalising community participa-
tion in the future management and maintenance of the water project, in 
addition to ensuring the initial community contribution to the construc-
tion. This strengthened and reaffirmed the chiefs’ legitimacy and govern-
ance over water resources and control over citizens’ choices. Nonetheless, 
the role and responsibilities of the chiefs as an important development 
agent and the extent to which the chiefs could emerge as an institutional 
entrepreneur was constrained by their access to and control over re-
sources. Existing norms, shared beliefs, values and cultural norms deter-
mined the kinds of practices that the chiefs could legitimately employ to 
modify or enforce institutional change.  
The capacity of the chiefs to enforce the 5% levy was made possible by 
the presence of cultural beliefs and practices of honouring and paying re-
spects to the dead. Indeed, in cases 1b and 2 the chiefs employed access 
to burial sites to enforce implementation of the 5% levy. Their social and 
political position in the community allowed them access to these commu-
nity-led institutions. 
It is somewhat surprising that local water actors in case 1a could not 
enlist the support of their chiefs to employ community-embedded institu-
tions to enforce the 5% levy. This was because the chiefs in that case 
lacked the authority and power to force citizens to comply with the 5% 
directive. The chiefs in case 1a had an overlord role,1 which did not impart 
the same control over community residents as their counterparts had in 
cases 1b and 2. If employment of community-embedded institutions had 
been attempted in case 1a, the result would likely have been much differ-
ent. Hence, local water actors had to look for alternative strategies to en-
sure compliance. This institutional gap limited local water actors’ ability to 
rely on the chiefs to ensure compliance with the 5% levy. The same com-
munity-initiated rules used to enforce the 5% levy in cases 1b and 2 were 
not acceptable in case 1a. As read in chapter 5, local water actors had to 
rely on associations, groups and loans from the bank to fulfil the 5% con-
tribution in the latter case.  
Along these same lines, March and Oslen (2006) and Campbell (2004: 
69-70) maintained that the strategies adopted by institutional entrepre-
neurs must be consistent with the dominant normative and cognitive prin-
ciples existing within the social environment. These follow a logic of 
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appropriateness by which the recombined elements must be acceptable 
and legitimate.  
Despite the link between chiefs’ authority and their ability to invoke 
community-initiated rules to enforce the 5% levy, this study found that 
the position and authority of the chiefs did not always ensure compliance. 
Chiefs in case 4, had the same powers and authority as those in cases 1b 
and 2. Notwithstanding this, they had to rely on state actors, specifically 
the courts and police, to enforce compliance. The strategies adopted in 
case 4 are consistent with processes of bricolage and institutional entre-
preneurship. Actors’ responses to challenges are often dynamic, uneven 
and temporally intermittent. Institutional entrepreneurs’ capacity to en-
gage in change and the strategies they adopt to this end take place within 
the limits of the available resources and social circumstances (Cleaver 
2012, 2002). For example, in case 4, the use of funeral rites and provision 
of land for burying the dead to enforce payment would have not been 
sustainable. Revering the dead is an important cultural value among the 
Ashanti’s in Ghana (in case 4 most inhabitants were Ashanti). Because of 
the central place of funeral ceremonies in the everyday lives of citizens in 
case 4, using funeral rites and land rights to enforce implementation would 
have fuelled resistance, rendering enforcement ineffective.  
The activities of the chiefs corroborate Sheingate's (2003) description 
of political entrepreneurs as resourceful political leaders who use available 
resources to influence policies or control decision-making processes. 
Here, the social position of the chiefs allowed them to control citizens' 
preferences and choices and determined the strategies they adopted to en-
force the 5% levy. In short, chiefs used their social and political position 
as community leaders to promote the institutional reforms under the 
NCWSP.  
The actions and activities of chiefs accord with their political and social 
role as custodians of the land. The teething troubles encountered in insti-
tutionalising participation (paying the 5% levy) can therefore also be seen 
as an opportunity for the chiefs to assert their authority and power over 
their subjects. The strategies adopted by the chiefs and local water actors 
in case 4 to enforce implementation differed from those adopted in cases 
1b and 2. The choices of the former actors were constrained by the local 
social context and practices, which influenced the kinds of practices that 
were legitimate, acceptable and sustainable.  
 The Role of State & Local Water Actors in Institutional Change   155 
Interestingly, while the chiefs were supportive of the institutional re-
forms as described above, these same chiefs perceived establishment of 
the water and sanitation management teams as a threat. The management 
teams were one of multiple entities created under the NCWSP. As dis-
cussed in chapter 5 (section 5.2.3), these parallel structures conflicted with 
traditional political structures. Thus, creation of the water and sanitation 
management teams and other water-related entities (the various water sys-
tem personnel positions) undermined the authority and powers of the 
chiefs, who had traditionally been in charge of the governance of water 
resources. The results of this conflict were consistent with those found in 
other studies and suggest that if proposed changes run counter to an ex-
isting belief system or threaten the leaders of existing organisations, insti-
tutional change becomes path dependent (North 2005, Prado and Trebil-
cock 2009).  
Similarly, this study has demonstrated that existing traditional political 
structures frustrated the work of the water and sanitation management 
teams, hence, making change counterproductive. Chiefs in cases 1 and 6 
supported the activities of the management teams because these activities 
confirmed their own political interests. Nonetheless, in cases 2, 3 and 4 
the chiefs resisted formation of the water and sanitation management 
teams because here they seemed to threaten the chiefs’ political position 
and interests. For example, in case 2, members of the water and sanitation 
management team were replaced even though their formal term had not 
yet expired. Accusations of wrongdoing were justified by the notion that 
the activities of the previous members of the management team conflicted 
with the interests of the ruling government. Furthermore, the previous 
management team members were said to have been misappropriating rev-
enues, warranting the decision to replace them with more trustworthy 
staff. In case 3, the chiefs meddled in the activities of the water and sani-
tation management team and influenced its membership by filling vacan-
cies with their own candidates. Here, the chiefs were motivated by per-
sonal interest, specifically, to influence and set the agenda for decision-
making and control water system personnel and activities. As argued by 
Helmsing (2013), actors whose benefits are threatened by the establish-
ment of new organisations may end up impeding processes of change.  
These findings support previous research by Sarpong (2005), Fuest 
(2006) and Nyarko (2007) which also reveal interference by chiefs in water 
and sanitation management team membership and activities in 
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communities in Ghana. Likewise, chapter 5 described a number of in-
stances in which chiefs’ actions were motivated mostly by economic con-
siderations and personal benefit, such as chiefs’ not paying for water con-
sumed, employing relatives in vendor positions, borrowing from the water 
account and using water revenues for activities unrelated to water and san-
itation. This is consistent with findings from Eguavoen and Youkhana 
(2008), who demonstrated that the local elite was motivated to influence 
the membership of water and sanitation management teams in order to 
emphasise their own privileges as community leaders. For example, some 
chiefs used their influence to ensure that public standpipes were built on 
their property or close to their houses (Eguavoen and Youkhana 2008).  
The practices of the chiefs in enforcing or resisting the 5% levy and in 
supporting or resisting the work of the water and sanitation management 
teams reaffirmed their authority and control over development-related is-
sues. This is linked to their political and social position as leaders in charge 
of coordinating development activities in the community they governed. 
The chiefs may also have been motivated by the desire to reaffirm their 
own position as an active development agent. By ensuring that the bene-
ficiary community fulfilled its obligation to pay 5% of the cost of the pro-
ject, the chief ensured that the water project would be implemented. This 
motivation represents a benevolent act, consistent with Helmsing (2016), 
who maintained that social entrepreneurs use their resources to bring so-
cial change (Hockerts et al. 2006: 37). It is important to note that the ac-
tivities of these chiefs in this circumstance contradicted the exclusionary 
provisions of the NCWSP, which prohibited chiefs from interfering in 
NCWSP implementation. However, the chiefs ignored this provision – 
though it was explicitly stated in the programme policy documents – using 
their control over the citizenry and their social and political position to 
support implementation of the 5% levy.  
Similarly, chiefs’ control over the establishment and composition of the 
water and sanitation management teams was, in some circumstances, 
borne out of genuine concern to ensure the collective good of the com-
munity. For example, in case 4, users were unsatisfied with the perfor-
mance of the water and sanitation management team. In response, the 
chiefs facilitated replacement of underperforming members with more 
trusted candidates. Indeed, as leaders and development agents, the onus 
was on the chiefs to ensure that the water and sanitation management 
teams were accountable to the community and provided quality water 
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services. In cases 2 and 3, too, the chiefs replaced the water and sanitation 
management teams, though in these cases they were motivated by a desire 
to serve and satisfy their own economic interests.  
Why did the behaviours of the chiefs differ? Here the answer can be 
found in existing embedded institutions, which influenced how traditional 
actors interpreted and translated policy ideas. The relationship between 
the chiefs and the local water actors determined the actions and practices 
displayed by each. This does not mean that chiefs with less influence on 
the water and sanitation management teams did not have an economic or 
personal interest. As discussed in chapter 5, the new water and sanitation 
management teams in some cases (e.g., in case 4), were perceived as cro-
nies of the chiefs. Further evidence suggests that there was still mistrust 
between the citizenry, on one hand, and the chiefs and water and sanita-
tion management teams, on the other, particularly in case 4. There was a 
general perception that the current crop of water and sanitation manage-
ment teams were favourites of the chiefs. In essence, this means that the 
chiefs still indirectly controlled the day-to-day management of the water 
system:  
We are still experiencing the same problem just like the old MWST [water 
and sanitation management team]. Since they assumed their position, they 
have not rendered the account to us. In addition, water does not flow fre-
quently. This is a major problem to us (Focus group discussion, case 4, Juaso 
Obogu, 9 August 2015). 
As particularly evidenced in cases 2, 3 and 4, these chiefs seem to have 
acted mainly to reinforce their own control over the water system, espe-
cially with regard to daily operation and management of the facility. In 
other words, their motivation was purely to promote their own economic 
and political interests.  
This finding is corroborated by Dacin and colleagues (2002: 47), who 
argued that change agents support the creation of institutions that they 
deem to be appropriate and aligned with their interests. They act strategi-
cally to bring change (Jensen and Fersch 2016, Weik 2011) by reconfigur-
ing organisational roles and structures (Buchanan and Badham 1999b).  
The actions of the chiefs in cases 2, 3 and 4 were consistent with a key 
characteristic of political entrepreneurs as “cunning, resourceful and op-
portunistic leaders, whose skillful manipulation of politics somehow re-
sults in the creation of…, new institution[s]… and have transformative 
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effects on policies” (Sheingate 2003: 188). As shown in the current study, 
chiefs employed different strategies to reconstitute the water and sanita-
tion management teams, appointing members they could manipulate to 
satisfy their own personal interests. Moreover, they invoked existing insti-
tutions and structures to ensure compliance with new institutional ar-
rangements that were likely to reinforce their own legitimacy and authority 
as political leaders in control over their community.  
In sum, the social and political position of the chiefs enabled them to 
resist or support implementation of institutional reforms in the sample 
cases of this research. They did this by relying on community-embedded 
institutions and practices (e.g., funeral rites) to enforce state-led policies 
(the 5% levy). Some chiefs resorted to state institutional structures (the 
police and courts) alongside traditional governance structures to enforce 
state policies. Similarly, their interference with the water and sanitation 
management teams was not always to object to their establishment; they 
also used their powers and authority to control who became a member. 
Chiefs accepted the management teams’ activities as long as these coin-
cided with their own preferences and interests and as long as the people 
occupying positions in the management teams could be trusted and con-
trolled.  
7.3 Displaying entrepreneurship: The role of state actors 
This section examines the display of entrepreneurial characteristics by 
NORST and CWSA. These state actors moved to resolve challenges in the 
operation and management of some of the water supply systems. The ac-
tivities referred to were described in chapter 6 (section 6.2).  
 Chapter 3 defined a policy entrepreneur as an actor with the capacity 
to identify a problem and use innovative strategies and practices to resolve 
it. Policy entrepreneurs use their command over resources, such as time, 
reputation, knowledge, information and financial resources, to engage oth-
ers in return for a benefit (Kingdon 2002, Schneider and Teske 1992) or 
to change an established way of doing things (Mintrom and Norman 
2009).  
Chapter 6 outlined strategies adopted by CWSA and NORST towards 
finding solutions to challenges of poor management of the water supply 
system by local water actors. A mismatch between the capacities of local 
water actors and their expected roles and responsibilities, a lack of 
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commitment and support, and power struggles among local actors af-
fected their management of the water system. This paved the way for state 
actor intervention. Among the strategies adopted by state actors to solve 
the challenges that had arisen in water system management was to change 
the management model from community-based to private-based manage-
ment. An important question here is to what extent did the activities of 
state actors make them institutional entrepreneurs or change agents. As 
read in chapter 6, state actors were required to monitor and coordinate 
water activities and to provide technical assistance to local water actors. 
However, state actors were not supposed to impose their own decisions 
on local actors. 
Nonetheless, state actors used their position as experts with knowledge 
and technical expertise to control the process of finding solutions to the 
challenges facing some of the water systems. Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that NORST’s engagement of private organisations to manage the 
water system in cases 5 and 6 was consistent with the institutional arrange-
ments in place at the time. What makes the actions of NORST comparable 
to those of institutional entrepreneurs is the strategies NORST adopted 
to change institutional arrangements for water system management. First, 
NORST preferred Pumptech, disregarding procurement rules that stipu-
lated competition in the selection of water management companies. In this 
regard, the behaviour of NORST can be likened to that of policy entre-
preneurs. It advocated change in an established way of doing things, in-
troducing innovation aimed at problem solving (Mintrom and Norman 
2009: 649-650, Kingdon 2002, Ackrill and Kay 2011). As revealed in this 
study and consistent with Kingdon's (1995) description of policy entre-
preneurs, state actors had particular resources they could draw upon to 
enable them to change procurement processes and recruit their preferred 
water organisation (Pumptech). Foremost among these resources were 
their intellectual ability, knowledge of policy matters, leadership position 
and credibility. 
CWSA and NORST did provide grounds to justify their preference for 
Pumptech. First, Pumptech was said to have good knowledge of water 
issues in the region, which made them the favoured candidate rather than 
competitors. Secondly, Pumptech’s experience in providing maintenance 
services and spare parts put them ahead of their peers. Thirdly, Pumptech 
was said to be familiar with the difficulties confronting the water systems 
and the circumstances under which private management was being sought, 
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which made it easier for state actors to change established ways of doing 
things. Finally, if Pumptech were chosen, CWSA and NORST could indi-
rectly oversee events, ensuring that Pumptech did not take advantage of 
the capacity gap to cheat local water actors.  
In cases 5 and 6, NORST used its position as technical advisor and 
financer of the water reforms to change institutional arrangements for wa-
ter system management to a private-based approach and ensure selection 
of Pumptech for the contract (section 6.2). This included (i) allocating 5% 
of water revenue for monitoring purposes, (ii) ensuring that Pumptech 
maintained all existing water personnel irrespective of their capacity and 
skills and (iii) providing for performance agreement contracts which all 
water personnel had to sign to serve as a benchmark for future evaluation 
of their performance.  
NORST’s and CWSA’s actions and strategies were informed by eco-
nomic interests, specifically, to bridge the technical capacity gap so as to 
ensure efficient management of the water system. Nevertheless, further 
investigation revealed a direct link between NORST and the Canadian In-
ternational Development Agency (CIDA). CIDA had financed the water 
project and thus had a huge stake in facilitating institutional change in the 
rural water sector. Failure to ensure successful implementation of the wa-
ter reforms would mean failure of NORST and CWSA, given their central 
role as facilitators and experts in NCWSP implementation.  
The urgency with which many communities in the region needed a safe 
water supply also meant that state actors and NORST felt a keen respon-
sibility to ensure that the water systems did not break down prematurely. 
The actions taken by CWSA and NORST to find solutions to the chal-
lenges confronting the water sector were consistent with those observed 
by Sheingate (2003), who maintained that uncertainties and crises provide 
opportunities for actors to engage in creativity and change established 
ways of doing things (Mintrom and Norman 2009). The challenges con-
fronting the water sector served as a window of opportunity (Hitman and 
Meijerink 2010) for NORST to orchestrate and convince other stakehold-
ers – such as CWSA, the DAs and the water and sanitation management 
teams – of the importance of resolving the challenges. The lack of alter-
native safe water sources in cases 5 and 6 and past challenges in accessing 
water made water provision a sensitive issue in some beneficiary commu-
nities. Hence, these actors recognised that a breakdown of the water sys-
tem would be a severe detriment to users. NORST and CWSA, therefore, 
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could not ignore the capacity gap and inefficiencies of local water actors. 
They felt compelled to move forward to find innovative solutions to the 
challenges confronting the water systems. 
Important in processes of institutional change is actors’ access to re-
sources that enable them to display entrepreneurship and agency. NORST 
had access to resources including technical expertise, knowledge on policy 
matters, and finances to initiate solutions to inefficiencies in local actors’ 
management of their water system (Kingdon 2002, Schneider and Teske 
1992). 
As read in chapter 6, CWSA was more proactive in suggesting solutions 
to challenges confronting the water sectors in cases 5 and 6 than in the 
other cases. Although cases 3 and 4 faced similar management challenges, 
private management was not an option here due to the absence of institu-
tional entrepreneurs such as NORST pushing for changes in the way the 
water system was managed. In cases 5 and 6, the presence of NORST 
working for CIDA put this organisation in a position to influence and 
change other actors’ perceptions. In short, the resources NORST com-
manded enabled it to convince other stakeholders to support institutional 
change in small town water supply system management.  
These findings are consistent with those of Sotarauta (2009), who iden-
tified multiple forms of power of institutional entrepreneurs. Likewise, 
NORST used its official position to force others to act differently. It did 
this by relying on its own expert knowledge to convince key persons, par-
ticularly among the water and sanitation management teams, to change 
their perceptions of their roles and responsibilities. It also wielded finan-
cial resources, which it could access thanks to its connection with CIDA. 
Drawing on all these resources positioned NORST to facilitate and con-
trol processes of institutional change in the management of these water 
systems.  
Although further evidence suggests that CWSA, the DAs and the water 
and sanitation management teams initially objected to private-based man-
agement, NORST as an international organisation and the main financier 
of the project used its influence and political connections to sway the de-
liberation processes and the kinds of change that emerged. 
The activities of NORST resemble those described as policy entrepre-
neurship. Its actions are consistent with key characteristics of institutional 
entrepreneurs as change agents who support the creation of institutions 
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that are appropriate and aligned with their interests (Dacin et al. 2002: 47) 
and who act strategically to bring change (Jensen and Fersch 2016, Weik 
2011). They do this by reconfiguring “an organisation’s roles, responsibil-
ities, structures, outputs, processes, systems, technology or other re-
sources” (Buchanan and Badham 1999: 610). 
NORST displayed institutional entrepreneurship by controlling and in-
fluencing other actors to collaborate and support new initiatives that 
would improve local water actors’ capacity and ensure the efficient man-
agement of the water systems. Its position as the main technical advisor 
for implementation of the water programme meant that it had a keen in-
terest in ensuring the NCWSP’s successful implementation.  
7.4 Displaying entrepreneurship: The role of local water 
actors  
So far, this chapter has focused on how traditional actors, state actors and 
affiliate organisations mediated the challenges encountered in implement-
ing the NCWSP. This section examines the entrepreneurial characteristics 
displayed by local water actors in relation to changing institutional arrange-
ments for the management of the water supply system. The activities ex-
amined were described in chapter 6 (section 6.3). 
Local water actors in this study include members of the water and san-
itation management teams, water personnel and water vendors, though 
the water vendors will be discussed separately in the next section. Local 
water actors and their characteristics conform with the descriptions of pol-
icy entrepreneurs by Kingdon (2002) and Mintrom and Norman (2009). 
As observed in previous chapters, local water actors modified institutional 
arrangements in order to overcome the challenges they encountered in 
managing their water system.  
As read in chapter 6 (section 6.3), a number of factors constrained local 
actors’ capacity to manage their water system using the community-based 
approach. Among these factors were inadequate technical capacity and 
training, a lack of alternative water sources and urgent need for a new wa-
ter supply facility, and the often unwieldy size of the water system under 
their care. Despite these constraints, local water actors maintained com-
munity-based approaches rather than resorting to private-based manage-
ment of their water system. Yet, this affected the quality of the water ser-
vices provided. For example, billing was inefficient and accounts for the 
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water distributed were incomplete, revenue was pilfered and water facili-
ties experienced frequent breakdowns. To bridge the gap in technical ca-
pacity and resolve the challenges, local water actors in cases 3 and 4 drew 
on the technical skills and expertise of an external actor, ASTWO.  
When do such initiatives by local water actors qualify them as policy 
entrepreneurs or institutional entrepreneurs? Local water actors modified 
existing institutional arrangements under community-based management 
to cope with the challenges they faced. Measures included tightening up 
financial practices by (i) adopting financial software that allowed local wa-
ter actors to manage their daily financial records more professionally, (ii) 
making vendors sign performance agreements and (iii) sending vendor 
revenues to the bank on a daily basis and paying vendor allowances 
through the bank.  
Consistent with the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, local actors’ 
capacity to modify the existing community-based management arrange-
ments was possible thanks to their alliance with ASTWO. This network 
organisation demonstrated that the innovative institutional arrangements 
had worked for other ASTWO members. Local water actors embraced 
ASTWO’s technical expertise and credibility in the field to convince op-
ponents and supporters to back modifications of the given institutional 
arrangements.  
Institutional entrepreneurs’ ability to change institutional arrangements 
depends largely on their ability to mobilise supporters by forging new re-
lationships with both opponents and supporters. As found in case 4, the 
inability of the water and sanitation management team to mobilise support 
from water personnel led to resistance to the modified arrangements. Ul-
timately, little innovation was introduced, particularly compared to case 3. 
Hence, institutional change in case 4 become path dependent with most 
of the inefficiencies persisting. For example, customer billing for water 
consumption remained infrequent (bills were sent 3-6 months after the 
fact), collection rates were low and water losses were substantial due to 
obsolete meters, which made it difficult to accurately determine how much 
water customers used.  
Consistent with scholarship on institutional entrepreneurship, the abil-
ity of institutional entrepreneurs to activate change depends on their ac-
cess to finances, information, expert knowledge, social networks and skills 
(Helmsing 2013:10, Campbell 2004, Kingdom 2002, Mintrom and Nor-
man 2009). 
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Although the water and sanitation management teams in case 4 had 
access to new ideas from their network organisation (ASTWSO), the man-
agement teams’ inability to get water personnel on their side hampered 
implementation. The institutional change literature, too, posits that when 
the perceived cost of change outweighs the expected benefits, actors are 
likely to resist change. This was indeed found among the water personnel 
in case 4. The gap or inefficiencies in the management of the water system 
benefitted the water personnel, hence their desire to maintain the status 
quo. The new software was not in their interest, as it could expose shoddy 
practices. They therefore resisted change.  
The water personnel in case 4 may have had genuine concerns which 
prompted their resistance to the new software. Interviews, however, sug-
gested that they did not have adequate knowledge and understanding of 
the new software to make an objective assessment. Besides, they were 
comfortable with the exiting institutional arrangements for accounting for 
water revenues. The new institutional arrangements would at the least be 
difficult for them to adopt, again leading to their resistance.  
Consistent with Campbell (2004), mobilising supporters by forging 
new relationships and building successful coalitions (Meijerink and 
Huitema 2010) is an important means for institutional entrepreneurs to 
engage in institutional change. Whereas in case 3 the water personnel was 
committed and supportive of new institutional arrangements, in case 4 the 
management team was unable to convince the water personnel of the need 
for the change. Even though the local water actors in cases 3 and 4 were 
both exposed to new ideas and training by ASWTO, change was not au-
tomatic. Thus, collaboration and backing from both supporters and op-
ponents appears to be necessary to forge and sustain institutional change 
(Campbell 2004).  
The findings above allow us to recognise the different motivations of 
water personnel and the water and sanitation management teams in cases 
3 and 4. This difference was key in determining the path of institutional 
change and the strategies adopted by these actors. Although both cases 
faced similar challenges in water system management, and both were ex-
posed to the inputs of ASTWO, the degree and extent of innovation dif-
fered in each case. The innovations introduced in case 3 were more influ-
ential and drastic compared to those in case 4: 
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We have made a lot of changes in the way we do things as a result of the 
training we continued to receive from the association. In the past, we never 
took our daily sales to the bank and records of vendors were poorly kept. 
Now we have a rule of keeping only 50 Ghana cedi. This has helped us to 
monitor daily revenues. We know how much money was collected for the 
day and which vendor is performing and those not doing well (Interview 
with water and sanitation management teams, case 3, Wiamaose, 30 July 
2018).  
Consistent with processes of institutional change, change can only take 
place within the boundaries of available resources and social circum-
stances. Actors respond to pressure for change by creating new institu-
tional arrangements or modifying existing ones to better engage with the 
challenges arising from institutional or technological advances (Campbell 
2004, 1997; Campbell et al. 1991). A problem can only get the attention of 
entrepreneurs if it reduces their power and resources. 
Whereas most studies on institutional entrepreneurship argue that ac-
tors’ access to and control over resources determines and influences their 
agency, this study found that the urgency with which a water supply system 
was needed and the availability of alternative water sources played an im-
portant role in determining the degree of actors’ innovation and agency. 
Topographical conditions in case 4 made water access less of a challenge 
than in case 3. In case 4, hand-dug wells were available in some areas of 
the community, so the breakdown of the water system in the near future 
was not considered as problematic as in, for example, case 3, where alter-
native water sources were scarce. Thus, providing quality water services 
and improving performance was less of a priority among water personnel 
in case 4, compared to case 3. This finding corroborates the idea of 
Fligstein (2001), who suggested that the social skills of entrepreneurs mat-
ter less in a stable field. In times of crisis, however, the social skills of 
institutional entrepreneurs play an important role in amassing collabora-
tion and support for new institutional arrangements (Fligstein 2001). Case 
4 had a more stable water situation than case 3. A breakdown of the water 
facility in case 3 would be tantamount to a crisis, as users would have dif-
ficulty accessing an alternative source. Local water actors in case 3 there-
fore had a much keener interest in ensuring the professional management 
of the water system. Low revenue, water unaccounted for and a lack of 
accountability among vendors were likely to plunge the water system into 
crisis. This motivated local water actors’ intervention to seek out and 
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introduce strategies to ameliorate institutional arrangements under com-
munity-based management.  
The motivations and logic behind local water actors’ activities, as case 
3 demonstrates, are consistent with scholarship on institutional change. 
Local water actors were driven by a collective concern to introduce new 
measures for the management of their water system. The expected eco-
nomic benefit motivated local water actors in case 3 to renegotiate the 
given institutional arrangements. In short, they sought to ensure the qual-
ity of water services, so that inhabitants could have uninterrupted access 
to potable water. The actions of the local water actors in case 3 are con-
sistent with Long's (2000) argument that actors make use of conflicting 
priorities that are likely to constrain their actions by adjusting and devel-
oping ways to deal with life. They do this by adjusting their goals, altering 
their perceptions or reinforcing their interests.  
The goals and aspirations of the water and sanitation management 
teams and water personnel in case 3 differed from those in case 4. While 
local water actors in case 3 pursued the visible common good of ensuring 
efficient management of the water system, the water personnel in case 4 
were more concerned with their individual interests and the benefits they 
would lose if they supported the changes proposed by the water and san-
itation management team.  
Ensuring uninterrupted water supply was an urgent issue in case 3. In 
case 4, hand-dug wells were available, so water personnel could take pro-
fessional management of the water system for granted. The water and san-
itation management teams had their image to protect. The chiefs had en-
trusted them with the management of this important resource, and 
expected them to revive the water system from its deplorable state.  
Economic considerations were not the only factors that informed ac-
tors’ motivations. Social relationships, too, played a significant role in pro-
cesses of institutional change. The capacity to initiate change was possible 
in case 3 because both the water and sanitation management team and 
water personnel shared a common interest in resolving challenges in man-
aging the water system. In case 4, both actors had different interests. Water 
personnel were interested in preserving their individual economic benefits 
into the future, and were thus loath to embrace the new software for man-
aging their financial records. The water and sanitation management team, 
on the other hand, wanted to preserve its professionalism by ensuring the 
efficient management of the system.  
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In sum, the actions of local water actors confirm key processes of in-
stitutional change and previous findings on the likelihood of institutional 
entrepreneurs emerging and engaging in institutional change. Actors 
within an existing institutional context, with their varied access to re-
sources and motivations, informed actors’ preferences and strategies in 
our cases. In case 3, the economic benefit of improved water services in-
formed local water actors’ strategies. This interest consequently triggered 
their entrepreneurship to avoid a situation in which the water system 
would likely break down in the future. The crisis that such a future break-
down would represent triggered a quest to find innovative ways to safe-
guard the water system. In case 4, local conditions were such that water 
was not an urgent issue. Water system management therefore did not de-
mand the full attention and interest of local water actors. This led them to 
resist changes proposed by the water and sanitation management team.  
7.5 Displaying institutional entrepreneurship:  
Role of water vendors  
The discussion thus far has examined how traditional, state and local water 
actors engaged in different practices to reduce the challenges that arose in 
managing their water supply system. This section looks at the activities of 
vendors in relation to the day-to-day management of the public stand-
pipes. The activities discussed are those described in chapter 6 (section 
6.4). 
Vendors are important actors in direct contact with water users. Not-
withstanding this, the NCWSP policy guidelines are ambiguous on how 
vendors are to be recruited and trained. Training of vendors is an im-
portant precondition for vendors to be familiar with their role, responsi-
bilities and the expectations accompanying their position.  
Management of standpipes under the NCWSP demands some 
knowledge and understanding of how to calculate daily revenue based on 
the quantity of water sold. Each public standpipe has a meter to monitor 
the quantity of water distributed and revenue expected. However, as read 
in previous chapters, most vendors were illiterate, without formal educa-
tion or training. This constrained their capacity to manage the public 
standpipes, leading to discrepancies between the revenues expected and 
revenues actually declared by the vendors. This produced tension and con-
flicts between revenue collectors and vendors regarding the revenues 
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declared. To make up for the discrepancies, vendors had to forfeit their 
commission or use part of their commission to resolve any shortfalls.  
While discrepancies between expected and declared revenues informed 
vendors’ actions in cases 3, 4, 5 and 6, low demand for water influenced 
vendors’ actions and practices in cases 1 and 2. In these latter two cases, 
they had to adopt strategies to supplement their income. Vendors indulged 
in various practices to make up for the shortfall in revenues. This included 
adjusting bucket sizes, revising the amounts that customers had to pay for 
water and forcing users to pay extra for water spillage. Some adjusted 
opening and closing times of standpipes and even refused to open the 
standpipes for days (section 6.4.1). A number of scholars have argued that 
institutional entrepreneurs’ access to resources such as power, social posi-
tion, information, expert knowledge and existing institutions informs their 
actions (Campbell 2004, Helmsing 2013, Kingdon 2002, Giddens 1984, 
Cleaver 2002). Nonetheless, this study found that vendors, compared to 
other actors who engaged in entrepreneurship, had fewer resources to en-
gage in institutional change. The resource constraints they faced contra-
dicts the proposition from the literature on access to resources as being a 
key determining factor in institutional entrepreneurship. Evidence from 
the current study indicates that the choices and practices that vendors 
adopted to mitigate the technological challenges they faced (mainly the 
water meters) were contingent on (i) the urgency with which water re-
sources were required and (ii) demand for public standpipe water.  
Thus the physical characteristics of water resources, that is, their safety 
and availability, influenced vendor strategies to mitigate the challenges of 
low income and low commission. Scarcity and non-availability of alterna-
tive water sources made water an urgent need in case 3. This provided 
opportunity for vendors in that community to indulge in practices such as 
adjusting bucket sizes and tariffs. This was because no alternative sources 
were available, which took away users’ negotiation powers. Users could 
not demand fairness. They still fetched water, even if they were unhappy 
with the vendor’s actions. Users would be worse off if they refused to pay 
the extra. They would then have to travel 35 minutes to an hour to fetch 
water. That cost outweighed the extra coins and other unfair practices of 
vendors. While the practices adopted by the vendors in case 3 were sus-
tainable, it would be challenging for vendors in cases 1 and 2 to engage in 
the same. Manipulating opening hours was a legitimate and acceptable 
practice among vendors in cases 1 and 2. Users in these communities 
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could either wait for the vendor to open the tap or opt for another alter-
native source.  
However, vendors in case 3 could not be lax with punctuality. Scott 
(2001), too, maintained that actors can only make use of what it is available 
to give their actions legitimacy. The legitimacy aspect of change is that new 
practices should fit into the regulative and normative institutional environ-
ment. Past experiences with difficult water access compounded by diffi-
cult-to-traverse landscape and large distances to alternative water sources 
meant that vendors' punctuality in opening the public tap was an im-
portant issue. It would therefore be unacceptable for vendors in case 3 to 
engage in practices such as manipulating opening times or being lax with 
punctuality. Both vendors and users valued punctuality in that community, 
and vendors adhered strictly to opening times (see figure 6.2). Consistent 
with other scholarship on institutional change and organisational studies, 
practices that actors can employ must be acceptable and legitimate and 
must fit within the local social and institutional context (Campbell 2004). 
In cases 3 and 5, the sensitive nature of water issues made it unacceptable 
for vendors to engage in practices such as manipulating opening hours 
because of the consequences on users. Vendors opted for practices that 
were acceptable and sustainable, such as adjusting bucket sizes and tariffs, 
with few being lax with punctuality (section 6.4.1). In cases 1 and 2, de-
mand for water was already low, so adjusting bucket sizes and making us-
ers pay more were not viable options.  
Practices adopted by vendors confirm Beckert’s (1999: 786, 2003) view 
on institutional entrepreneurs as reflective while at the same time finding 
alternative solutions that are aligned with their interests. Interviews with 
the vendors suggest that they did not just engage in practices but weighed 
the consequences of their actions before embarking on a specific course:  
 
I cannot just close the tap and leave people stranded. They will complain to 
the authorities and my appointment will be terminated. I have signed a con-
tract with the water personnel. They are strict and I cannot take things for 
granted (Vendor, case 3, Wiamoase, 30 July 2015). 
 This is not to imply that vendors were punctual in the rest of the cases. 
There was evidence of vendors' unreliability in cases 3, 4 and 5. This fur-
ther confirms that vendors’ ability to engage in particular practices is in-
fluenced by their underlying social realities and circumstances. In addition, 
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vendors' motivations and the logic behind their actions influence what 
they do. In both scenarios, vendors’ priority is altering institutional ar-
rangements in order to enhance their own economic performance (Beck-
ert 1999, Jensen and Fersch 2016, Weik 2011). In short, they display their 
agency by creating new institutional arrangements that are appropriate and 
aligned with their economic interests (Dorado 2005, Dacin et al. 2002: 47).  
An economic rationale informed vendors’ interpretation of their prob-
lems and potential solutions. As observed above, the actions of vendors 
in cases 1, 2 and 3 were mainly economically motivated. Inadequate infor-
mation, understanding and training on how to read and manage the water 
meters created tension between vendors and revenue collectors, which led 
some vendors to lose their daily commission. Findings from this research 
indicate that vendors’ adjustment of bucket sizes and making users pay 
extra, as well as their adjusting opening and closing times, was done with 
the sole objective of maximising their expected earnings or commission. 
A considerable amount of the institutional entrepreneurship literature 
pays particular attention to the conflicting and contradictory elements in-
herent in the design of institutions. These factors, as argued by Beckert 
(1999, 2003), trigger actors’ agency and open the way for contending in-
terpretations and variations in enforcement. For example, as found in this 
study, the water meters served as a control device with which the local 
water actors could monitor the vendors. Granted that water meters do not 
necessarily lead to losses. However, in this case due to the inability of the 
vendors to read the meters because of their bounded rationally, there was 
a certain inevitability that they would act incorrectly in managing the pub-
lic standpipes. To address this challenge, vendors engaged in the above-
mentioned practices, which differed from the given institutional arrange-
ments.  
At the same time it is important to note that vendors may feign igno-
rance in order to avoid such controls. This is consistent with principal-
agent theory, which postulates agents as taking advantage of the principal's 
weakness to escape responsibilities.  
Notwithstanding the above, the economic explanation given so far fails 
to clarify why other water vendors, for example, in cases 5 and 6, did not 
change the given institutional arrangements. They followed the set rules 
governing management of the public standpipes. Perhaps they recognised 
cheating as an effective strategy for economic gain in the short term, but 
sensed that if users discovered wrongdoings the vendor would lose 
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customers or their job. Hence, in the end it would not pay to cheat. The 
difference between vendors may lie in their different risk assessments, re-
garding their options for managing the challenges encountered.  
Vendors’ responses to the challenges that arose in managing the stand-
pipes in cases 5 and 6 were motivated by moral and cultural reasons. For 
example, most of these vendors refused to adjust the institutional arrange-
ment, expressing a sense of moral obligation and social responsibility. 
These vendors feared jeopardising their relationships with their neigh-
bours and the rest of the community (Campbell 2004, Cleaver 2012, 
Schneider and Teske 1992). March and Olsen (2006) referred to such an 
attitude as informed by the values and identity (the logic of appropriate-
ness) of the actors involved. This is the symbolic part of scripts, cultural 
values and schemes which shapes actors interpretations and understand-
ing of things. For example, scarcity and past struggles for water made it 
unacceptable for some vendors to deny users access to water, even though 
it may have inconvenienced the vendor.  
The communal set-up in cases 5 and 6 was embedded in personal rela-
tionships involving family ties and networks. The vendors likely had some 
relationship with the majority of people who purchased water from them. 
These relationships between vendors and users went beyond the water 
transaction. They reached into extended family relationships. Denying us-
ers access to water would not be perceived as the right way of dealing with 
extended family and maintaining kinship ties. Such values go beyond eco-
nomic benefits. Due to the absence of alternative water sources and the 
difficult topography, vendors needed to be punctual and not deny anyone 
water. Given this situation, most vendors were reluctant to engage in prac-
tices that would go against users’ interests.  
The evidence presented in this chapter is generally consistent with 
other studies demonstrating that economic gains do not always trigger en-
trepreneurship. Social relationships embedded in the moral and cultural 
frames influence actors in key ways. Identities, worldviews and what is 
considered the “right way of doing things” influence the actions that those 
involved ultimately take and the practices that are considered legitimate 
and acceptable (March and Olsen 2006, Olsen 1996). Thus, vendors felt 
morally obligated to ensure that everyone got water, even when the op-
portunity cost of opening the public standpipe outweighed the expected 
benefits of not opening. The “switching cost” involved in changing 
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institutions is high. Hence, engaging in new practices, unlike the estab-
lished institutional arrangements, becomes less attractive.  
7.6 Discussion  
Entrepreneurship is not a heroic characteristic of actors. The study of en-
trepreneurship centres on how individuals or groups of people propel or 
block institutional change. It is interested in understanding how institu-
tional entrepreneurs resist, facilitate and modify institutional arrange-
ments. The key concern of the current study is the processes by which 
entrepreneurship takes shape. What factors motivate or trigger actors’ en-
trepreneurship and innovation? We are also interested in how actors’ ac-
cess to resources constrains or enables the strategies or practices they 
choose to navigate the challenges of institutional and technological change 
that they face.  
The discussion in this chapter discerns two main groups of actors dis-
playing some form of entrepreneurship. The first category is the traditional 
actors, comparable to Sheingate's (2003) political entrepreneurs. This type 
of entrepreneurs consists of resourceful and opportunistic leaders. In the 
cases studied, their skilful manipulation of events had transformative ef-
fects on policies. The second category of entrepreneurs is state and local 
water actors, comparable to Kingdon's (2002) and Mintrom and Norman's 
(2009) policy entrepreneurs and Schneider’s (1992) public entrepreneurs. 
This category of actors is willing to invest their resources – knowledge, 
skills and finances – to change an established way of doing things for a 
future return, while also engaging others towards solving problems 
(Schneider and Teske 1992: 741). 
These actors display the features and activities of entrepreneurship. 
With our examination, we delved into how structural factors influenced 
the kinds of strategies they utilised to resolve institutional challenges or 
promote their interests. Nevertheless, these actors’ activities do not fall 
strictly into the political or policy entrepreneurship categorisation, nor can 
they be classified as one particular type of actor. Unlike other studies, the 
current research found that the characteristics displayed by each actor 
were often blurred. This brings to light a foremost criticism of scholarship 
on entrepreneurship; that is, the fact that a proliferation of terms are in 
use to describe the same actors engaged in institutional change (Weik 
2011: 466). 
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Despite the differences observed, a common thread across the differ-
ent types of entrepreneurship is the use of resources to promote innova-
tion or to resolve a problem hoping for a future return (Galanti 2018). 
Similarly, this study found that actors – both the chiefs and state and local 
water actors – had an interest in particular institutional arrangements and 
sufficient resources to resist, facilitate or transform existing ones (Maguire 
et al. 2004, DiMaggio 1988).  
For example, chiefs were not key policymakers or implementers, yet 
they played an active part in enforcing implementation of the 5% levy. The 
social position of the chiefs enabled them to change the direction of policy 
implementation. Chiefs are social leaders. This allowed them to use their 
position to manipulate implementation of the NCWSP, such as by sup-
porting payment of the 5% levy or frustrating the composition and activ-
ities of the water and sanitation management teams. The chiefs use of their 
social position to promote and enforce implementation of the 5% can be 
seen as positive in this instance. However, their use of the same institu-
tions to impede the working of the water and sanitation management 
teams could be construed otherwise.  
The current study found inconsistency in policy guidelines with regard 
to acknowledgement of the chiefs’ role as an important development 
agent. This is part of what triggered their entrepreneurship. That is, the 
agential characteristics of the chiefs were activated not because they were 
skilful in manipulating events, but rather because of the relevance of their 
past and existing position as an important development agent. This posi-
tion gave them a pathway to influence the process of water reform imple-
mentation. Similar to Mantzavinos and colleagues (2004), the current 
study argues that informal institutions that supported collective action en-
abled some chiefs to activate their agency. For example, the NCWSP by 
laws excluded chiefs as members of the water and sanitation management 
teams; this contradicted and challenged the chiefs’ authority and leader-
ship. This prompted or created conditions for their entrepreneurship to 
emerge. Chiefs who felt threatened moved to oppose persons whose ac-
tivities did not resonate with their own (the chiefs’) interests. The behav-
iour of these chiefs points us to the anthropological literature which de-
bates the inclusion of chiefs in development programmes and institutional 
reforms. The question is whether such involvement is merited in order to 
guarantee the success of a programme (Elwert and Bierschenk 1988: 102, 
Fuest 2006: 40).  
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Consistent with the process of bricolage, the chiefs justified their ac-
tions based on different attributes, such as power, identity and kinship, 
which came with their social position. They fell back on existing customs 
and cultural practices, invoking the legitimacy bestowed on them through 
tradition (Giddens 1984; Arce and Long 2000; Cleaver 2001, 2012, 2002; 
Hodgson 2003). Their position made institutional changes possible, as 
their role as main enforcers of community rules enabled them to promote 
or resist implementation of specific institutional arrangements in which 
they had an interest.  
Whereas some chiefs took advantage of their position to support or 
resist institutional change, there are shreds of evidence suggesting that the 
social position of the chiefs may also have constrained their ability to en-
gage in entrepreneurship. In other words, the social position of chiefs did 
not always enable entrepreneurship. For instance, the absence of central-
ised structures for local decision-making in cases 5 and 6 enabled the water 
and sanitation management team to be easily embedded in local structures. 
This prevented the chiefs from interrupting in the management teams’ ac-
tivities, unlike what was observed in cases 2, 3 and 4. In these latter cases, 
the chiefs did influence the activities of the water and sanitation manage-
ment teams. In other words, in cases 5 and 6 the chiefs’ social position 
prevented them from reinforcing their power and controlling decision-
making processes.  
A possible explanation for the low agency of the chiefs in cases 5 and 
6 is the traditional governance structure in the northern part of Ghana. In 
these cases traditional authority was more decentralised than in the rest of 
the cases. More decentralised decision-making meant that the chiefs in 
cases 5 and 6 had less power than in the cases where decision-making was 
vertical and stratified according to power, social status and economic 
rank.2 These latter chiefs had more power and control over their citizens, 
which explains their greater influence and entrepreneurship in cases 1, 2, 
3 and 4, compared to cases 5 and 6. 
We could also ask in what way the local context constrained the chiefs’ 
ability to interfere with the activities and membership of the water and 
sanitation management teams. Evidence found in the current work sug-
gests that in case 5, most members of the water and sanitation manage-
ment team occupied other positions as well, and had access to more in-
formation and knowledge about the NCWSP. In addition, some team 
members were more educated than the chiefs, which allowed them to 
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understand their role and responsibilities. This put the water and sanita-
tion management teams in an advantageous position, which they used to 
resist interference from the public, especially the chiefs. It is important to 
note that the chiefs were disadvantaged by their lack of access to infor-
mation and knowledge about the operations of the water and sanitation 
management teams. This made it difficult for them to penetrate the man-
agement team memberships and control decisions about the water system.  
Evidence from case 5 contradicts studies arguing that the social posi-
tion of the chiefs enables them to exert their agency. As shown, the chiefs’ 
ability to use their social position required that other conditions also be in 
place, such as knowledge and social skills. These other conditions may be 
equally important to enable change. We also learned that the practices 
adopted by the chiefs must be normatively acceptable and aligned with the 
cognitive frames of both the chiefs and the rest of the interested players. 
Although the chiefs in case 5 were unhappy about the activities of the 
water and sanitation management team, they could not make changes to 
its membership, though this was done in cases 2, 3 and 4.  
Evidence from case 6 shows that forging mutual relations and collab-
oration between the chiefs and the water and sanitation management team 
provided an avenue for traditional actors to make themselves relevant in 
the day-to-day management of the water system. As a result, no power 
struggle arose between the chiefs and the water and sanitation manage-
ment team in case 6, unlike in case 5.  
Furthermore, in case 6 the water supply system was in crisis. Half of 
the pumps were not working. This demanded a unified response, leading 
to the collaboration and cooperation between the chiefs and the water and 
sanitation management team. Case 5 did not “benefit” from the same chal-
lenges with regard to water flows. The chiefs and water and sanitation 
management team appeared unified in case 6, as they needed the support 
of state actors to help them find solutions to the frequent water shortages 
due to the rationing of water. The activities of the chiefs in all of the cases 
demonstrates that social position is a necessary precondition to enable 
agency, but varying motivations, logics and interests directed the actions 
that the chiefs ultimately took.  
While the chiefs engaged in entrepreneurship to institutionalise com-
munity participation in water activities, state and local water actors partic-
ipated in entrepreneurship to resolve challenges in the management of the 
water supply system. Inconsistency between the needed institutional 
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capacity and the actual capacity of local water actors stimulated such en-
trepreneurship. The size of the water system made it challenging for local 
water actors to manage their water system using community-based ap-
proaches. Hence, the need arose for local water actors to change the given 
institutional arrangements to better suit local needs and conditions. Local 
water actors’ exposure to ASTWO brought new skills and training, assist-
ing them in managing the challenges they were facing on a daily basis.  
State actors altered community-based approaches for the management 
of the water systems, instituting private-based management to ensure ef-
ficient operations. This was possibly a result of NORST’s ability to build 
a coalition with other actors -- particularly CWSA and the DAs – in sup-
port of its new ideas. Furthermore, in cases 5 and 6, NORST exploited the 
opportunity offered by inefficiencies in local water actors’ management of 
their water system to negotiate changes. The actions of water actors in 
cases 3 and 4, on one hand, and in cases 5 and 6, on the other hand, cor-
roborate Fligstein’s (2001) notion that in times of crisis, the social skills of 
institutional entrepreneurs play an important role in amassing collabora-
tion and support for new institutional arrangements. Disruptive events 
such as technological challenges and regulatory changes lead to tension, 
which then provides the stimuli for entrepreneurs to emerge and engage 
in change.  
The evidence collaborates key characteristics of institutional entrepre-
neurs as change agents. As change agents, these actors facilitated, resisted 
and modified institutional arrangements in ways that were appropriate and 
aligned with their interests (Dacin et al. 2002: 47) and they acted strategi-
cally to bring change (Jensen and Fersch 2016, Weik 2011). They did this 
by reconfiguring “an organisation’s roles, responsibilities, structures and 
institutional arrangements or other resources” (Buchanan and Badham 
1999: 610). As change agents, they mobilised the necessary resources to 
be able to effect the changes they sought (Jensen and Fersch 2016). They 
did so through the acquisition of power (Klein et al. 2010), as well as by 
motivating others to join them through what Fligstein (2001) described as 
social skills.  
Most of the institutional entrepreneurship literature maintains that in-
stitutional entrepreneurs’ social and political position, social skills, social 
network, finances and expert knowledge enable entrepreneurship. How-
ever, this study found that physical characteristics related to the availability 
of water resources determined the choices that institutional entrepreneurs 
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ultimately made. In all of the cases, the difficulty of accessing water and 
the availability or scarcity of alternative sources guided actors’ agency.  
 In case 3, local water actors made use of their network (ASTWO) to 
introduce new institutional arrangements. This is consistent with Camp-
bell’s (2004) assertion that entrepreneurs’ location and the extent to which 
they are exposed to new ideas determines whether drastic change can oc-
cur. Actors without access to such a network would be less likely to be 
privy to new ideas. Nonetheless, local water actors in case 4 were unable 
to apply the new knowledge and skills they acquired from the network to 
make transformative changes in the way they managed the water system, 
unlike in case 3. The availability of alternative water sources in some parts 
of the community meant that the efficient management of the water sys-
tem was not as urgent an issue. Water personnel were therefore less moti-
vated to find innovative ways of doing things. According to DiMaggio 
(1988: 15), changing institutions is expensive and requires the mobilisation 
of resources, interests and cooperation across a range of actors. This ob-
servation counters Campbell's (2004) argument that access to a network 
and new ideas triggers radical or evolutionary institutional change. The 
capacity of local water actors was generally a problem throughout the 
cases. However, in cases 3, 5 and 6, where alternative water sources were 
limited, more water actors were engaged in entrepreneurship, compared 
to the cases with more abundant alternative sources. 
Likewise, the physical characteristics of water resources influenced the 
strategies vendors’ employed to resolve the challenges they faced in man-
aging public standpipes. Fligstein (2001) argued that actors without re-
sources use institutions in unintended ways to create new institutions. Ex-
amination of the role of vendors suggests that the distribution of 
alternative water sources influenced the vendors’ agency, leading them to 
modify institutional arrangements, deviating from the given institutional 
arrangements.  
Nevertheless, the development of strategies and practices by which to 
engage in institutional entrepreneurship hinges on institutional entrepre-
neurs’ motivations and interests. The findings in this study support the 
growing body of literature that views the motivations and logic of institu-
tional entrepreneurs as a necessary condition to enable them to display 
agency and engage in entrepreneurship. Similarly, this chapter found that 
political and economic motives propelled actors to resist institutional ar-
rangements (e.g., the given procedures for formation of the water and 
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sanitation management teams), to facilitate institutional arrangements 
(e.g., community payment of the 5% levy) and to modify institutional ar-
rangements (e.g., water system management approach and rules on the 
public standpipes). The findings further support the idea that economic 
and political factors trigger the emergence of institutional entrepreneur-
ship (March and Olsen 2006, Campbell 2004, Schneider and Teske 1992).  
From an economic perspective (logic of instrumentality), actors were 
motivated to change the institutional arrangements or to engage in entre-
preneurship based on expected economic benefits. These benefits in-
cluded but were not limited to the following: reducing operational costs, 
finding solutions to technological challenges, dealing with accountability-
related issues and responding to institutional and technical capacity-related 
challenges. 
Finally, the current study found that actors’ motivations were embed-
ded in their ideologies, worldviews, norms, identities and cultural values, 
which therefore should also be considered key elements informing insti-
tutional entrepreneurs’ actions and practices (Campbell 2004, Cleaver 
2012, Long 2003, Leftwich 2010). These embedded institutions (or com-
munity-led institutions) may be taken for granted by policy actors, but 
have an influence on how actors interpret, understand and give meaning 
to events (March and Olsen 2006, Campbell 2004). They therefore play a 
part in directing the nature of the institutional change that is likely to ulti-
mately emerge.  
In sum, the current study supports the idea that economic benefits are 
not the only factor that activates institutional entrepreneurship. The social 
and cultural structures embedded in the local environment also play a key 
role in informing actors’ decisions, practices and degree of entrepreneur-
ship.  
7.7 Conclusion  
In NCWSP implementation, differences in local institutional contexts and 
in the demands of implementing actors determined whether actors dis-
played agency in engaging in bricolage or institutional entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, this study found that environmental constraints were nec-
essary but not sufficient to trigger actors’ entrepreneurship. The availabil-
ity of and control over resources enabled entrepreneurship as well, but 
were also not sufficient to trigger big change. The physical characteristics 
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of the communities and nature of water resources available played an im-
portant role in influencing actors’ agency and the extent to which they 
ultimately engaged in entrepreneurship. Urgent need for water triggered 
entrepreneurship and greater acceptance of change within the case study 
communities. In contexts where water was not an urgent need, the insti-
tutional reforms met more resistance. The extent to which actors could 
initiate or enforce changes was informed by economic, political and social 
interests, and the worldviews and ideologies of potential institutional en-
trepreneurs were also instrumental. Nevertheless, the extent to which ac-
tors could engage in change was dependent on their command over re-
sources, such as technical capacity, social skills, social position, knowledge 
and programme information, networks and existing institutions. These re-
sources played a key role in determining the kinds of change and practices 
entrepreneurs employed and the degree of change that was ultimately 
deemed permissible. These factors nevertheless were not the only deter-
minants of agency. Actors without these resources also engaged in entre-
preneurship. The availability of alternative water sources and the age and 
capacity of the water system, for example, were also factors determining 
whether institutional arrangements could be changed to serve actors’ per-
sonal interests. In some cases, actors decided not to engage in change, for 
example, out of respect for the collective good or to maintain social rela-
tionships.  
Notes 
1 Case 1a did not have a functioning chieftaincy lineage. The chief of the commu-
nity served as the overseer of the community, holding it in trust for the chief of 
Abakrampa, an adjoining town. 
2 Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 were located in the southern part of Ghana (i.e., they were 
Akans). 
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8 
Conclusion: Understanding Processes 
of Institutional Change  
 
8.1 Introduction  
A global shift in water governance over the last two decades has led to 
institutional reforms in most developing countries, including Ghana. 
These institutional changes have moved decision-making processes away 
from the national level, putting them into the domain of a broader range 
of stakeholders at the local level. However, interactions across this range 
of actors have often led to divergence between policies as designed and 
actual practices. Well-intended reforms and strategies have failed to pro-
duce the desired results, and impacts of policies have been disappointing 
as a result of differences in the way actors interpret and implement insti-
tutional reforms. Why do actors implement institutional reforms differ-
ently despite their similar institutional context? This question is a major 
area of concern in policy and institutional change scholarship. It is also the 
focus of this thesis.  
Several scholars have argued that the existing local social and institu-
tional context constrains actors’ ability to interpret and implement institu-
tional changes, leading them to resist institutional change (Thelen 1999, 
Pierson 2000). Path dependence and diffusion are concepts used by insti-
tutionalists to explain why change tends to be incremental. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of institutions seldom specifies the processes by which actors 
arrive at their preferences and make their choices (Campbell 2004, North 
1990, Campbell and Lindberg 1990). The current research has expanded 
on this area of study by exploring how actors changed institutions for gov-
erning small town water supply systems in actual practice in Ghana.  
This research applied two related concepts (translation and bricolage) 
and one actor-based concept (institutional entrepreneurship) to trace how 
actors implemented the NCWSP. The research framework acknowledges 
both the constraining and enabling aspects of institutions. This framework 
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enabled us to examine how existing institutions provided the repertoire of 
actors’ agency. In addition, I looked at the motivational factors and logic 
that informed actors’ choices and practices, and how their control and ac-
cess to resources informed the kinds of practices that were deemed cog-
nitively and normatively acceptable and appropriate.  
The main objective of this research was to explore differences in the 
actual implementation of the NCWSP across beneficiary communities. I 
sought to appreciate the role of actors who as institutional entrepreneurs 
enforced, renegotiated and changed institutions for governing small town 
water supply systems, often departing from policy guidelines and given 
arrangements. By understanding actor agency, we learned what motivated 
actors, and how they defined their interests. Through this process, we ad-
vanced our understanding of processes of institutional change. The spe-
cific objectives of the current research are reiterated below:  
▪ to examine contextual factors that constrain or enable institutional 
change 
▪ to explain how these changes occur in actual practice and what 
resources are employed to frustrate or promote institutional 
change  
▪ to analyse the motivating factors and logic behind actors’ abilities 
to emerge as institutional entrepreneurs and change institutional 
arrangements 
▪ to explore ways in which the concepts of bricolage, translation and 
institutional entrepreneurship might contribute to understanding 
processes of institutional change 
I selected six cases from three regions of Ghana: the Central, Ashanti 
and Northern regions. My aim was to understand the diversity of local 
responses and uncover implementation dynamics. A number of factors 
informed case selection: population size; physical characteristics and avail-
ability of water sources; distribution of water points; size of the water sup-
ply system; total amount of water supplied; and age of the water system.  
This chapter presents my conclusions from the study as a whole. I pay 
particular attention to the findings and discussions from chapters 5, 6 and 
7, to contribute to the field of institutional analysis. The research shows 
that the local social and institutional context constrained actors’ under-
standing, interpretation and implementation of institutional changes in the 
water sector. The constraining factors, however, provided the means for 
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institutional entrepreneurs/translators/bricoleurs to find solutions to 
pressures for institutional and technological change under the NCWSP. 
Findings from this study reveal that the institutional and technical capacity 
of implementers, the physical characteristics and nature of the water re-
sources available, knowledge and access to information on the water re-
forms, and the support and commitment of implementing actors deter-
mined the extent to which actors resisted or supported NCWSP 
implementation. Here I draw together and advance key arguments pre-
sented in this thesis on understanding processes by which institutions for 
governing water systems change. In so doing, I reflect on the cases and 
specific concepts, and discuss new empirical insights supporting or chal-
lenging concepts used in analysing the cases. I further reflect on the em-
pirical findings in relation to the research framework and the contribution 
of the empirical findings to theory development on processes of institu-
tional change. In short, I revisit the question of why institutional change 
often turns out to be gradual and incremental, as opposed to radical and 
abrupt. With these findings, I seek to contribute to understanding of why 
rural water sectors have not achieved much in relation to (i) user partici-
pation in system management, (ii) improved quality of water services and 
(iii) efficient management and maintenance of water systems. Finally, I 
look at the strengths and weakness of this research and implications for 
further study on the sustainable governance of rural water supply systems.  
8.2 Summary of research findings  
8.2.1 The role of local social and institutional contexts as drivers 
of institutional change  
The first research question was “what contextual differences explain vari-
ations in the implementation of the NCWSP”. In other words, can we 
explain the differences in implementation of the water reforms as being 
triggered by context-related factors? This study found that four related 
factors constrained actors’ ability to translate and implement the NCWSP: 
institutional and technical capacity, knowledge and access to information 
on the water reforms, the nature and characteristics of the available water 
resources; and support and acceptance of the water project. Actors mod-
ified policy ideas to “fit their unique needs in relation to the context in 
which they found themselves” (Whittle et al. 2010: 20). This finding is 
consistent with other studies that also show that an actor’s ability to 
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translate policies depends on the social and local institutional context 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, Campbell 2004).  
Notwithstanding the constraints imposed by the local context, the cur-
rent study found that actors’ local social and institutional context is a nec-
essary element but not sufficient to trigger institutional change. One of 
the more significant findings emerging from this study is that the physical 
conditions and characteristics of the water resources available, and the ex-
tent to which water was an urgent need, triggered the actions and practices 
that actors ultimately employed.  
Even though most users did not have access to information and were 
not knowledgeable about the NCWSP, evidence from this study indicates 
that actors’ acceptance of the idea of the 5% levy depended on the urgency 
of their need for water (chapter 5).  
Similarly, this study found that water being an urgent need triggered 
different practices among local water actors than those found where water 
was not an urgent issue (chapter 6). For example, state actors modified the 
institutional arrangements for private-based management in cases 5 and 6 
in order to ensure the functionality of the water systems. Similarly, local 
water actors in case 3 modified institutional arrangements in order to re-
solve challenges that they encountered in managing their water system un-
der community-based management.  
Likewise, vendors’ ability to change standpipe opening times, in cases 
1 and 2, and to establish rules serving their own private interests instead 
of collective interests, in case 3, depended on the demand for water from 
the public standpipes and the availability of alternative water sources 
(chapter 6). However, an urgent need for water did not always lead to ven-
dors’ agency, as evidenced in cases 5 and 6 (chapter 6). Here, social rela-
tionships and kinship ties constrained actors’ capacity to engage in prac-
tices that deviated from the given policies. Corroborating Campbell's 
(2004) results, this study found that internally built obstacles and the ex-
isting local social and institutional context cause actors to hesitate to en-
gage in practices that contravene established institutional arrangements.  
The framework adopted for this study emerged as very useful for ex-
plaining the evolutionary or gradual nature of institutional change, as it 
shed light on how actors operationalised policy ideas in different practices. 
Actors resisted change when it conflicted with the existing local social and 
institutional context or status quo. The application of the concept of 
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translation in this study provided a deeper understanding of how the local 
social and institutional context (like the urgency with which a new water 
system was needed) influenced actors’ choices and the practices they em-
ployed. For example, while the urgent need for water stimulated actors to 
enforce new institutional arrangements and practices, in communities 
without such urgency, actors resisted institutional change. The concepts 
of institutional bricolage and institutional entrepreneurship shed addi-
tional light on how actors activated their agency and arrived at the prac-
tices they employed. This brings us to the second research question. 
8.2.2 Towards gradual institutional change:  
The role of institutions  
The second research question was “what practices do implementing actors 
engage in to find solutions to pressure for institutional and technological 
change”. This study found that an actor’s capacity to resist and modify 
institutional arrangements under the NCWSP was dependent on past 
events and existing institutions.  
As read in chapter 5, the kinds of practices used by chiefs to enforce 
the 5% levy differed in all of the cases. In some circumstances, as in our 
sample cases 1b and 2, the chiefs applied community-embedded institu-
tions. In others, as in case 4, chiefs relied on state organisations such as 
the courts and the police to support their efforts to enforce the 5% con-
tribution. In yet other circumstances, as in case 1a, chiefs encouraged users 
to resist payment.  
This study also found that the chiefs’ capacity to change membership 
of the water and sanitation management teams was embedded in commu-
nity-led institutions. The chiefs’ capacity to influence membership of the 
water and sanitation management teams was informed by the past, as all 
water activities were previously under the chiefs’ purview (chapter 4). 
Community-led institutions provided the means by which some chiefs 
were able to exercise their authority to reconstitute the water and sanita-
tion management teams. The actions of these chiefs to form new water 
and sanitation management teams would henceforth be legitimate. In 
cases 1b, 2 and 3, the chiefs were motivated by a desire to reinforce their 
own leadership role and to ensure that citizens complied with community 
rules. Yet, we also found instances where the chiefs influenced institu-
tional arrangements because they wanted to promote positive social 
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change, for example, ensuring that water actors were accountable to the 
citizenry. This was found particularly in case 4.  
The current findings provide additional evidence of the role of history 
and existing institutions in influencing the configuration of actors’ inter-
ests and the bargaining power they could bring to bear to resist, modify 
and support implementation of the NCWSP (Campbell 1997, 2004).  
 
The role of community-embedded institutions in processes of institutional change  
The finding that traditional actors drew on community-embedded institu-
tions to resist the given processes for governing the water and sanitation 
management teams and to justify their support for the 5% levy add to the 
growing literature on bricolage.  
This finding recalls Cleaver's (2012, 2002) description of bricolage as 
an “articulation and assertion of identities and cultural values” to resist 
imposed national policies. The capacity of the chiefs to frustrate pro-
gramme implementation and promote institutional change was rooted in 
the customs and practices of the traditional governance system, which al-
lowed chiefs to enforce and change community rules (Cleaver 2012, 2001, 
2002; Cleaver and De Koning 2015). It also confirms bricolage as a key 
process in response to everyday challenges, in which the practices initiated 
by bricoleurs are often dynamic and characterised by unevenness and tem-
poral intermittence. As Cleaver (2002, 2012) observed, the institutional 
arrangements invented were borrowed from existing institutions but also 
had to conform to routines or habitual ways of doing things. 
Similarly actors’ capacity to invoke community-embedded institutions 
provides additional evidence of Campbell’s (1997, 2004) idea of symbolic 
bricolage. This study similarly found that the strategies adopted by some 
chiefs to promote the 5% levy and to resist the initial composition of the 
water and sanitation management teams, in cases 1, 2, 3 and 4, were con-
sistent with existing institutional practices. After all, chiefs controlled the 
social, religious, administrative and judiciary functions of their community. 
In addition, they were in charge of grassroots governance and represented 
every member of the community; no one could question the traditions 
that were the chiefs’ source of power (Bamfo 2000). This power was a 
resource that legitimised their activities, such as enforcement of rules and 
resolution of disputes (Agyenim 2011).  
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Similarly, in cases 5 and 6, vendors refused to modify the given institu-
tional arrangements, despite the challenges they encountered in managing 
the public standpipes. In this, their actions were consistent with their 
worldview, which emphasised the importance of maintaining good rela-
tionships with everyone. Preventing people from accessing water was in-
consistent with the value of community cohesion. In both instances, ac-
tors engaged in practices that they deemed acceptable and legitimate. 
The findings from the current study clearly support the relevance of 
the local social and institutional context in enabling actors to display 
agency in resisting or supporting the implementation of externally given 
policies. Even though the chiefs were not part of the given implementa-
tion process, they used their social and political position to change the 
direction of national policies (Schneider and Teske 1992: 741). This study’s 
empirical findings thus confirm the proposition found in much of the wa-
ter literature that neglect of community-embedded institutions and endog-
enously negotiated processes is a foremost reason for the challenges facing 
ongoing interventions in the water sector (Molle 2005, Rusca et al. 2015). 
 
Modifying institutional arrangements: The role of state-led institutions  
As demonstrated in this study, the capacity of state and local water actors 
to modify institutional arrangements provides additional evidence of 
Campbell's (2004, 1997) notion of substantive bricolage. As read in chap-
ter 6, to ensure the efficient management of the water systems, local water 
actors supported community management (in cases 3 and 4) and state ac-
tors supported private management (in cases 5 and 6).  
In both scenarios, we observed that water actors’ capacity to modify 
institutional arrangements involved recombination of existing institutional 
principles and practices to address the challenges they faced in water sys-
tem management. Similarly, in cases 1, 2 and 3, vendors’ capacity to mod-
ify the institutional arrangements given for managing the public standpipes 
was linked to the challenges they faced in management of the standpipes.  
The practices of water actors are consist with Campbell’s (2004) de-
scription of substantive bricolage and come close to Cleaver’s (2012) con-
cept of “alteration”. Nonetheless, I do not perceive water actors’ practices 
as bricolage. Indeed, we can only infer an activity to be bricolage when 
community-embedded institutions are invoked and practices employed 
that are locally culturally acceptable and legitimate. For example, the use 
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of funeral rites was not possible in some communities. In case 4, inhabit-
ants would have resisted such a strategy, unlike those in cases 1b and 2, 
where it was easily accepted and successfully applied. Similarly, chiefs in 
case 5, for example, could not dissolve the water and sanitation manage-
ment team, because social relationships here frowned upon interference 
by chiefs in the governance of water resources.  
At the same time, both community-based management and private-
based management were deemed acceptable ways to manage water sys-
tems under the NCWSP. Nonetheless, this study found that actors modi-
fied these existing institutional arrangements to better fit local circum-
stances. The activities of local water actors were in part a response to 
implementation challenges, which required them to employ innovative 
strategies to surmount the hurdles they faced. 
The empirical findings from this study further lend credence to a con-
cern raised in the policy implementation literature; that is, that implemen-
tation challenges typically arise at the micro level (Matland 1995, Booth 
2009, Andrews 2013). These challenges stimulate street-level bureaucrats 
to engage in a variety of practices and strategies to circumvent the obsta-
cles they encounter in the course of implementation (Maynard-Moody et 
al. 1990). However, while acknowledging that policy implementation re-
quires policy adaptation, we must also recognise that street-level bureau-
crats sometimes take advantage of challenges to cater to their own inter-
ests, which explains why institutional reforms may be unable to achieve 
their intended objectives (Lindblom 1959). 
The concept of bricolage enables us to better understand actor agency. 
Nevertheless, the motivations and logics informing actors’ choices are less 
visible in the concept of bricolage compared to institutional entrepreneur-
ship. Application of the notion of institutional entrepreneurship requires 
us to pursue an explicit account of the motivations and resources that al-
low entrepreneurs to innovate or engage in bricolage. As shown in the 
framework for this research, the conceptualisation of actors as institu-
tional entrepreneurs sheds more light on actors’ motivations and resources 
to engage in institutional change. In short, institutional entrepreneurship 
provides greater clarity on the characteristics of actors and the resources 
they hold that allow them to engage in bricolage or entrepreneurship.  
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 8.2.3 The role of institutional entrepreneurs in understanding 
processes of institutional change  
The third research question focuses on the change agents. It asks, “in what 
ways do institutional entrepreneurs engage in institutional change, and 
what are their motivations for changing institutional arrangements under 
the NCWSP”. This study found three types of actors involved in institu-
tional entrepreneurship. Their characteristics resemble those of political 
and policy entrepreneurs. However, this study defines institutional entre-
preneurs as actors involved in the process of institutional change.  
 
Role of the social and political positions of actors in enabling institutional  
entrepreneurship  
This study found that actors’ capacity to emerge as institutional entrepre-
neurs and engage in institutional entrepreneurship or bricolage was reliant 
on their access to resources. The ability of chiefs to emerge as an institu-
tional entrepreneur or bricoleur hinged on the position the chiefs occupied 
as social and political leaders of their community. That position of social 
and political leadership made it acceptable and legitimate, for example, for 
chiefs to invoke community-led institutions to enforce the 5% levy and 
resist the rules governing composition of the water and sanitation man-
agement teams. The findings, therefore, suggest that the chiefs’ control 
over creation and enforcement of community-led institutions allowed 
them to invoke these institutions to influence institutional reforms in wa-
ter governance.  
However, this study also demonstrated that the social position of the 
chiefs did not always enable them to influence decision-making processes. 
In case 4, for example, the chiefs had to rely on state institutions to enforce 
the 5% levy. In case 5, the chiefs were unable to influence the composition 
of the water and sanitation management team because the members of the 
team knew more about the team members’ role and responsibilities. This 
undermined the chiefs’ efforts to use their leadership position to influence 
the management team. This finding enhances our understanding of the 
relationship between actors’ access to information and their ability to en-
force rules, monitor behaviour and limit elite appropriation of institutional 
reforms (Platteau and Abraham 2002: 1). The activities of the chiefs in 
case 2 provide further evidence of this. In both cases 2 and 4, challenges 
that arose in the early stages of the project allowed chiefs access to infor-
mation and knowledge about the NCWSP, which enabled these chiefs to 
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exercise entrepreneurship in changing the composition of the water and 
sanitation management teams.  
Nonetheless, we must interpret these findings with caution. In cases 1, 
2, 3 and 4, the chiefs’ ability to influence the water and sanitation manage-
ment teams stemmed largely from the governance structures in place in 
the beneficiary communities, which were vertical and stratified according 
to power, social status and economic rank (Elwert and Bierschenk 1988: 
102). Because of unequal power relations, chiefs had control over devel-
opment initiatives, with less resistance from the citizenry. In contrast, in 
cases 5 and 6, the governance structure was decentralised and grounded 
on family ties and interpersonal relationships. In case 5, the inability of the 
chiefs to interfere with the composition of the water and sanitation man-
agement teams stemmed from existing interpersonal relationships built on 
trust and peaceful coexistence. These existing norms constrained chiefs’ 
interference in the activities of the water and sanitation management 
teams.  
Herein, we find additional evidence of the role of existing institutions 
in providing the social scripts that actors follow when defining problems 
and interests and responding to pressures for institutional change (March 
and Olsen 1983; Jepperson 1991: 46; Campbell 1997, 2004). 
 
Roles of networks and expert knowledge in enabling institutional entrepreneurship  
This study provides additional evidence of institutional entrepreneurs 
drawing on networks and expert knowledge to engage in institutional en-
trepreneurship. In cases 5 and 6, NORST’s capacity to mobilise support 
from other stakeholders to introduce private management was enhanced 
by the organisation’s position as the main financier of the water project. 
Moreover, NORST had expert knowledge on the implementation of the 
water project. This provided it the credibility it needed to push for changes 
in existing institutional arrangements.  
Similarly, in case 3, local water actors’ capacity to modify institutional 
arrangements was facilitated by support provided by external water actors, 
such as the network organisation ASTWO, which offered the needed tech-
nical and institutional backstopping. Moreover, the existing institutional 
arrangements under community-based management were modified to en-
able local water actors to manage the challenges they faced when operating 
the water system under the community-based approach. ASTWO’s pres-
ence provided a means for water actors to engage in entrepreneurship.  
190 CHAPTER 8 
 
This study’s findings, however, challenge the idea that it is merely ac-
tors’ access to resources that enables institutional entrepreneurship. Even 
though local water actors in case 4 had access to ASTWO’s expert 
knowledge and training, existing institutional arrangements nevertheless 
remained unchanged. Access to resources is necessary to trigger institu-
tional entrepreneurship but it is not sufficient to stimulate actors to engage 
in entrepreneurship. The extent to which local water actors engage in in-
stitutional change and the choices and practices they adopt in the process 
must be consistent with their motivations and existing organisational 
norms and cultural values.  
8.2.4 Motivations and logic of entrepreneurs:  
Towards a gradual institutional change  
The final research question asks, “how can we account for the motivating 
factors and logic behind institutional entrepreneurs’ practices and ac-
tions”. In short, the current research provides additional evidence of the 
enabling and constraining characteristics of institutions (e.g., DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991, Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997, Hirsch 1997, Stinchcombe 
1996, Campbell 1998).  
The enabling aspects of institutions help explain how actors resolve the 
everyday challenges arising from technological and institutional change. 
This study found that omission of the chiefs as a key actor in NCWSP 
implementation did not prevent them from interfering in decision-making 
processes. Political motivations determined the extent that the chiefs pro-
moted implementation of the 5% levy and sought to influence who be-
came a member of the water and sanitation management teams. The 
chiefs’ role as a social and political leader motivated them to participate in 
implementation of the new policy. By engaging in the institutional reform 
process, the chiefs reinforced their power and control over the citizenry. 
They did this by using their social position to promote collective action, 
as is consistent with their traditional role and responsibilities. This finding 
adds to the growing literature confirming the need for decision makers to 
pay attention to issues of local power and politics in the design of institu-
tional reforms (Booth 2009, Cleaver et al. 2014). 
This study also provides additional evidence on the role of economic 
concerns in motivating actors to engage in entrepreneurship. Though the 
actions of the chiefs were found to be motivated by political 
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considerations, some chiefs did resort to their political position not to pro-
mote the collective good of the community but to serve their own eco-
nomic and personal interests. Although this can be debated, in cases 2, 3 
and 4 allegations and evidence were found suggesting that chiefs used their 
position to dissolve water and sanitation management teams in order to 
install their own representatives. Having their own delegates on the water 
and sanitation management teams would enable these chiefs to control 
water system management.  
Economic considerations motivated most vendors’ practices. Some 
cheated users or manipulated opening times in order to improve daily 
commissions and income. Similarly, local water actors’ (in cases 3 and 4) 
decided to maintain community management in order to safeguard water 
revenues and also to assure that the community would remain in control 
over its water system. Likewise, state actors' interference in water system 
management was motivated by economic considerations, geared towards 
protecting the investment made in the water facility and improving the 
quality of water services. The logic behind the actions of both actors was 
to reduce production costs by mimicking successful institutional arrange-
ments in neighbouring communities. 
Findings of this study further confirm the conclusion of Gómez (2008) 
that actors’ moral values, worldviews and identities drive institutional 
change. In cases 5 and 6, vendors' propensity to cheat (or not) and to ma-
nipulate opening and closing times was informed by the need to maintain 
good social relationships and kinship ties. Similarly, chiefs’ inability to in-
terfere in the composition of water and sanitation management teams, as 
in case 5, was informed by social values and norms that made it unaccepta-
ble for traditional actors to interfere in the activities of individuals in lead-
ership positions. These are examples of the kinds of cultural values and 
norms that shape actors’ interpretations and understanding of events, con-
sequently influencing the choices actors make and the practices they em-
brace.  
Nonetheless, this study also established that more than political, eco-
nomic and moral considerations are at work in guiding actors’ motivations. 
At times, actors were motivated by a combination of political, economic 
and embedded values. The type and nature of the resources in play and 
the sector under study seem to have influenced actors’ choices and prac-
tices. This study demonstrates that an urgent need for water can hasten 
actors to display agency and pursue innovations. In such situations, both 
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economic considerations and moral responsibilities may be at work to pro-
pel actors to look for ways to prevent a crisis. A looming threat of water 
scarcity places a huge responsibility on water actors to ensure that the wa-
ter supply is reliable, available and that users receive water in sufficient 
quantities and quality.  
Such an account of actors’ motivations leads us to focus more on the 
enabling aspect of institutions, when it overrides the constraining aspect. 
That is, it directs our attention to what actors ultimately do to resolve the 
everyday challenges they face in maintaining and sustaining institutions, 
despite the constraints imposed by their immediate environment. This 
study found that the motivations of actors and their access to and control 
over resources determined the kinds of practices and strategies they em-
ployed. Factoring actor agency into our analysis of institutional change 
(see, e.g., Friedland and Alfred 1991: 254, Hay 2002, McAnulla 2005, Gid-
dens 1979, Leftwich 2010) thus helps us to understand reasons for actors’ 
choices and the practices they adopt to resolve implementation challenges 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Scott and Meyer 1994, Steinmo and Thelen 
1992). 
In sum, the empirical findings of this study provide additional evidence 
with respect to the role of actors and their capacity to influence and trans-
form institutional contexts. This study, however, suggests that the extent 
to which actors exhibit specific entrepreneurial characteristics is depend-
ent not only on the characteristics, motivations and resources at their dis-
posal, as suggested in the institutional entrepreneurship literature. Rather, 
the nature of the sector under study (e.g., the influence of biophysical 
characteristics and the nature and availability of water resources) directs 
institutional entrepreneurs’ choices and the strategies they adopt to resist 
or facilitate institutional change or to modify existing institutional arrange-
ments.  
8.3 Understanding processes of institutional change  
In view of the above empirical findings, can we conclude that translation, 
bricolage and entrepreneurship contribute towards understanding pro-
cesses of institutional change? Using the implementation of the NCWSP 
I have shown that institutional reforms in the water sector are slow and 
evolutionary in nature because of the presence of existing institutions and 
the lingering influence of past events. Yet, these institutions and resources 
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are more than just constraints; they also provide actors the means with 
which to frustrate, support and modify existing institutional arrangements, 
hence making institutional change gradual and path dependent.  
This study used the inter-related concepts of translation, bricolage and 
institutional entrepreneurship to comprehensively analyse the institutional 
change process. Findings from this study indicate that each concept on its 
own is inadequate to explain actors’ choices and preferences. By analysing 
these concepts holistically, this study has enhanced our knowledge of what 
informs actors’ choices and the reasons for differences in the practices 
they embrace. In other words, it enabled us to better account for differ-
ences between policies as they were developed and the way they were ac-
tually practiced upon implementation. This minimises the risk of substi-
tuting our own assumptions and interpretations of actors’ interests for 
those that actually motivate actors’ choices and practices. 
Elaborating on the concept of policy translation provides clarity on 
how and why actors translate policy differently. Consistent with the trans-
lation literature (Mukhtarov 2014, Whittle et al. 2010, Lendvai and Stubbs 
2007, Freeman 2007, Clarke 2008), I found that the multiplicity of actors, 
with their different ideologies, discourses, symbols and identities, is key in 
determining the extent to which actors resist or embrace new policy ideas.  
In translation, the emphasis is on actor agency, which illuminates or 
makes explicit the distinctions between policies and practices (Freeman 
2009). Notwithstanding the importance of actor agency in the translation 
process, the role of the motivations and logic behind actors’ choices and 
actions is not always apparent. In other words, the concept of translation 
does not provide clarity on why one kind of practice is invoked in one 
circumstance and a different kind of practice in another circumstance, de-
spite similar environmental conditions.  
The concepts of bricolage and institutional entrepreneurship direct our 
focus to actors and the motivations behind their choices and practices. 
Indeed, the current study found that actors’ capacity to display agency was 
not automatic but reliant on the presence of institutional entrepreneurs 
with command over resources with which to resist, renegotiate and enable 
institutional change (Beckert 1999, 2003; Kingdon 2002; Schneider and 
Teske 1992; Sheingate 2003; Helmsing 2016). 
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8.3.1 Towards explaining processes of institutional change:  
The role of actor agency  
The present study provides additional evidence concerning the role of ex-
isting institutions in constraining actors’ choices and preferences, hence 
making change evolutionary and incremental (Martin and Sunley 2006; 
Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996; Campbell 2004, 1997). 
Although evolutionists rely on the constraining aspects of institutions to 
explain change, they fail to establish how actors define their problems and 
interests and develop ideas about alternatives to institutional arrangements 
(Campbell 1997, 2004). In short, their accounts of institutional change ne-
glect to account for actor agency, though this is a key factor in processes 
of institutional change (Campbell 2004, 1997). 
In this study, I relied on the concepts of bricolage and institutional en-
trepreneurship to account for actor agency. Accounting for actor agency 
explained the gradual and continuous nature of institutions, with less focus 
on constraints. 
The concept of bricolage applied in my framework is indicative of why 
the outcome of institutional change is often gradual and continuous. Bri-
colage reveals change to be path dependent and evolutionary because ac-
tors are not only constrained by existing institutions, but also existing in-
stitutions provide the means that enable actors to achieve their ends 
(though this does not always apply to some actors, like traditional actors). 
In other words, existing institutions enable actors to resist or direct them 
towards a new path of institutional change. Change is path dependent be-
cause actors can only make use of resources and institutions within their 
reach and control, hence, directing change to look similar to past institu-
tions. Institutional change is gradual and continuous because actors com-
bine elements within their repertoire in creative bricolage to form new 
institutional arrangements which differ but have some resemblance to the 
old ones (see Douglas 1986: 66-68, Levi-Strauss 1966: 16-33, Veblen 1964: 
50-51, Campbell 2004). 
 The concept of bricolage highlights the importance of actor agency in 
processes of institutional change. Bricolage explains the enabling and con-
straining role of institutions. It hereby goes beyond the explanation that 
institutions change in a path-dependent manner which most evolutionists 
rely on to explain institutional change. Two of the best known illustrations 
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of the use of bricolage to explain the enabling and constraining nature of 
institutions were provided by Cleaver (2001) and Campbell (2005).  
Cleaver (2001) identified three ways by which institutional bricolage 
takes shape: (i) aggregation, defined as recombination of existing institu-
tions or socio-cultural institutions with newly introduced institutions; (ii) 
alteration, defined as improvising ad hoc new institutional arrangements 
by borrowing from both institutions to fit into a specific context; and (iii) 
articulation, defined as asserting identities and cultural values to resist im-
posed institutional design (Cleaver 2012, 2001, 2002; Cleaver, Dalton and 
De Koning 2015).  
Campbell (2004) distinguished two types of bricolage: substantive and 
symbolic. Substantive bricolage “involves the re-combination of already 
existing institutional principles and practices to address [challenges] and 
follows the logic of instrumentality”. Symbolic bricolage involves the re-
combination of symbolic principles and practices consistent with the dom-
inant normative and cognitive principles existing within the social envi-
ronment. This follows the logic of appropriateness, by which the 
recombined elements must be acceptable and legitimate (Campbell 2004: 
67-70). 
8.3.2 Bricolage and institutional entrepreneurship:  
Explaining actor agency  
The definitions of bricolage by these scholars, however, do not provide a 
clear understanding of when an actor’s innovation can be referred to as 
bricolage and when an activity should be viewed as a means for imple-
menters to resolve implementation challenges (institutional entrepreneur-
ship). Campbell (2004) came close in differentiating between substantive 
and symbolic bricolage, as this distinction closely relates to the logic that 
informs actors’ choices and preferences. According to Campbell (2004), 
substantive bricolage aims to resolve institutional challenges, while sym-
bolic bricolage is concerned with the normative and cognitive principles 
dominant within the social environment. Campbell’s (2004) usage of bri-
colage, however, is applicable to higher level national actors in processes 
of policy formulation and implementation. He distinguished between bri-
colage and translation as follows: “Bricolage is recombination of old lo-
cally given ones [elements], translation on the other hand involves combi-
nation of new externally given elements received through diffusion as well 
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as old locally given ones inherited from the past” (Campbell 2004: 80). 
This distinction limits bricolage to only innovations or modifications of 
existing old practices. Translation then considers the possibility of actors 
looking in from outside an environment to innovate.  
Campbell’s (2004) description of symbolic and substantive bricolage 
does not clarify how actors set bricolage processes in motion. In other 
words, the outcome of a bricolage process is unclear, though Campbell 
(2004) identified the processes that qualify an activity as bricolage. It is 
important to note, however, that Campbell (2004) acknowledged this gap 
and called for longitudinal studies to enable the outcome of bricolage pro-
cesses to be better understood. This notwithstanding, he maintained that 
in the absence of longitudinal studies bricolage can be discerned in action 
by observing the everyday practices of change agents. 
Cleaver’s (2001) usage of bricolage focuses on innovations at the local 
level, when an existing local social context encounters external policies. 
Cleaver (2001) identified key characteristics of the bricolage process as 
follows: (i) responses to everyday challenges, (ii) choices of actors are mul-
tipurpose and dynamic and (iii) solutions to challenges are familiar and 
legitimate and also aligned with the worldviews and moral values of the 
change agent. However, the translation processes that account for the ac-
tions and practices of actors remain unclear in Cleaver’s (2001) conceptu-
alisation of bricolage.  
Cleaver’s (2001) conceptualisation pays closer attention to the pro-
cesses of bricolage than Campbell’s (2004) use of the terminology, which 
is more descriptive and emphasises the logic that informs an actor’s 
choices. Cleaver’s (2012, 2002) description of the processes provides a 
much better understanding of the outcome of institutional change pro-
cesses. Cleaver (2012, 2002) used the terms articulation, alteration and ag-
gregation to describe the way actors make their choices by combining dif-
ferent institutional elements from their repertoire and the outcome of 
these choices.  
As the policy implementation literature amply demonstrates, challenges 
in implementing policies is not new. In this regard, some scholars have 
pointed to the actions of street-level bureaucrats who change polices to 
suit local conditions. In that regard, Cleaver’s (2012, 2002) usage of alter-
ation and aggregation and Campbell’s (2004, 1997) substantive bricolage 
are little different from earlier arguments raised on the activities of street-
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level actors or bureaucrats (Lipsky and Bureaucracy 1980; Lipsky 1971, 
2010). 
Thus, while the bricolage concept can enhance our understanding of 
issues related to structure and agency, it does not offer a conceptual break-
through or theoretical innovation; nor does it settle fundamental questions 
about structure and agency (Bakir and Jarvis 2018). Bricolage, rather, re-
states the definition of policy and institutional entrepreneurs familiar from 
the institutional entrepreneurship literature. 
The forgoing leads this study to restrict bricolage only to actors’ capac-
ity to invoke community-embedded institutions to resist or promote insti-
tutional change. The focus on that capacity enabled us to posit explana-
tions of why actors did what they did and why practices differed despite 
similar local social institutional contexts.  
8.3.3 Institutional entrepreneurship in explaining actor agency  
The concept of institutional entrepreneurship bridges the gap between in-
stitutions and actors by focusing on how actors activate their agency, 
which contributes to our understanding of processes of institutional 
change (Hardy and Maguire 2008). In this study, I used the institutional 
entrepreneurship concept to provide explicit accounts of actors’ motiva-
tions and the resources they employed to modify or change institutional 
arrangements. Although actors had the capacity to frustrate or promote 
institutional change, their choices were not automatic. Existing institutions 
and actors’ command over resources determined what practices were 
deemed normatively acceptable and cognitively possible. The choices that 
actors ultimately made and the practices they embraced, as shown in this 
study, had to “fit in” socially with the norms and worldviews of the change 
agents and other interest groups.  
This focus on actors’ motivations and strategies and the resources ac-
tors employed provides a clear understanding of when actors’ activities 
qualify as bricolage and when activities are employed towards the resolu-
tion of implementation challenges. In addition, it provides insight into why 
actors adopted different practices despite similar environmental condi-
tions.  
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8.3.4 Understanding processes of institutional change:  
An approach to comparative institutional analysis  
In line with Maseland (2011), this study argued that the challenges in un-
derstanding processes of institutional change are not about theories or 
empirical evidence. Rather, they are methodological in nature. Meaningful 
comparisons require factors held in common across all cases. Compari-
sons overlooking differing conditions or contextual factors may reduce 
the internal and external validity of any findings generated.  
The findings from the current research indicate that certain common 
factors were at work which made change gradual. Among these factors are 
the social context, institutional capacity, knowledge and access to pro-
gramme information, the nature and physical characteristics of water re-
sources, and the support and commitment of leaders.  
The strength of this study lies in the methodological approach adopted 
in selection of the cases. “Most different” and “most similar” cases were 
used as the basis for determining what factors were common to all, thus 
enabling us to understand what processes account for actor agency.  
First, the analytical framework for this study, which employs an inter-
disciplinary lens to bring causal relationships into focus, allowed us to 
move beyond the theoretical and empirical evidence. The findings from 
this study demonstrate diversity in implementation, despite both similari-
ties and differences in institutional context. Herewith, the study provides 
additional evidence regarding the roles actors play in processes of institu-
tional change.  
Secondly, we were able to link a number of factors to actors’ choices 
and practices. The findings from this study point to a configuration or 
combination of factors that may explain why changes are persistent and 
representative of a process of bricolage (Cleaver 2012, 2002; Campbell 
2004, 1997), while in other circumstances, actors modified innovations 
to “fit their unique needs in time and space” (Whittle et al. 2010: 19).  
The current study’s employment of the concepts of translation, brico-
lage and institutional entrepreneurship contributes to existing knowledge 
on the role of institutions and resources in constraining and enabling actor 
agency. This reasserts the primacy of context and actor agency for under-
standing and analysing institutional and policy change. Although institu-
tions constrain actors’ ability to translate institutional changes, they also 
provide the means by which actors can exercise their agency. This study’s 
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unique contribution is that it traces further evidence to establish what fac-
tors motivate actors to do things differently. The motivations and logic 
behind actors’ actions legitimise institutional change and also enhance the 
durability and acceptance of the new practices introduced by change 
agents.  
This study suggests that actors’ responses to pressure for institutional 
change do not depend only on existing local social and environmental re-
sources available to institutional entrepreneurs. Actors’ motivations, logic 
and expectations play an important role in the selection process. Indeed, 
motivations, logic and expectations can promote or frustrate processes to 
enforce institutional change. This research additionally suggests that the 
presence of bricoleurs and institutional entrepreneurs and their command 
over resources play an important role in the choices that actors ultimately 
make and the strategies they employ. Drawing on the NCWSP, I showed 
why the institutional changes anticipated in the small town water sector in 
Ghana have been slow and path dependent. Little has been achieved in 
terms of stimulating collective ownership and responsibility for operations 
and maintenance or in accumulating resources for future upgrades and 
system expansions.  
Notwithstanding the above, it must be remarked that this study focused 
on water resources, and thus was limited in its representation of the nature 
of the water sector. The water sector is recognised as having particular 
characteristics in terms of institutional change, related to water rights, 
physical locations and territorial boundaries, to name just a few. As a re-
sult, generalisation of the current findings to other economic or public 
goods may be misleading.  
The primary contribution of this study is methodological. The em-
ployed method shed light on why the behaviour of actors may differ de-
spite similar contextual settings, and why behaviour may be similar despite 
differences in context. This study revealed institutional change to be a 
messy and complex process. Study of such a process requires an interdis-
ciplinary approach, drawing on the strengths of a variety of concepts and 
theories. Only with such a broad approach can we understand and appre-
ciate the factors held in common which direct the path of actors’ choices 
and practices.  
This study found the following interrelated factors to be key in driving 
institutional change: social context, institutional capacity, knowledge and 
access to programme information, the nature and physical characteristics 
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of the resources, the presence of external actors or networks, and the sup-
port and commitment of leaders. Despite the importance of these factors 
in driving change, the political, economic, moral and social interests of 
change agents were also important in determining actors’ choices and 
practices. In addition, the existence of institutional entrepreneurs or bri-
coleurs with command over resources determined the path and direction 
of change. The outcome of the institutional reform process was not the 
focus of the change agents. Rather, change agents made choices and em-
braced practices that were cognitively aligned with their interests, 
worldviews and values and were normatively acceptable.  
8.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the research 
The current study was not specifically designed to evaluate the outcome 
of institutional change processes. However, the survey conducted for this 
research found that the quality of water services was deteriorating in the 
case study communities (see appendix 14). Furthermore, activities to en-
sure the continued functionality of the water systems were not being en-
forced in most of the cases (see appendix 15). Demand for piped water 
has remained low in communities with alternative water sources, while 
water scarce communities have been unable to expand their water system 
to accommodate increased population and community expansion. An-
other important finding concerns the worrying financial position of the 
water systems, due to both a rising unit cost of production, as a result of 
low demand, and overstretched water facilities. However, this study could 
not establish the consequences of the actions of change agents towards 
collective participation and ownership of the water system.  
This study did find that implementation has been slow and path de-
pendent. The ideas of community management and community participa-
tion centre on empowerment of users to participate in water activities and 
hold water actors accountable. Although the current study is based on 
small sample, the findings suggest that water activities have been left to a 
few actors, while assurances of water service quality and continuous func-
tionality continue to diminish. The findings indicate that current activities 
are little different from the challenges encountered before, which 
prompted the institutional reforms. 
Nonetheless, the findings from this study are subject to some limita-
tions. First, this study draws on only six cases, which might prevent a fair 
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assessment of actors’ choices and preferences. In addition, actors’ re-
sponses to change did not always effectively bring about institutional or 
technological change. This study illustrates that understanding the pro-
cesses involved in finding solutions to water-related challenges cannot be 
achieved in a linear and straightforward fashion, but rather, involves lon-
gitudinal research. Moreover, although the framework of the current study 
sets out to explain institutional change processes, it may not be exhaustive. 
A way forward in this regard would be to undertake detailed anthropolog-
ical or longitudinal research. These paths could deepen understanding of 
actor agency beyond the current findings. That is, future research could 
look into an actor’s habit of thought to better understand constitutive fac-
tors that may be invisible and taken for granted but nonetheless form a 
core part of actors’ interpretations of events, informing their choices.  
Secondly, the nature and characteristics of the water sector make it dif-
ficult to apply a common study framework, such as the integrated water 
framework (Ostrom 2005), a collective action framework or an integrated 
development framework. The choices made among the different concepts 
used in our framework limited this study’s ability to engage in a detailed 
theoretical exercise. However, this study provides empirical contributions 
in relation to understanding the role of institutions in enabling actor 
agency despite existing environmental challenges. Discerning factors held 
in common in reference to actors’ motivations and the logic behind their 
actions enabled us to understand that actors’ reasons for engaging in in-
stitutional change are complex and hard to discern. Change is motivated 
by economic, political and social considerations. Actors’ motivations and 
logic coupled with the underlying institutional context and conditions de-
termined how actor interpreted phenomena, the choices they made and 
the practices they embraced.  
Thirdly, this study examined implementation at the local level with 
lesser focus on the influence of state and local government actors on the 
process of institutional change. Taking a more holistic approach, including 
these actors, could deepen our understanding of how change agents exer-
cise power in modifying or renegotiating given institutional arrangements. 
Change must be understood from both the state perspective (policy) and 
the community perspective (practice). Only if processes are analysed ho-
listically can the internal and external validity of our case findings be con-
firmed. My efforts to get state actors’ views were constrained by govern-
ment actors’ lack of availability during my fieldwork. In addition, frequent 
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staff transfers in state organisations is a major issue that further compli-
cates roles. In some cases, particularly cases 4 and 5, it proved challenging 
to even pinpoint the staff responsible for water activities. In the rest of 
the cases, some information was made available, which I used in my anal-
ysis to gain an overall picture of state actors’ roles in the process of change. 
In addition, my role as a senior development planning officer at the Ga 
South Municipal Assembly in Ghana enabled me to act as both an insider 
and an outsider to assess the implementation of institutional change. Fur-
thermore, state and local government actors have already received more 
attention than local level implementers in studies of public policies, de-
centralisation and public service provision.  
In view of the above, care should be taken in generalising the findings 
to other social, political and economic domains and academic disciplines. 
Bearing in mind this study’s limitations, water institutions, like any institu-
tion, were found to be subjective, path dependent, hierarchical and nested 
both structurally and spatially, and embedded within a social, cultural and 
political context, while also involving multiple actors. The choices made 
in case selection for the current research provided a strong methodological 
framework with which a number of combinational factors could be 
mapped to explain processes of institutional change. These factors 
demonstrate a logic of economic rationality, but are also informed by com-
munity-embedded institutions, which are often taken for granted.  
The research framework relies on several concepts (translation, brico-
lage and institutional entrepreneurship) to identify common factors ac-
counting for differences between policy and practice. Combining insights 
from several disciplines provided additional evidence to show that institu-
tions create stable expectations and practices which constrain actors’ 
choices. However, the stability of institutions hinges on actors’ motiva-
tions and expectations, which inform the choices that actors make and the 
practices they employ; and it is these that determine the path that an insti-
tutional change process takes.  
8.5  Further research: Understanding actors’ motivations 
and logic 
A number of conceptual issues have been raised as key in matching actors’ 
actions with their own best interests or the collective good. As shown by 
many studies, including this one, understanding the role of actors and their 
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agency facilitates our view of processes of institutional change. More re-
search is therefore required to determine the efficacy of the motivations 
and logic behind actors’ choices and practices, especially in translating and 
implementing institutional change.  
Community-embedded institutions are part of the repertoire of institu-
tions; they constrain actor agency while at the same time enabling institu-
tional entrepreneurs to exhibit agency. Community-embedded institutions 
are socially constructed based on individual and group interpretations of 
a particular setting. Hence, they are a key determinant of actors’ behaviour. 
This brings us to the notion of “habit” as a key determinant in institution 
formation. Institutions emerge from habits of thought and actions in the 
social domain, which are the outcomes of habits of life. According to Veb-
len, (1899) institutional change should be understood as a product of hu-
man nature. Habits, according to him, are durable mechanisms that sustain 
institutions and enable individuals to make decisions and act in particular 
ways (Chavance 2009). 
Revisiting the notion of “habit” is therefore essential to deepen our 
understanding of the motivations and logic behind actor agency. Scholars 
such as the old institutional economists (e.g., Thorstein Veblen, John 
Commons and Wesely Mitchell) and the pragmatist philosophers (e.g., 
William James and John Dewey) provide a number of studies on habit. 
According to these, institutions work only because the rules involved are 
embedded in shared habits of thought and behaviour. People choose to 
follow rules repeatedly because the rules are embedded and emerge from 
social structures rooted in commonly held habits or thoughts. Based on 
this notion, institutions can be understood as conditioned by and depend-
ent on individuals and their habits but not reducible to them (Hodgson 
2003).  
The capacity of institutions to mould our preferences and purposes, 
and to change individuals’ aspirations, stems from the concept of habits 
(habits help determine our preferences and dispositions). When new hab-
its are acquired or existing habits change, our preferences alter. Under-
standing actors’ habits of thought also allows us to identify the reasons 
behind their choices and practices. This in turn provides a more informed 
understanding of actor agency and limits errors of attributing wrong cau-
salities to actors’ choices and practices in a given context.  
In this analysis, we observed that processes of change were not linear 
but messy, involving different actors with varying power and relationships. 
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The efficiency of actors’ choices and practices in steering the outcomes of 
implementation has, however, received limited attention. We need further 
evidence to evaluate the relevance of institutional reforms and understand 
what works at the ground level. It is only by engaging in more comparative 
institutional analysis that we will we be able to identify structured combi-
nations of factors that allow us to discern actors’ motivations and the 
choices they make in directing paths of institutional change.  
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Composition and procedure for formation of water and sanitation  
management team  
1. A Management Team shall consist of not less than ten and not more than 
fifteen elected members, at least one-third of whom are women and at least one-
third of whom are representatives of the Assembly or Unit Committees.  
2. Subject to paragraph 1, the assembly shall determine the total number of mem-
bers of each Management Team based on the number of constituencies that exist 
in the area covered by the Management Team.  
3. The members of the Management Team shall be elected from representative 
constituencies.  
4. A constituency shall determine its own electoral procedure.  
5. The electoral procedure shall be facilitated by the District Water and Sanitation 
Management Team.  
6. For the purpose of election, a representative constituency shall include:  
(a) water and sanitation committees established in designated neighbourhoods of 
the area or community;  
(b) the elected Assembly members of the community;  
(c) the Unit Committee members of the community;  
(d) water user groups;  
(f) a representative of the traditional authority, except that the chief of the com-
munity is not eligible for election to the Management Team.  
 
For the purpose of this schedule,  
“a water and sanitation committee” means a management team for a community 
which has a borehole with a hand pump as a water supply facility;  
“connection fee” means a fee paid upfront for directly piped connection of water 
to a house, institution or other property excluding the cost of material and labour; 
and  
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“constituency” means a section of a community or identifiable group of people 
that have a common interest in the water facility (CWSA LI 2007). 
Appendix 2 
Water supply project cycle (NCWSP) 
Project promotion: under this phase state actors are to sensitise and create 
awareness of the project within proposed beneficiary communities. This stage 
ensures that community members have knowledge of the overall reforms and 
expected activities to be undertaken by the community to enable participation in 
the project.  
 
Community development stage  
Application stage: This is followed by community members initiating the desire 
to have a water system. The community initiates the process through holding a 
community meeting facilitated by opinion leaders in the community. The com-
munity unanimously accepts the offer by formally applying for a water facility. 
The discussions at this stage are to ensure that (a) all sections of the community 
are part of the decision-making processes; (b) deliberations are undertaken on 
fundraising strategy to pay the counterpart funding; and (c) choices are made 
among the technological options applicable to the community. 
Community selection: After the application stage the participating communi-
ties are selected to benefit from the water project based on the following criteria:  
▪ level of poverty in the community  
▪ existing water facilities and conditions in relation to distance and prox-
imity 
▪ water coverage  
▪ incidence of water-related diseases  
▪ performance of existing community-based organisations  
▪ number of self-help project completed in the last five years  
▪ evidence of bank statement showing initial deposit of counterpart fund-
ing  
 
Construction, supervision and community development stage: Both the 
construction of the facility and community development and mobilisation are 
carried out simultaneously. Activities outlined at this stage include the following:  
▪ community sensitisation of the project 
▪ formation and training of water and sanitation committees (WATSAN) 
and water and sanitation management team (WSMT) 
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▪ mobilising community to raise funds towards the operations and man-
agement of the facility  
▪ support for the community to undertake participatory planning to deter-
mine the position of standpipes, identification of sources of water, se-
lection of management options for the operations and management of 
the system 
 
Post-construction stage: Activities under this stage include: 
▪ monitoring and coordination of the activities of water and sanitation man-
agement team and operating staff by the DAs  
▪ ensuring that the community, water and sanitation management teams and 
operating staff have all the relevant information and training with regard 
the operations and maintenance of the water system 
▪ reviewing management reports from water and sanitation management 
teams and taking appropriate and corrective actions  
▪ providing information and linkages to relevant stakeholders to assist in 
ensuring sustainability of the system 
▪ approving tariffs  
▪ conducting technical, physical, social and financial auditing of the water 
system  
▪ ensuring that beneficiary communities have in place and have adopted a 
by laws  
 
Post Project: The CWSA shall provide relevant post-project support (up to one 
year) to beneficiary communities to promote achievement of system sustainabil-
ity 
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Appendix 3 
General Principles 
Small Town Water Supply Systems shall be operated and maintained in Sustain-
able manner by meeting the following requirements: 
a. Delivering to consumers the design quantity of water. 
b. Producing water to Ghana Standards Board Water Quality Standards. 
c. Delivery of water in a cost-effective manner (in accordance with tariff guide-
lines). 
d. Delivering water in a virtually uninterrupted manner (at least 95% of the time). 
e. Planned routine and periodic maintenance are carried out for all electrome-
chanical equipment and civil works structures. 
2. Water Supply Systems shall be operated and maintained either directly by the 
community or through contractual arrangements with private companies. 
3. All operational staff of private companies or community members engaged to 
operate and maintain the systems shall be provided with adequate training and 
shall be certified to perform their respective duties. Periodic refresher training 
shall be provided to such staff. 
4. Adequate records shall be kept in the operation and maintenance of the water 
supply system for analysis, reporting and informed decision-making (Operations 
and maintenance guidelines 2010)  
Appendix 4 
Basic requirements for community water facility  
A person who designs a water facility for a community shall ensure that:  
(a) an individual in a served community has access to not less than twenty litres 
of water per day  
(b) the water facility or delivery point in the case of a piped scheme is located at 
a place which is within a walking distance of not more than five hundred meters 
from the farthest house in the community or a section of the community  
(c) the water facility provides safe water to the community throughout the year  
(d) the water facility design conforms to the design guidelines issued by the 
agency (Community water and sanitation Agency Regulation, 2011:5) 
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Appendix 5 
LI 2007 
A person who operates a piped water supply system shall ensure that the 
piped water supply system is maintained in a sustainable manner by 
(a) delivering the specified quantity of water to customers over the designed life 
of the piped water supply system  
(b) producing water in accordance with the water quality standard in these regu-
lations  
(c) delivering water in a cost effective manner  
(d) delivering water in a virtually uninterrupted manner, at least ninety-five per-
cent of the time  
(e) ensuring that routine and periodic maintenance is carried out for electro me-
chanical equipment and civil works structures, with minimum interruption of 
supply 
(f) ensuring that the management team is in accordance with the respective DA’s 
by laws  
(g) ensuring that the source of water supply is protected from the risk of con-
tamination  
(h) ensuring that operational hazards are avoided. 
Appendix 6 
Roles and responsibilities of local water actors 
Type of actor Responsibility  Minimum qualification 
System manager  Responsible for the overall manage-
ment of staff 
Higher national diploma from 
technical programme 
 Operator  Carry out technical and routine 
maintenance and pumping water for 
distribution  
National vocational training 
institute in electrical or me-
chanical field (NVTI) 
Administrator /Finan-
cial clerk  
In charge of all administrative activi-
ties 
Ghana commercial examina-
tion stage II or RSA II 
Accountant  Review available financial records 
and prepare monthly financial re-
ports 
Higher national diploma in 
accounting (HND) 
Plumber  In charge of minor plumbing works   
Revenue collector Collect revenue from vendors and 
private users 
Senior secondary school 
certificate examination 
(SSCE) 
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Vendor Collect money at the standpipes and 
opening and closing the tap within 
the timeframe provided  
No qualification needed  
Water and sanitation 
management team 
(WSMT) and water 
and sanitation com-
mittee (WATSAN) 
 
Prepare and execute plans for provi-
sion of improved water supply facili-
ties 
Mobilise funds to pay for part of cap-
ital cost of the water project and to 
cover operations and maintenance 
works 
Set water tariffs 
Engage accredited laboratories to 
undertake periodic water quality 
tests in accordance with the Ghana 
Standards Board Standard/Water 
Safety Framework 
 Set application procedures, connec-
tion and reconnection fees for ser-
vice  
Ensure sustainability of water facili-
ties  
Collect technical data on manage-
ment of the water supply system 
Prepare financial records for opera-
tions and maintenance and provide 
records to the metropolitan, munici-
pal or district assembly and CWSA 
for inspection 
Audit financial records internally 
Present reports on management of 
water supply system twice yearly to 
the entire community (town) 
Monitor and coordinate activities of 
water personnel  
 
No qualification needed 
Appendix 7 
Components of water tariff (Regulations 4 and 5)  
1. Water production cost  
2. Distribution cost  
3. Routine maintenance and other contracts  
4. Repair work by staff and private maintenance contracts  
5. Water quality monitoring at plant level  
6. Tariff collection cost (vendors) (not more than 20% of the total tariff)  
7. Replacement cost (20% of the total sum of items 1 to 6)  
8. Rehabilitation and expansion (5% of the total sum of items 1 to 6)  
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9. Sanitation fund (8% of the total sum of items 1 to 6)  
10. Contingency (2% of the total sum of items 1 to 6) 
 
Appendix 8 
Tariff setting for individual and institutional customers  
(Regulation 19 (1)) 
Item Description Unit rate Gh₵ per 
cubic meter 
Actual amount of 
tariff Gh₵ 
Method of tariffs 
collection  
1 Individual  Standpipe tariff per 
cubic metre 
The volume of water 
consumed in cubic 
metres times the unit 
rate 
The pay-as-you-
fetch method at 
standpipes or 
pumps  
2 Non-com-
mercial cus-
tomer  
1.2 to 1.3 times the 
standpipe tariff per 
cubic metre 
The volume of water 
consumed in cubic 
metres times the unit 
rate 
Monthly billing for in-
dividuals 
3 Commercial 
customer 
1.4 to 1.5 times the 
standpipe tariff per 
cubic metre 
Volume of water 
consumed in cubic 
metres times the unit 
rate 
Monthly billing for in-
dividuals and organi-
sations  
Appendix 9 
Actors and their roles and responsibilities 
Actors  Roles and Responsibilities  
Development partners  Provide financial, technical and logistical support for the imple-
mentation of the NCSWP  
Participate in policy dialogues and lesson sharing, monitoring 
and evaluation  
Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment and Rural De-
velopment  
Formulate policies for governance and develop sector plans 
Provide management advisory services to the metropolitan, mu-
nicipal and district assemblies 
Ministry of Water Re-
sources, Works, and 
Housing (MWRWH) 
 
Water Directorate (es-
tablished within the 
MWRWH) 
Formulate strategies, mobilising resources, sector coordination, 
planning, evaluation and monitoring  
 
 
Coordinate the activities of Community Water and Sanitation 
Agency (CWSA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) and 
Water Resources Commission (WRC) 
Community Water and 
Sanitation Agency 
(Head Office) 
 
 
 
 
Recommend policy changes to the Ministry of Water Resources, 
Works and Housing and set strategies, procedures, guidelines 
and standards for water supply and sanitation interventions 
Assist metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies to source 
funds both nationally and internationally. 
Provide backup support to CWSA regional offices for monitoring 
and evaluation 
212 THE CASE OF SMALL TOWN WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS IN GHANA 
 
 
 
Regional Community 
Water and Sanitation 
Agency  
 
Disseminate sector policies and guidelines to all stakeholders 
 
Provide professional backup services to metropolitan, municipal 
and district assembly staff in all areas especially in the prepara-
tion and review of District Water and Sanitation Plans (DWSPs) 
Monitor progress of the project cycle 
Enhance sector capacity building through provision of training 
opportunities to stakeholders at local, regional and national level 
Monitor the effectiveness of national policies and CWSA guide-
lines and standards and recommend review where necessary 
Facilitate water safety monitoring in accordance with the Water 
Safety Framework and ensure the required actions are imple-
mented (Sector guidelines – general, Rural Communities & 
Small Towns, 2014:5) 
Metropolitan, municipal 
and district assemblies/ 
works departments  
 
 
 
Prepare District Water and Sanitation Plans in line with medium-
term goals of the assembly 
Monitor operate and maintain systems in terms of financial, tech-
nical 
and administrative performance 
Monitor the water safety of all water systems in the district in ac-
cordance with the Water Safety Framework 
Audit WSDB and WATSAN accounts 
Review and approve community tariffs in accordance with oper-
ations and maintenance guidelines 
Approve by laws for the operation of WSDBs and WATSANs 
Provide technical approval for WSDB plans (extensions etc.) 
Disseminate information on water supply, sanitation, and hy-
giene promotion 
Support district works departments to provide technical support 
to WSDBs and WATSANs 
Manage and monitor contracts at the district level (Sector guide-
lines – general, Rural Communities & Small Towns, 2014:6) 
Water and sanitation 
management team 
(WSMT) and water and 
sanitation committee 
(WATSAN) 
 
Prepare and execute plans for provision of improved water sup-
ply facilities 
Mobilise funds to pay for operations and maintenance costs 
Set water tariffs 
Engage accredited laboratories to undertake periodic water 
quality tests in accordance with the Ghana Standards Board 
Standard/Water Safety Framework 
Set application procedures, connection and reconnection fees 
for service connections 
Ensure sustainability of water facilities  
Collect technical data on management of the water supply sys-
tem 
Prepare financial records for operations and maintenance and 
provide records to metropolitan, municipal and district assem-
blies and CWSA for inspection 
Audit financial records internally 
Present reports on management of water supply system twice 
yearly to the entire community (town) 
Water personnel  Carry out the overall management of the water systems 
Carry out technical and routine maintenance  
Review financial records and prepare monthly financial report 
Collect revenue  
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  Collect money at standpipes  
Manage all administrative activities 
Technical assistance /  
partner organisation  
 
 
 
Contractors/suppliers 
and distributors  
 
Area mechanics and pri-
vate firms  
Draw up feasibility studies and designs  
Evaluate bids and supervise construction, hydrogeological ser-
vices, training, community mobilisation and hygiene and sanita-
tion promotion 
 
Carry out construction (drilling and civil works) 
Supply and install equipment, spare parts 
 
Provide repair and maintenance services  
Community  Express demand for services, including technology preferences 
and level of services  
Pay for services provided  
Register complaints when services do not meet minimum stand-
ards  
Demand accountability from service providers  
Monitor operations and maintenance activities of service provid-
ers (District Operational Manual, 2014). 
Private water operators  Operate and maintain water supply infrastructures, including 
electrical/mechanical equipment, hand pumps, etc. 
Manage and operate water supply schemes 
Appendix 10 
Operational management guidelines  
There shall be four main options for management operations and maintenance 
of water supply systems. 
 
Option 1: The community, through its water and sanitation management teams 
and employees, operates and maintains the Water Supply System entirely by itself 
(non-mechanised systems e.g. gravity water schemes). A trained Manager, Oper-
ator, and Financial/Administrative staff shall be employed by the community to 
carry out daily operation and maintenance activities. They shall be supported by 
skilled artisans, e.g. plumbers and masons, from within the community whose 
services may be procured when necessary on a retainer basis. 
 
Option 2: The community, through its water and sanitation management teams 
engages staff for the daily operation (financial, administrative, technical) and 
maintenance and calls a certified/reputable firm to carry out specialized tech-
nical, financial or administrative functions as and when needed. Such functions 
may include the preparation of financial reports, internal auditing or some aspects 
of planned maintenance. 
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Option 3: The community, through its water and sanitation management teams 
engages staff for the daily operation (financial, administrative, technical) and 
maintenance and signs a contract with a firm or firms to perform other special-
ized technical, financial or administrative functions on a periodic basis. Such 
functions may include the preparation of financial reports, internal auditing or 
routine/preventive maintenance. 
 
Option 4: The community, through its water and sanitation management teams 
contracts a firm to completely operate and maintain the Water Supply System 
including meter reading, billing and revenue collection, etc., for an agreed fee. 
This arrangement enables the water and sanitation management teams to set per-
formance standards for a set period of time. 
 
Other management options may be adopted where necessary. Each water and 
sanitation management teams, in consultation with the community CWSA and 
DA’S must decide on the management option to be adopted. The choice of the 
option depends on the following; 
▪ The complexity of the Water Supply System; 
▪ The quantity of water being produced/Number of people served; 
▪ The availability of private firms to provide the relevant services required; 
▪ The socio-economic status and heterogeneity status of the community, 
and 
▪ The interest and commitment of the community towards operational 
management of 
▪ the system, etc. 
 
Generally, the following guidelines shall apply: 
1. Communities with up to 5,000 people served with non-mechanised systems 
(e.g. gravity water schemes) may adopt Option 1, provided they are interested 
and committed to the operational management of the Water Supply Systems 
themselves. 
2. Communities of 5,001 – 10,000 people served with simple boreholes, gravity 
or slow sand filtration based piped systems may adopt Option 2 or preferably 
Option 3 to ensure the sustainability of mechanized systems and reduce the re-
pair cost. 
3. Communities with populations of above 10,000, and/or communities served 
with complex Water Supply Systems shall adopt Option 4 (Small Town Sector 
and maintenance Guidelines 2010:2-4). 
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Appendix 11 
Population and water resources of cases 
Case  Population PSP PC HDW BH DAM STREAM MBH IC 
1a 2,012 5 27 13 2(NF) 0 1 0  
1b 1,649 3 12 1 2 0 1 0  
2 2,491 6 21 12 3(NF) 0 1 0  
3 13,800 26 450 8 3 0 10 0 3 
4 10,137 16 125 50 2 0 0 0 1 
5 11,173 20 33 0 10 2 0 1 2 
6 15,581 47 42 0 4 3 0 3 6 
 
PSP = Public standpipe, PC = Private connection, HDW =Hand-dug well, BH=Bore hole  
MBH= Mechanised bore hole, IC= Institutional connection 
NF =Not functioning  
Appendix 12 
Water and sanitation team educational qualifications and training received  
Case  Name Position Educational  
Qualification 
Training 
received 
Case 1  J.K Owusu Chairman MSLC Yes 
 James B. K Juser Secretary MSLC Yes 
 Mary Tawiah Treasurer MSLC Yes 
 Mohammed Sagoe Vice Chairman O level Yes 
 Kwame Odartey Vice Secretary O level Yes 
 Nana Abaidoo Technical-Coordinator MSLC Yes 
 Grace Nyarkoh Women user Organiser MSLC Yes 
 Margaret Amaoh Hygiene and Sanitation 
and women Organiser 
MSLC Yes 
 John Ampoong Chief Representative MSLC Yes 
 Amoo Nyarko Assembly member MSLC Yes 
 Kofi Heinsen Assembly Member MSLC Yes 
     
Case 2 Benoni Cole Chairman MSLC No 
 Bismark Intsiful Secretary MSLC No 
 Esther Manso Treasure Nil No 
     
Case 3  Emmanuel G. Apaw Chairman Diploma in Education No 
 Simon Antwi Treasurer Information  
Technology 
No 
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 Atta Bright Secretary Degree Finance No 
 Kofi O. Agyemang Member Banking No 
 Benjamin Agyemang Member Degree (Education) No 
 Ebenezer Bempah Member Degree No 
 Abraham Yeboah Member Diploma Education No 
 Samuel Kyeremateng Member Electrician No 
 Sefah Kwame Asiedu Member MSLC No 
 Hannah Apau Member MSLC No 
 Boah George Member MSLC No 
 Eric Brobbey Member MSLC No 
 Dora Ahenkora Member MSLC No 
 Nana Kofi Adu II Member MSLC No 
 Kwabena Sarpong  O level No 
     
Case 4 Frimpong Manso Chairman Diploma No 
 Danso Stephen Technical Degree No 
 Agyemang Isaac Secretary Degree No 
 Appiah Kasagyen Member Diploma in Theology No 
 Kasmas Kyezia Member Degree No 
 Ahenkra Matison Member Diploma No 
 Afareb System manager/manager Diploma No 
 Agyekum Rebecca Member MSLC No 
 Metaa Baba Member Nil No 
 Nana Kwame Afrifa Member MSLC No 
     
Case 5  Henry Kumah Chairman Agric Extension Officer Yes 
 N.K Godwin Secretary Diploma in Education Yes 
 Alhaji Issah Vice Chairman Nil No 
 Bekirite Hanna Vice Secretary SSCE No 
 Badakbu Npong Financial Secretary Nil No 
 Koyatibe Moses Treasurer Nil No 
 Akua Gmakanyi Member Nil No 
 Alhaji Inusah Member Nil No 
 Godfrey Napari Member Diploma in Education  
Case 6 Ibrahim Yakubu Chairman O level Yes 
 Yakubu Azara Vice Chairman Nil Yes 
 Adam Bawa Secretary Nil Yes 
 Abukari Marima Treasurer Nil Yes 
 Alhassan Ramatu Organiser do No 
 Alhasan Dukuruga Vice Organiser do No 
 Adam Gado Chief rep do No 
 Mahama Azara Member do No 
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 Ibrahim Abdulai do do No 
 Abukari Abiba do do No 
 Zilim Alhassan do do No 
 Abukari Adam do do No 
 Yusif A. Rahaman Assembly member rep SSCE No 
 
Appendix 13 
Water personal and qualifications 
 
 
 
System manager 
Qualification 
Opera-
tor/Plumber 
qualification 
Administrator /Ac-
countant (Qualifi-
cation) 
Revenue Collector 
(qualification) 
Security 
Officers 
Total # of  
Vendor 
Case 
1 
Position filled 
(1) 
City and guilds 
Electrical  
Plumbing   General Certifi-
cate in Education 
‘Ordinary Level’ 
(‘O’ level) 
Position vacant   6 
Case 
2 
Position Vacant 
(finance officer 
acting in that ca-
pacity) 
Middle Level 
School certifi-
cate (MLSC) 
Ghana Commer-
cial Examination 
Certificate /RSA 
III 
Position vacant   6 
Case 
3  
Position Vacant 
(finance officer 
acting in that ca-
pacity) 
Position filled 
(2) 
Both staff have 
qualification in 
NVTI (mechan-
ical) 
Position filled (1) 
HND in account-
ing  
Position filled (1) 
General Certifi-
cate in Education 
‘Ordinary Level’  
Position 
filled (2) 
26 
Case 
4  
 ‘O’ level  ‘O’ level  Senior Second-
ary School Certif-
icate Examination 
(SSCE) 
 14 
Case 
5 
London City and 
Guilds 
Hand pump 
technician 
HND in account-
ing  
Junior High 
School  
 27 have 
been 
sacked  
Case 
6 
Position vacant  SSCE HND in account-
ing  
SSCE (Two Col-
lectors) 
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Appendix 14 
Results of survey on quality of water services (% of user respondents)  
Cas
es  
Distance to PSP  
(%) 
Quantity of water re-
ceived  
(20 litres a day) % 
Reliability of water 
(%) 
Quality of water  
(%) 
Good Indif-
ferent 
Poor Good Indif-
ferent 
Poor Good Indif-
ferent 
Poor Good Indif-
ferent 
Poor 
1a  59 18 23 67 33  50 43 7 30 57 13 
1b  75 25  80 15 5 55 45  60 40  
2  70 25 5 65 35  70 25 5 63 31 6 
3  64 15 21 38 21 41 35 25 40 26 19 45 
4  46 23 31 38 32 30 31 37 32 41 36 23 
5  70 15 15 44 18 38 34 30 36 95 3 2 
6  57 22 21 9 26 66 20 30 50 91 7 2 
 
Appendix 15 
Institutional arrangements to ensure continuous functionality  
of the water supply system 
Cases  1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6 
Routine maintenance conducted  Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Conduct water quality test Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Operational staff provided with 
training and refresher courses  
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Annual accounts are audited regu-
larly  
Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
*Each water system has the re-
quired financial account  
Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
Quarterly report sent to DA  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Public durbar held once a year  Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
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